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I. INTRODUCTION 
Leaders frequently disappoint their followers. Religious leaders, 
who purport to speak in the name of God and who address our 
deepest longings and fears, are unusually vulnerable to this 
phenomenon. Humans, deeply aware of their own fallibility, will 
often project unreasonable expectations of perfection upon those 
who hold authority in communities of faith. The resulting tendency 
to disappoint is amplified in our own time and place, in which the 
ubiquitous mass media endlessly parade the flaws, foibles, and faux 
pas of the prominent. 
Even if the world were more generous and forgiving towards 
those in leadership, however, recent events and disclosures would 
still have produced a massive decline in the status of clergy and those 
who supervise them. Episodes of sexual exploitation and other 
4LUP-FIN 12/2/2004 12:35 PM 
1789] Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity 
 1791 
 
breaches of trust by members of the clergy are epidemic.1 The scale 
of betrayal represented by these stories is more massive than most 
people can absorb. The tales are deeply aggravated by the follow-up 
accounts of religious supervisors who, having learned of such 
malfeasance, failed to take the proper steps to prevent recurrence.2 
The combination of misbehaving clergy and irresponsible supervision 
has widely expanded the scope of harms committed, the sheer 
number of victims, and the public outrage that has ensued. 
Much, but by no means all, of this story has involved the sexual 
exploitation of children, which of course has accentuated the public’s 
anger and sense of betrayal. The nationwide scandal involving the 
Roman Catholic Church, the wrongful behavior of some of its 
priests, and the repeat offenses facilitated by the conduct of those in 
its hierarchy of supervision have been deeply impressed upon the 
public consciousness.3 It will take several generations, a clean record, 
and an abundance of good deeds for the Church of Rome in the 
U.S. to regain the full measure of its institutional reputation. 
 1. The best early source for the massive media coverage of the sexual abuse 
phenomenon by clergy of all faiths is the archive of stories published throughout 2002 and 
2003, which is maintained by The Poynter Institute. See http://poynter.org/ 
column.asp?id=46. For stories published after January 1, 2004, see the archive maintained by 
the National Catholic Reporter, at http://www.ncrnews.org/abuse. For a detailed assessment 
of the media reports of sexual abuse and misconduct in the Catholic Church through 2002, 
see Catholics for a Free Choice, Sexual Abuse & Misconduct in the Catholic Church: Selected 
Cases from Media Reports Through 2002, at http://www.bishopswatch.org/New/ 
SexAbuseChart.htm. 
 2. The story of supervisory failure is told in the most detail in the reports of the 
prosecutors who have considered indicting such supervisors. See, e.g., THOMAS F. REILLY, THE 
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON: A 
REPORT BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2003) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT]. 
Additional reports from New Hampshire and Suffolk County, NY, are cited in note 11 and 
Part III.C. 
 3. In addition to the sources cited in notes 1–2, see PETER STEINFELS, A PEOPLE 
ADRIFT: THE CRISIS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN AMERICA (2003). See also 
CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE: OUT OF THE SHADOWS: A 
SHADOW REPORT ON THE HOLY SEE AND THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
(2002), available at http://www.bishopswatch.org/Links/May_Shadow_report.pdf. A recent 
survey by the National Review Board, a panel of lay Catholics commissioned by the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, reports that nearly 4,500 Catholic priests—slightly under ten 
percent of those who have served as priests—have been accused of sexual misconduct over the 
past fifty years. Alan Cooperman, Nearly 4500 Priests Accused of Abuse, Draft Report Finds, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2004, at A2. A thorough account of the church hierarchy’s response to 
the scandal appears in Raymond C. O’Brien, Clergy, Sex and the American Way, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 363 (2004). 
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The legal fallout from the scandal of the Catholic Church may be 
even more widespread and enduring than the religious 
consequences.4 Priests have gone to prison for lengthy terms.5 Many 
courts have upheld tort claims against dioceses and their officers,6 
and First Amendment defenses once thought likely to insulate 
defendants against such claims have been aggressively advanced and 
explicitly rejected.7 Churches have had to sell substantial properties 
to pay out many millions of dollars in legal settlements.8 Several 
Catholic dioceses have filed for reorganization in bankruptcy to 
protect their assets against potential judgment creditors, whose 
 4. For predictions and concerns about that fallout, see Mark E. Chopko, Shaping the 
Church: Overcoming the Twin Challenges of Secularization and Scandal (Jan. 15, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (article based on the Brendan Brown 
Lecture at the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America). Mr. Chopko is 
General Counsel for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Id. at 125. 
 5. For details of such incarcerations, see Catholics for a Free Choice, supra note 1. 
John Geoghan, one of the more notorious of the abusers in the Archdiocese of Boston, was 
recently murdered in prison while serving a nine- to ten-year sentence for sexually assaulting 
minors. Richard Nangle & Kathleen A. Shaw, Geoghan is Killed in Prison, SHIRLEY (MA) 
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2003, at A1, available at http://poynter.org/ 
column.asp?id=46&aid=45500. Until recently, Catholic bishops had escaped indictment in 
these scandals. See Alan Cooperman, Bishops Have Eluded Sex Abuse Indictments; Experts Cite 
Hurdles for Prosecuting Those Who Did Not Sop Others’ Crimes, WASH. POST, June 4, 2003, at 
A2. In September, 2004, however, a Massachusetts district attorney announced the indictment 
of former Bishop Thomas Dupre of Springfield on charges of child sexual assault. The district 
attorney also announced that he could not pursue the indictment because the statute of 
limitations had run. See Adam Garlick, Former Springfield Bishop Avoids Prosecution on Sex 
Charges, PORTSMOUTH HERALD, Sept. 28, 2004, available at http://www.seacoastonline. 
com/news/09282004/south_of/40083.htm.  
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The Archdiocese of Boston has recently settled a group of such lawsuits for a total of 
eighty-five million dollars and is financing the settlement in part with proceeds from selling the 
estate that has long housed the city’s Catholic cardinals. See, e.g., Michael Paulson & Steve 
Bailey, BC Eyes Archdiocese Land; Loans for Church Seen, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2003, at 
A1, available at http://poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=56645; see also Todd Ruger, 
Diocese Settlement Totals $9M, QUAD CITY TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004 (reporting on settlement in 
Davenport, Iowa); Nancy Meersman, Diocese Agrees to Pay 6.5 Million, UNION LEADER 
SUNDAY NEWS, May 23, 2003, at A1 (reporting on a settlement in Manchester, NH); Diocese 
to Pay Out $7 Million, at http://www.your.lawyer.com/practice/news.htm?story_ 
id=82568.topic=clergy%20Abuse (reporting a settlement of sex abuse claims by the Diocese of 
Springfield, Massachusetts); Judge Approves $25.7 Million Archdiocese Settlement to Abuse 
Victims, WAVE, Aug. 1, 2003, available at http://www.poynter.org/ 
column.asp?id=46&aid=43394; Diocese to Pay $21 Million for Sex Abuse, NEW HAVEN 
REGISTER, Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=46& 
aid=51674; Archdiocese Settles 15 Sex Abuse Claims for $8 Million, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 3, 
2003, at 8, available at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=50096. 
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claims will arise from incidents of sexual misconduct.9 In several 
jurisdictions, prosecutors have impaneled grand juries to investigate 
the possibility of criminal wrongdoing by church leaders.10 Although 
prosecutors have yet to bring charges for criminally neglectful or 
otherwise culpable supervision, they have filed public reports that 
suggest criminal behavior of this sort has occurred,11 and settlements 
between prosecutors and religious entities have included terms that 
deeply involve the state in the process of clergy supervision.12 
The problems of sexual exploitation and supervisory failure, 
however, are not limited to the Roman Catholic Church,13 nor are 
 9. Susan Chandler, Oregon Archdiocese Takes a Page from Corporate Playbook; 
Bankruptcy Filing may Fend off Big Losses in Sex-Abuse Claims, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 1, 2004, 
at 1; Michell Kann, Tucson Diocese Files for Bankruptcy Protection, YUMA SUN, Sept. 21, 2004, 
available at http://sun.yumasun.com/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/7/13272. See also 
Spokane Diocese May File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A13, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/01/national/01priests.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Suffolk County Supreme Court Special Grand Jury, May 6, 2002, Grand 
Jury Report CPL § 190.85(1)(C) (transcript released Jan. 17, 2003). 
 11. See PETER W. HEED ET AL., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE DIOCESE OF 
MANCHESTER (NH), March 3, 2003 (Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General) 
[hereinafter NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT]; MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2. 
 12. Such agreements have been reached in Phoenix, Arizona; Cincinnati, Ohio; and 
Manchester, New Hampshire. See Archdiocese’s Plea Deal, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 21, 
2003, available at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=55370; NH AG, Bishop 
Cut a Deal to End Criminal Probe, UNION LEADER, (Dec. 10, 2002), 
http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=12713. The text of the New Hampshire 
settlement agreement can be found at: http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id= 
46&aid=12908, UNION LEADER (Dec. 11, 2002). The text of the Phoenix agreement can be 
found at http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=46&aid=36071, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (June 
2, 2003). We discuss the First Amendment questions raised by such agreements in Part III. 
 13. Although the problems of the Catholic Church have dominated the news, the 
general phenomenon of sexual abuse by clergy is by no means limited to that faith community. 
See, e.g., Michael Paulson, All Faiths Question Handling of Abuse: Debate over Celibacy as 
Factor Is Rancorous, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2002, at A1, available at 
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/031302_abuse.htm (referring to 
sexual abuse by clergy in many faiths, including Hare Krishna, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roman 
Catholic Church, United Church of Christ, Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, Unitarian 
Universalist Association, American Baptists Churches of Massachusetts, Greek Orthodox 
Diocese of Massachusetts, and Orthodox Judaism); see also Julie Weiner, Sexual Abuse Case 
Broke Down Barriers, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS, Aug. 23, 2001 (reporting on the pattern of 
molestation of teenage girls by an Orthodox Jewish rabbi); Stephanie Saul, A ‘Crisis’ for Jewish 
Leaders; Struggling with Allegations Against Rabbis of Sex Abuse, NEWSDAY, May 27, 2003, at 
A5; Elizabeth Neff, Mom: Bishop Knew of Pedophile, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Sept. 6, 2001, at 
B1, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/882147/posts (reporting a 
$3 million settlement against the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“Church of Jesus 
Christ”)); Marion Smith, Blame the Victim: Hushing Mormon Sexual Abuse, Apr. 10, 1996, at 
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the problems limited to sexual assaults on minors. Relationships 
between clergy-counselors and adult parishioners have spawned a 
large number of legally actionable sexual abuse claims involving a 
wide variety of religious denominations.14 Plaintiffs in these cases 
have asserted a range of theories of tort liability, including 
professional malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of 
the clergy-counselor. The same claims have been pressed up the 
chain of supervisory responsibility within religious denominations, 
and plaintiffs have asserted that supervisors in these circumstances 
have committed tortious acts of negligent training, supervision, 
retention, and assignment of clergy, as well as breaches of fiduciary 
duty.15 
The cases in which an adult is the victim have received less public 
attention than those involving children, and they typically do not 
raise the specter of criminal law violations. Nevertheless, these cases 
do raise problems concerning the collision between tort law and the 
First Amendment immunities of clergy, denominational supervisors, 
and religious entities themselves. Indeed, because the cases brought 
by adult victims rarely involve violations of criminal law, they present 
the most difficult constitutional questions. Because the public 
interest in clergy behavior is weaker in cases involving consenting 
adults than in cases involving children, state intervention in the 
affairs of religious organizations is harder to justify in the adult cases. 
Here too, however, the past several decades have witnessed a quite 
remarkable trend away from recognition of First Amendment 
defenses and a judicial willingness to impose liability upon clergy—
and their supervisors—at least as broad as the liability imposed upon 
analogous secular enterprises.16 
www.affirmation.org/news/1996_05.asp (describing series of abuse cases and the failure of 
the Church of Jesus Christ’s authorities to take proper action against the perpetrators). 
 14. We discuss such cases in Part IV.A. 
 15. In Part IV.B.1 we discuss cases in which victims of clergy misconduct assert that 
supervisors have breached fiduciary duties owed to such victims. 
 16. See discussion and cases cited infra Part III. In one additional (and less well-
publicized) context, sexual misbehavior by members of the clergy has resulted in the erosion of 
an important and well-recognized legal immunity of religious institutions. For many years, the 
courts have recognized a “ministerial exception” to the law of employment discrimination and 
other features of the law governing the employment relation between church and clergy. See, 
e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 
553 (5th Cir. 1972). As we discuss in Part II, infra, such claims have been barred whenever 
adjudication of them would involve courts in superintending the evaluation of clergy 
performance by a faith community. Recently, however, several courts have recognized sexual 
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This paper will critically analyze the possibility and structure of 
First Amendment defenses to actions, both civil and criminal, arising 
out of sexual misconduct by members of the clergy. When faced with 
First Amendment defenses, most courts have, unfortunately, reacted 
in constitutionally unsophisticated ways. These courts have tended to 
either totally accept or completely reject claims of First Amendment 
immunity, and they frequently fail to ground either stance in a well-
reasoned account of the distinctive constitutional place of religious 
institutions. We think that such an account is available, and that it 
sheds considerable light on the problems addressed in this paper. As 
we explain below, the Establishment Clause imposes jurisdictional 
limits on courts’ authority to adjudicate issues of religious import, 
and the Free Exercise Clause imposes limits on laws or doctrines that 
single out religion for disfavored treatment.17 
This paper unpacks the significance of that pair of principles in a 
variety of contexts. The most important and complex situation we 
explore is the liability of a religious entity for misconduct by clergy 
over whom the entity has some authority. Because religious 
institutions are often the only party in a position to offer 
compensation, courts and juries experience great pressure to allow 
for institutional liability. That pressure is understandable, but an 
optimal legal arrangement should balance the concerns of the tort 
system that liability be fairly and efficiently placed, on the one hand, 
with the constitutional concerns regarding structural autonomy of 
religious institutions, on the other. We believe this balancing is best 
accomplished by limiting liability for supervisory wrongs to situations 
in which supervisors, with requisite authority to act, have actual 
knowledge of clergy propensity for wrongdoing, or in which such 
supervisors act in reckless disregard of the risks of such wrongdoing. 
A similar standard already reconciles tort considerations and First 
Amendment concerns in the law of libel, and we argue that a similar 
structure of reconciliation can operate successfully here. 
harassment as an exception to this immunity. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 
196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); 
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002). Sexual harassment claims, like tort claims 
against church leaders for misbehavior of clergy, may represent one more example of the 
erosion of ecclesiastical immunities under the pressure to make institutions account for sex-
related wrongdoing by their agents. 
 17.  See infra Parts II & III. 
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Setting up this argument requires some preparatory groundwork. 
Part II will trace the expansion of relevant theories of tort and 
criminal liability, and the waning of immunities—constitutional and 
statutory—that once applied to such actions. The legal developments 
associated with this trend include the general expansion of tort 
liability beyond primary wrongdoers to secondary actors and the 
enterprises for which they act; the erosion of charitable immunity 
once made broadly available by state law; and the changes in law 
triggered by heightened social awareness of the vulnerability of 
children, and of adults in counseling relationships, to sexual 
exploitation. The legal and cultural phenomena that animate these 
trends occur against the backdrop, which Part II also explores, of a 
comparable decline in the constitutional distinctiveness of religious 
institutions. This legally recognized loss of distinctiveness has 
facilitated the exposure of religious institutions to trends which 
otherwise might have bypassed these entities. 
Part III of the paper suggests a normative theory of the 
constitutional distinctiveness of religion and ties that theory to an 
Establishment Clause conception of ecclesiastical immunity.18 Most 
conceptions of such immunity represent assertions of the liberty of 
religious organizations and are grounded in the Constitution’s Free 
Exercise Clause. Our approach, however, is rooted in the 
Establishment Clause and proceeds from a vision of jurisdictional 
limits on civil government. As we articulate in Part III and elaborate 
in Part IV, the jurisdiction of civil government is limited to temporal 
matters—that is, government is constitutionally disabled from 
addressing or asserting control over ultimate questions. This basic 
precept undergirds the immunity of religious institutions in resolving 
internal disputes and in selecting and training their leaders. 
Part IV of the paper then brings the lessons of Part III to bear on 
the particular problems of sexual abuse by clergy, and the criminal 
and civil liability of secondary actors for such misconduct. Here we 
analyze the particulars of tort claims frequently advanced by 
plaintiffs, and we offer guidelines to courts and criminal prosecutors 
 18. For a broader conception of this immunity, see Kathleen A. Brady, Religious 
Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Carl 
H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious 
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Douglas Laycock, Towards A General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981). 
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faced with such claims concerning how best to reconcile the 
appropriate First Amendment norms with the theories of liability 
associated with clergy misconduct. 
Woven into the fabric of Part IV are three major themes. First, 
those who perpetrate sexual harms against children, or others who 
lack capacity to consent, have no claim of ecclesiastical immunity. 
Second, the religious status of persons and the religious character of 
institutions should not give rise to fiduciary duties as a matter of law. 
In applying the law of fiduciary duty, courts should take great care to 
avoid the imposition, by juries and others, of liability for breaches of 
duties that are distinctly religious. For example, some courts have 
used the image of the shepherd—drawn from the religious self-
understanding of pastors and congregations—to justify the 
imposition of fiduciary duties on such leaders and organizations, 
even though parallel secular leaders or organizations might not be 
subject to those same duties.19 The creation of such duties violates 
the constitutional prohibition on discrimination against religion as 
compared with analogous secular roles and entities. Third, 
adjudication of wrongful acts in the hiring and supervision of clergy 
must be conducted with sensitivity to constitutional concerns of 
both substance and process. The Establishment Clause forbids the 
state to use adjudication of tort claims as an instrument to effectively 
institute a system of licensure for clergy or to determine the structure 
of religious organizations. Borrowing from the law concerning First 
Amendment limitations on the tort liability of the press, we argue 
that liability of supervising institutions should be limited to cases 
involving an “intentional failure to supervise,” and the judicial 
processes should be tailored to maintain compliance with that 
standard. 
II. THE DECLINE OF ECCLESIASTICAL IMMUNITY 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a person sexually 
molested by someone acting on behalf of a religious organization 
would not have contemplated legal action against the religious 
organization and would not have been successful in such an action 
had she tried. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, 
a person who had suffered such an injury might well be a successful 
 19. See infra notes 113–62 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff in a suit against the wrongdoer, the ecclesiastical officials, 
and the religious entity in which the individual defendants served. 
How can we account for this dramatic change? As Professor 
Idleman has discussed, part of the answer rests in changing cultural 
norms.20 Members of religious communities have become 
increasingly willing to pursue legal claims against their religious 
community and its agents.21 Moreover, religious institutions, like 
many institutions, have seen their reputations decline, at least partly 
because of widely publicized scandals, both sexual and financial.22 
These cultural shifts have paralleled—and perhaps even 
fostered—legal changes that have dramatically increased the exposure 
of religious organizations to liability. First, a general decline in the 
doctrine of charitable immunity has made possible a wide array of 
tort claims against religious organizations. Under this doctrine, 
which held sway in American courts from the late nineteenth 
through the mid-twentieth centuries, nonprofit organizations were 
immune from liability for torts that they or their agents committed 
against beneficiaries of their services.23 By the early 1960s, charitable 
immunity was quickly eroding, especially with respect to medical 
malpractice claims against nonprofit hospitals.24 In most states, the 
 20. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional 
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 240–42 (2000). Professor Idleman’s article is the germinal work 
on the late twentieth-century trend to expand the tort liability of religious entities. 
 21. Id. at 241. 
 22. Id. at 242. 
 23. Janet Fairchild, Annotation, Tort Immunity of Nongovernmental Charities—Modern 
Status, 25 A.L.R.4th 517, 522–23 (1983). The doctrine of charitable immunity in American 
law originated out of court decisions applying two English cases, both of which had been 
overruled by the time of their adoption into American law. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 
20, 26–28 (1885); McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The doctrine was 
eventually adopted by nearly all American jurisdictions, either by judicial decision or statute. 
Charitable immunity rested on a number of policy grounds, including a notion of implied trust 
limiting the uses of the organization’s funds to its charitable purposes, and a theory that 
beneficiaries of such services implicitly waived their right to sue in tort over injuries suffered as 
a result of receiving the services. WILLIAM W. BASSETT, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
LAW §§ 7.2–.6 (2003). 
 24. Most state courts dealt with these claims by creating an exception to charitable 
immunity for injured beneficiaries who paid a fee for the charity’s services. See, e.g., Robertson 
v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 190 S.E. 432 (Ga. 1937); Morton v. Savannah 
Hosp., 96 S.E. 887, 888 (Ga. 1918) (holding that the only funds subject to tort judgments are 
those received from paying patients); Bougon v. Volunteers of Am., 151 So. 797 (La. Ct. App. 
1934); Lincoln Mem’l Univ. v. Sutton, 43 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Tenn. 1931). 
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erosion was complete by the mid-1980s.25 Policy reasons for the shift 
are not hard to fathom: the culture had come to expect a legal 
remedy for nearly every injury, and institutions seemed better able 
than the injured parties to absorb—or to purchase insurance to 
cover—the costs of such injuries.26 
Second, the past century also witnessed a significant expansion in 
theories of tort liability, especially in the law’s willingness to hold 
supervisors and institutions liable for injuries inflicted by their agents. 
The earliest of these developments was the concept of vicarious 
liability, commonly referred to as respondeat superior, under which 
the employer is liable for the tortious acts of its agent when such acts 
fall within the scope of employment.27 Later developments in tort 
theory have expanded the employer’s nonvicarious liability to include 
injuries caused by the employer’s negligence in hiring, training, 
supervising, and retaining agents who inflict injuries on third parties. 
The employer may be liable even when the alleged wrong, such as 
 25. By the beginning of 1986, thirty-nine jurisdictions had abrogated the doctrine for 
certain charities, and twenty of the thirty-nine had abandoned it altogether. See Fairchild, supra 
note 23, at 547. 
 26. Note, The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing Immunity, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1399 n.8 (1987) (quoting President of Georgetown College v. 
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“The doctrine of immunity of charitable 
corporations found its way into the law . . . through misconception . . . of previously 
established principles.”)). Although the doctrine of charitable immunity has certainly waned, 
special protections for charitable institutions remain in many jurisdictions. Very few states 
retain blanket immunity for charities. Many place monetary limits on charities’ exposure to tort 
liability, and even more extend immunity to individual volunteers of charities for torts arising 
out of their work on behalf of the charity. See, e.g., Conners v. Northeast Hosp. Corp., 789 
N.E.2d 129 (Mass. 2003) (applying a Massachusetts law that imposes a $20,000 cap on 
charities’ liability for tort damages, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85K (2002)). Other states 
restrict charities’ exposure to the limits of their liability insurance policy. See, e.g., MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-406 (2004) (limiting liability of charitable organization to 
$200,000, if charity has that amount of liability insurance); Abramson v. Reiss, 638 A.2d 743 
(Md. 1994) (reaffirming Maryland’s doctrine of charitable immunity). New Jersey is notable 
for its maintenance of a strong doctrine of charitable immunity. The immunity of charitable 
institutions in New Jersey, however, does not extend to individuals who serve such entities. 
See, e.g., F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (permitting a lawsuit against priests for 
alleged breach of fiduciary duties owed to parishioner). The fall of charitable immunity, of 
course, is a religion-neutral phenomenon. Where such protections remain, they are enjoyed by 
religious and nonreligious charities alike; where abrogated, the same burden is borne by both 
religious and nonreligious organizations. 
 27. See, e.g., Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A 
Recommendation for Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. 
L. REV. 570, 573–77 (1994) (discussing the history of the doctrine of respondeat superior). 
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sexual abuse, occurs outside the scope of the agent’s employment 
but nevertheless is facilitated by the employment relationship.28 
Third, particularly in the last quarter century, the law has become 
especially responsive to sexual violence, abuse, and exploitation.29 
Such developments include prosecution of marital and date rape;30 
shield laws to protect rape victims in the legal process;31 laws 
requiring the reporting of child abuse, including sexual 
molestation;32 prohibitions against sexual harassment in schools and 
workplaces;33 and the imposition of tort liability and professional 
discipline on lawyers, physicians, and therapists who sexually exploit 
their clients or patients.34 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965) (discussing a master’s liability for 
certain acts of a servant even though the acts fall outside the scope of the servant’s agency). For 
a discussion of liability for such negligent acts by supervisors employed by religious entities, see 
infra Part III. 
 29. See generally R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE, 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 99–145 (1992) (discussing increased activism directed toward state 
responses to domestic sexual violence and abuse). 
 30. See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 80–91 (1987) (discussing the reform of 
rape laws under which the scope of the crime has expanded). 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 32. Currently, the following states, excluding those states that only require reporting 
post mortem, have mandatory reporting statutes: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2004); 
California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (2004); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 39.201 (2003); 
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2003); Illinois, 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7.19 (2003); 
Iowa, IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2003); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2003); Louisiana, 
LA. CHILDREN’S CODE ANN. § 609 (1995); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2003); 
Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-101 (2003); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-711 
(2004); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 169-C:2 (2004); New York, N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 2805-n (2004); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2004); Oregon, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2003); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (2003); 
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-6-502 (2004); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 
(2004). 
 33. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (sexual 
harassment in the workplace); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 
1681 (2000) (sexual harassment in schools); see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 
U.S. 629 (1999) (holding that a school district may be held liable for failure to respond 
adequately to peer sexual harassment under Title IX). 
 34. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2003) (“A lawyer shall not 
have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them 
when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/1 et. seq. 
(2004) (Illinois Sexual Exploitation in Psychotherapy, Professional Health Services, and 
Professional Mental Health Services Act imposes criminal liability on mental health 
professionals for sexual contact with patients.); see also Scott M. Puglise, Note, “Calling Dr. 
Love”: The Physician-Patient Sexual Relationship as Grounds for Medical Malpractice—Society 
Pays While the Doctor and Patient Play, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 321 (1999/2000) (discussing 
malpractice liability of physicians who engage in sexual relationships with patients). 
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Notwithstanding these general developments in the law of tort 
and crime, one might expect that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment would provide constitutional immunities for 
ecclesiastical authorities implicated in the wrongdoing of their 
agents. Indeed, if existing doctrines of church-state separation were 
generally robust, one would be surprised to see a rapid waning of 
such immunities. These lawsuits, after all, effectively empower judges 
and juries to evaluate the processes of assignment and supervision of 
clergy and may coercively extract significant wealth from religious 
communities if state-empowered decision-makers determine that the 
leaders of such communities have violated legal duties of care or 
loyalty. 
The overarching constitutional regime of Separationism35 that 
once grounded First Amendment-based immunities for religious 
entities, however, has been shrinking. A Separationist regime 
depends entirely on a conception of the constitutional distinctiveness 
of religion and religious institutions. Thirty years ago, in 
Separationism’s heyday, the Supreme Court stood firmly behind just 
such a conception. The Court’s stance was rooted in both religion 
clauses of the First Amendment. With respect to the Establishment 
Clause, norms of Separation included the prohibition on officially 
sponsored religious speech in public schools36 and a firm bar on 
direct financial assistance to “pervasively sectarian” institutions, 
including houses of worship and religious elementary and secondary 
schools.37 With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s 
decisions suggested that state-imposed burdens on religious freedom 
are subject to strict and searching judicial examination, even if the 
burdens arise from laws of general applicability.38 And another line of 
 35. By “Separationism,” we mean a constitutional regime that includes distinctive rights 
and disabilities for religious institutions. We analyze and compare Separationism with other 
constitutional regimes in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious 
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 51–65 (2002) [hereinafter 
Distinctive Place]. 
 36. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding 
officially sponsored Bible reading at the start of a public school day violates the Establishment 
Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that the practice of starting each public 
school day with the Regent’s Prayer violates the Establishment Clause). 
 37. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The line of decision in which Lemon 
is prominent begins with Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 38. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that the Free Exercise 
Clause supports an exemption from an affirmative duty of parents to send their children to an 
accredited school until the children reach the age of sixteen). 
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decisions precluded civil courts from adjudicating disputes, 
concerning both property and personnel, arising from within a 
particular faith community.39 
By the turn of the millennium, several of the building blocks in 
the edifice of Separationism had crumbled, and a competing 
paradigm of Neutrality or evenhandedness between religion and 
secularity had taken center stage. These developments became 
manifest in a number of discrete moves in the Supreme Court. First 
and foremost for our purposes, the Court in Jones v. Wolf.40 upheld 
the authority of lower courts to adjudicate internal church disputes 
in those situations in which religion-neutral legal principles permit 
judicial resolution without involvement in matters of theological 
principle or ecclesiastical structure. Second, in what has become a 
lengthy series of decisions, the Court has recognized the right of 
speakers with a religious perspective to have equal access to public 
fora for speech.41 In these cases, time and again, the Court has 
rejected defenses based on a Separationist theory of the 
Establishment Clause. Third, in a development that shocked the 
world of lawyers and scholars, the decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith42 narrowed or eliminated the Free Exercise doctrine calling for 
 39. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 
(1969); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). This line of decisions, upon which we build in Part III, infra, 
stretches back in its origins to English common law. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Hands 
Off.! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 
1848–49 (1998). 
 40. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 41. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court soon thereafter reaffirmed Smith’s 
controversial holding in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993). Congress attempted to legislatively “overrule” Smith in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, but the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as applied to 
the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The legislative responses to Smith 
nevertheless continue. Congress, for example, has enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000) [hereinafter RLUIPA], 
which specially protects the religious liberty of inmates in state institutions and the uses of land 
by religious entities. Constitutional challenges to RLUIPA have been working their way 
through the federal courts. See, e.g., Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003), petition 
for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2004) (No. 03-1404) (upholding RLUIPA 
against Establishment Clause attack). Contra Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 
2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2004). See also Marci A. Hamilton, 
4LUP-FIN 12/2/2004 12:35 PM 
1789] Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity 
 1803 
 
strict judicial evaluation of burdens imposed on religious freedom by 
religion-neutral, generally applicable legal norms. Fourth, 
Establishment Clause constraints on both direct and indirect funding 
of activities by religious entities have withered.43 
This movement toward Neutrality, though sweeping, has 
remained incomplete. First, the norms of Separationism have 
strengthened with respect to the government’s own sponsorship of 
religious speech,44 especially in the venue of public schools.45 Second, 
Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L. J. 311 (2003). 
 43. The ban on direct state funding of services at pervasively sectarian entities has been 
replaced by a considerably narrower (and hotly disputed) prohibition on state support for 
specifically religious activities. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). For an elaboration of this 
trend, see IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS WITH FAITH-
BASED SERVICE PROVIDERS: THE STATE OF THE LAW DECEMBER 2002 (Roundtable on 
Religion and Social Welfare Policy, Rockefeller Institute of Government), Dec. 4, 2002 
[hereinafter GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS]. Lower courts have begun to notice this change. 
See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002) 
(invalidating a contract between state and faith-based service providers because the contract 
financed faith-intensive treatment for substance abuse). And the Cleveland voucher decision 
has upheld the permissibility of indirect state financing of the provision of education by 
religious institutions, even if religious instruction and worship activities are included in such 
educational programs. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). For earlier 
incarnations of the beneficiary choice principle, see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 
509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). The 
lower courts have noticed the constitutional distinction between direct and indirect financing. 
In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003), the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the participation in a beneficiary choice program of the same faith-
based service provider that the U.S District Court barred from participation in a direct 
financing scheme (the state did not appeal the exclusion of the provider from the direct 
financing scheme). We analyze the significance of indirect financing in Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of 
Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917 (2003) and in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service 
Providers, 18 J. L. & POL. 539 (2002) [hereinafter Sites of Redemption]. 
 44. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The scope of governmental 
authority to sponsor religious speech will be tested in this Term’s pair of cases involving the 
display of the Ten Commandments on government property. See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 
F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 346 (Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-1500); 
ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 310 
(Oct. 12, 2004) (No. 03-1693). 
 45. The school prayer cases of the early 1960s, which involved government-sponsored 
religious speech at the start of the school day, have been extended into postings of the Ten 
Commandments, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), moments of silence, Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), commencement prayer at public schools, Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577 (1992), and school-sponsored student prayer at public high school athletic contests, 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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even with respect to direct financial aid to religious institutions, a 
robust prohibition remains on activities that would render the 
government responsible for religious indoctrination by private 
parties.46 
Two additional doctrines, both highly significant for the set of 
problems to which this paper is addressed, also persist. The Court’s 
teachings about church-state entanglement, which have appeared in 
both Establishment Clause and Free Exercise settings, have been 
expressly reaffirmed,47 though they have not been applied in the 
Supreme Court with much rigor over the past fifteen years.48 
Moreover, constitutional limitations persist with respect to 
adjudication of matters internal to the structure and belief of 
religious institutions. Courts, as noted above, may apply religion-
neutral principles to similarly neutral aspects of a religious entity’s 
activities, but courts remain forbidden from resolving questions of 
religious structure or theological principle.49 Prominent in the 
context of internal disputes is the “ministerial exception” to 
employment law, which bars adjudication of most claims against 
religious entities with respect to decisions involving who shall be a 
spokesperson for a particular faith.50 In all of these contexts—
government speech, direct financial assistance to religious entities, 
areas of potential entanglement, and resolution of internal church 
disputes—courts continue to apply norms that derive from the view 
that religion and religious entities are constitutionally distinctive for 
some purposes. 
What is the relevance of this distinct but incomplete movement 
from Separationism to Neutrality for questions of ecclesiastical 
immunity from tort liability? If that movement is ineluctably on its 
way to completion, and Separationism is a lingering but terminal 
patient, the answer has the character of prediction—religion-
distinctive tort immunities have been disappearing, and they will 
 46. Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. We explore this proposition in more detail in Sites of 
Redemption, supra note 43, at 537, and GOVERNMENT PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 43. 
 47. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203. 
 48. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 49. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), expressly preserved this line of authority, even as it was rejecting religion-specific 
exemptions in other contexts. Id. at 877. Kathleen Brady builds her contribution to this 
conference on this dictum. Brady, supra note 18, at 1633–34. 
 50. See discussion infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
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continue to vanish to the point of extinction. At the bottom of the 
slide, religious entities and their officers will have neither fewer nor 
greater defenses than those available to comparable secular 
organizations and their agents. 
If, however, the trend away from a constitutional conception of 
religious distinctiveness has a normative stopping place, then the 
answer to the question we pose about the future of ecclesiastical 
immunities may be very different. In a world in which, for a variety 
of legal and cultural reasons, religion has lost much of its 
constitutional distinctiveness, the blanket immunities once available 
to religious entities are gone for good. It remains to be asked, 
however, whether one might yet mount a normative defense for a 
narrower, still vibrant version of Separationism, and whether such a 
defense would lead in turn to a more focused account of immunity 
for religious institutions and their personnel with respect to certain 
categories of legal action. It is to such a normative theory, and its 
implications for issues of legal responsibility for clergy misbehavior, 
that we now turn. 
III. THE REMNANTS OF ECCLESIASTICAL IMMUNITY 
As we asserted in Part II, Separationism is built on a concept of 
the constitutional distinctiveness of religion and religious 
institutions. For understandable reasons, the constitutional doctrines 
supporting Separationism, as a matter of Free Exercise, non-
Establishment, or both, receded from the high water marks reached 
in the 1970s.51 As Professors Bill Marshall, Fred Gedicks, Larry 
Sager, Chris Eisgruber, and others have argued, contemporary 
Western culture and values make it impossible to sustain a claim of 
religion’s overarching distinctiveness and the corresponding claim of 
religion to specialized legal treatment.52 
 51. We analyze the underpinnings of Separationism as a philosophy of the religion 
clauses in Distinctive Place, supra note 35, at 51–65. 
 52. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 
(1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 925 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable 
Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 555 (1998); William 
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 
(1991); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of the Equal 
Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193 
(2000). 
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We have suggested elsewhere, however, that distinctiveness does 
not have to be an all or nothing proposition.53 Religion may indeed 
be distinctive for some constitutional or legal purposes and not 
others, though we believe that the burden of persuasion should 
always be placed on the proponent of distinctive treatment.54 
More fundamentally, the relevant constitutional framework to be 
applied to questions of constitutional distinctiveness should not 
begin with an examination of religious belief, practice, or structure. 
Instead, proper understanding commences with an analysis of 
political and constitutional theory. Here is our analysis of the 
question, offered several years ago in the Giannella Lecture at 
Villanova:55 
Quite paradoxically, a constitutionally sufficient answer to the 
question of religious distinctiveness cannot begin with theology or 
the sociology of religion. It must begin, instead, with a political 
concept of religion—one implicit in the founders’ “novus ordo 
seclorum.” Hopes for this new order rested, in important part, on 
its limited horizon. The order would belong to “the ages,” and its 
powers would be restricted to the temporal welfare of its citizens. 
Though each of them might (indeed likely would) have religious 
commitments, the state itself would have no religious confession to 
make. By thus circumscribing the government’s jurisdiction, this 
new world order would avoid both conflict among religious 
factions for political authority and the inevitable despotism of the 
religious faction that won out. Seen in political terms, “religion” 
represents that which the new order disclaims: jurisdiction over 
ultimate truths, a comprehensive claim to undivided loyalty, and a 
command to worship. Separationism, then, depends on articulation 
of this political concept of sacredness and on some attempt to 
identify what particular aspects of the behavior of religious 
institutions are bound up with the sacred. 
Understood this way, Separationism—a sense of boundary between 
state and some aspects of institutional behavior—functions much 
like the constitutional right of privacy, [that is], as a check on 
totalitarianism. Totalitarian regimes typically try to control intimate 
aspects of their subjects’ lives. Control of the intellectual, political, 
sexual, and economic details of the lives of political subjects creates 
 53. Distinctive Place, supra note 35; see also Sites of Redemption, supra note 43, at 543–56. 
 54. Distinctive Place, supra note 35, at 78–79. 
 55. Id. at 83–84 (internal citations omitted). 
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enormous leverage for the state in the struggle for control of their 
spirits—their souls, if you will. If the right of privacy, at least in 
part, insulates the realm of the spirit from state control, the 
constitutional distinctiveness of religious institutions—those that 
nurture the spirit directly—rests on comparable foundations. 
We concluded that lecture with the following conceptualization 
of the state’s role: 
The role of the contemporary state is broad indeed, but it remains 
circumscribed by its penultimacy. Life’s ultimate questions are to 
be left in private hands, and when those hands are institutional, the 
state must respect the internal life and self-governance of such 
institutions. Most importantly, our approach is consistent with the 
duality of roles of religious institutions in contemporary America. 
When those institutions perform functions indistinguishable from 
other segments of the nonprofit world, the law should treat them 
as their secular counterparts are treated. When, however, religious 
institutions act in uniquely religious ways, making connections with 
the world beyond the temporal and material concerns that are the 
proper jurisdiction of the state, the legally distinctive qualities of 
such institutions begin to emerge. It is only by exploring the 
intrinsic limit on state power to affect these ultimate concerns, 
rather than by mining the desires, activities or teachings of religious 
organizations, that the distinctive place of religious entities in our 
constitutional order can be located.56 
Even if we are entirely correct that this vision of the state as a 
temporal entity accounts for constitutional norms of religious 
distinctiveness, we must articulate the details that follow from this 
insight. Issues of organizational commitment and leadership are 
obvious places to begin. If the state may mandate to a religious 
organization what its substantive commitments may include—for 
example, by dictating or limiting the contents of liturgical material—
the state will have seized control of the organization’s vision of the 
ultimate. It is no surprise that the earliest American state 
constitutions protected each citizen’s right to worship God 
“according to the dictates of his own conscience,”57 and such a 
 56. Id. at 92. For further discussion of novus ordo seclorum, see FORREST MCDONALD, 
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985). 
 57. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. II, reprinted in MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT 
A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 49 (1996). As Ariens and Destro 
recount, such a guarantee appeared in a variety of forms in almost every early American state 
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guarantee remains at the core of any and every theory of the religion 
clauses. 
The substantive freedom of religious communities to chart their 
own vision of divine order has supported a pair of corollary freedoms 
that continue to find religion-distinctive protection in decisions 
linked to both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause.58 The first is the right to settle, free from state interference, 
internal disputes whose resolution depends upon judgments about 
theological principles or issues of religious polity. If ownership and 
possession of church property, for example, turns on fidelity to 
religious texts or principles, and competing factions within the 
church each assert that it is the only group faithful to church 
teachings, courts cannot possibly adjudicate between the parties 
without judicial resolution of the true meaning of the faith. It is this 
dilemma that has led American courts, first as a matter of common 
law59 and now as a firm principle of constitutional law,60 to defer to 
the resolution reached by the religious polity as organized by the 
faith community.61 
No comparable doctrine of absolute deference exists with respect 
to disputes within business organizations or secular, nonprofit 
constitution. Id. at 45–63; see also THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH & 
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). 
 58. Judicial decisions at times locate these doctrines of church autonomy in both 
religion clauses, see, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 
as the organizers of this conference did by creating separate panels on Free Exercise and 
Nonestablishment approaches to church autonomy. For a variety of reasons explained below, it 
may matter greatly on which clause such doctrines rest. Because the Establishment Clause is a 
structural limitation on the role and power of the state, its prohibitions (unlike the rights 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause) may not be balanced against state interests and may not 
be “waived.” Officially sponsored prayer in public school, for example, is unconstitutional even 
if every parent of every child in the school gives explicit written permission to the state to 
sponsor such prayer. The Establishment Clause exists to keep the state out of the realm of 
ultimate concern, and private parties do not have authority to vest any such power in state 
institutions. For further exploration of the structural quality of the Establishment Clause, see 
Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint: Validations and 
Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445 (2002). 
 59. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 60. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
 61. In hierarchical churches, judicial deference is to the hierarchical authority; in 
congregational churches, deference is to the congregational polity. Cases in which religious 
denominations are organized in a mix of hierarchical and congregational forms, as is typical of 
the Presbyterian Church, present the greatest difficulty for courts. See, e.g., Presbyterian 
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). For a 
discussion of these polity forms and their significance, see Greenawalt, supra note 39, at 1843.  
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organizations, all of whom courts may hold in compliance with the 
substance of the organizations’ founding legal documents.62 For 
example, courts may resolve disputes among business partners 
according to the terms of a partnership agreement;63 settle 
disagreements between majority and minority shareholders of a 
corporation according to the terms of a corporate charter;64 and 
compel, in an appropriate action, a secular nonprofit organization to 
conform to trust instruments under which it operates.65 Religious 
entities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of 
internal disputes unlike any other known to the law, and this 
autonomy may not be surrendered by contract or other act of 
consent to state power. Courts may not rely on theological principles 
to resolve disputes, even if the parties so desire, and even if some 
immediate social good will be served thereby.66 
The second corollary freedom is the right to designate leaders 
and spokespersons for the faith. Those in such positions are the 
authors of each faith community’s continuing vision. They regulate 
its worship life, preside over changes in its liturgy and sense of values, 
and communicate its stories, beliefs, ethics, and sense of continuity 
from one generation to the next. State interference with the selection 
of leaders thus implicates the religious community’s method of 
transmitting its vision and cannot help but alter the content of the 
vision itself. 
Here, too, the constitutional law of religious association protects 
the organizational interest in leadership selection and does so more 
thoroughly and completely than it protects the comparable interests 
of secular associations. Although the matter has never come up 
directly, no one would doubt that the First Amendment precludes 
 62. For a comparable assertion, see John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the 
Liability of Churches for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
1167, 1169 (2003). 
 63. 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 120 (2004). 
 64. Frankino v. Gleason, No. CIV.A.17399, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 219, at *12–14 
(Nov. 5, 1999) (using contract interpretation principles to interpret a bylaw provision in a 
company’s certificate of incorporation); McNamara v. Frankino, 744 A.2d 988 (Del. 1999); 
Morris v. American Pub. Utils. Co., 122 A. 696, 701 (Del. Ch. 1923) (noting that the terms 
of the contract between shareholders are determined by “the appropriate provisions of the 
certificate of incorporation and the law of the State”). 
 65. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 199(a) (1959). 
 66. As Professor Mansfield argues, this limitation on civil courts may deprive religious 
entities of state assistance upon which others are free to call. Mansfield, supra note 62, at 
1169. 
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the state from instituting a system of licensure for the clergy. To do 
so would, in effect, impose a prior restraint on those who preach and 
give the state control, through criteria of education, character, or 
otherwise, over those who would speak in the name of a religious 
community. The clergy may be a learned profession, like medicine, 
law, architecture, or others, but the state may not create barriers to 
its entry. If a faith community chooses to ordain an illiterate ex-felon 
as its pastor, the state may not intervene or object.67 
Acting consistently with the norm against state licensure of 
clergy, the Supreme Court has on a number of occasions ruled 
against efforts to overturn the judgment of a religious institution 
with respect to a selection for church office.68 These decisions require 
the lower courts to categorically reject claims of breach of contract, 
or implied contract, to place or maintain a particular person in a 
religious office against the will of a religious organization. 
As an outgrowth of these decisions, lower courts for many years 
have applied the doctrine of “ministerial exception” to a broad 
variety of norms that otherwise govern the employment relation. 
With respect to employees in a position of spokesperson for the 
faith—member of the clergy,69 professor of theology70 or canon 
law,71 director of religious music,72 and other positions, defined by 
 67. See Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
1089, 1112–13 (2003). 
 68. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Gonzalez v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929). 
 69. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972) (construing Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, to exclude religious bodies, hiring for positions 
of religious significance, from the statutory prohibition on gender discrimination); accord 
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (reaching 
the same result as McClure on constitutional grounds). For recent applications of the 
exception, see Callahan v. First Congregational Church, 808 N.E.2d 301 (Mass. 2004); 
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). The 
most prominent commentary on the ministerial exception remains Bruce Bagni, 
Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious 
Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979). One of the authors of this article has been 
highly critical of the ministerial exception, see Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemptions and 
Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987), 
but has since revised his position on it, see Distinctive Place, supra note 35, at 90, n.177. 
 70. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
 71. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding a church-
controlled university constitutionally and statutorily immune from suit for sex discrimination in 
its refusal to tenure a female professor of canon law). 
 72. EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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function rather than title—religious organizations are immune from 
claims that would entail judicial evaluation of an employee’s 
performance or a prospective employee’s qualifications. 
The ministerial exemption is strikingly broad in its immunizing 
scope. For example, in its application to the law prohibiting sex 
discrimination in employment, the exemption is not limited to 
religious institutions that explicitly assert a preference for either sex 
for clergy positions. The exemption extends to all claims of sex 
discrimination in the hiring or conditions of employment of clergy, 
including assertions that a religious organization that purports to 
comply with norms of sex equality has covertly engaged in sex 
discrimination under the pretext of some sex-neutral policy.73 Courts 
have consistently ruled that to permit adjudication of such pretext 
claims would be to invite judicial second-guessing of institutional 
judgments about the performance of agents in leadership roles. 74 
Here, too, as in the case of broad immunity from judicial 
determination of theological principle to resolve intrafaith disputes, 
no comparable doctrine of immunity exists with respect to leadership 
positions in other organizations, nonprofit or otherwise. Perhaps, as 
a matter of freedom of association, the NAACP may reserve its 
presidency to African-Americans. Can we imagine, however, that 
courts would be barred from adjudicating a claim of race 
discrimination against such an organization if it held itself out as 
hiring on a nondiscriminatory basis? Nothing in American law would 
support such a claim.75 
 73. Virtually every case involving the application of the ministerial exception takes this 
form. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 
(11th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a claim for unlawful retaliation brought by a pastor who advised a 
female minister about pursuing a sexual harassment claim against the church). We analyze 
Gellington, and the generic problem it presents, in considerable detail in Distinctive Place, 
supra note 35. 
 74. See cases cited at supra note 69. 
 75. The Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 
(2000), protects the associational freedom of private, noncommercial groups to impose 
leadership or membership restrictions free from interference by the state’s laws against 
discrimination. Nothing in Dale, however, suggests that the Scouts (or any other comparable 
group) could take the position that it treated heterosexuals and homosexuals equally, but that 
it should remain free from state inquiry into whether it behaved in fidelity to its commitment 
to nondiscriminatory treatment. There are, of course, special difficulties associated with 
applying civil rights norms to high-level executive positions. See generally Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982). In his comment 
in this conference, Professor Sager argues that the ministerial exception should be grounded in 
a right of intimate association. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 52, at 1248–49. We doubt, 
4LUP-FIN 12/2/2004 12:35 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
1812 
 
For reasons that we develop below, the regime of legal immunity 
for intrafaith disputes and for personnel matters involving 
spokespersons for the faith has quite properly survived the demise, 
decreed by Employment Division v. Smith,76 of a more general 
doctrine of religious exemptions. Smith held that religiously 
motivated claimants did not have a right under the Free Exercise 
Clause to remain exempt from religion-neutral, generally applicable 
laws.77 The laws of property, contract, and economic association that 
permit state resolution of intraorganizational disputes are indeed 
religion-neutral and generally applicable. The Smith opinion, 
however, explicitly recognizes the legal immunity of religious 
organizations from any civil adjudication that determines religious 
principle or structure.78 
Nor have the courts backtracked from the ministerial exception 
in the wake of Smith. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v. Catholic University of America,79 a leading and widely cited 
decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the 
panel expressly reaffirmed the ministerial exception in the face of an 
argument that it should not survive Smith. The decision upheld a 
district court ruling that constitutional immunities barred 
adjudication of Sister Elizabeth McDonough’s complaint that 
unlawful sex discrimination had infected Catholic University’s 
decision to deny her tenure. 
The Catholic University decision is worth noting in some detail. 
It is a thorough, well-developed opinion by a prominent court on 
the scope of the ministerial exemption and its continued vitality. 
Sister McDonough’s tenure application had gone through a series of 
petitions and appeals to the faculty of Canon Law, the Committee 
on Appointments and Promotions of the University’s School of 
Religious Studies, and a comparable committee of the University’s 
Academic Senate.80 The process went on for over a year, ending with 
the Senate Committee’s unanimous vote against a tenure 
however, that concerns of intimate or private association can successfully account for the scope 
of the current doctrine. 
 76. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 77. Id. at 879. 
 78. Id. at 877. 
 79. 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 80. Id. at 458–59. 
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recommendation.81 The Committee’s primary reason for its decision 
was that “[t]he scholarship of the candidate [did] not measure up to 
the standards expected in the field for the granting of tenure.”82 
Sister McDonough then filed a complaint with the EEOC 
alleging unlawful sex discrimination.83 The Commission undertook a 
two-year investigation and made unsuccessful efforts at 
conciliation.84 The EEOC and Sister McDonough thereupon 
brought suit against the University, and the case eventually went to 
trial, but the University did not raise the ministerial exception 
defense.85 A week into the trial, after hearing competing expert 
testimony on the quality of Sister McDonough’s scholarship 
compared to that of men who had been granted tenure in the Canon 
Law Department at the University, District Judge Oberdorfer asked 
the parties to brief the question of constitutional immunity.86 After 
they did so, he dismissed the case, holding that Sister McDonough’s 
role in instructing members of the Catholic clergy in Canon Law 
made her functionally equivalent to a minister. The Free Exercise 
Clause therefore barred review of the decision.87 He also ruled that 
the Establishment Clause barred adjudication of her claim because it 
required impermissible judicial evaluation of the merits of scholarship 
in Canon Law, a theological subject. Moreover, the EEOC 
investigation itself involved impermissible procedural entanglement 
between the government and a religious institution.88 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
synthesized Supreme Court decisions on intrafaith disputes and 
lower court decisions applying the ministerial exemption, focusing 
on what it saw as the central issue in the case—whether a Professor 
of Canon Law at Catholic University would have “essentially 
 81. Id. at 459. 
 82. Id. The Committee also stated that the candidate had made a contribution to 
“service and the practice of canon law,” but that this did not “counterbalance the marginal 
performance in teaching and scholarly publications” and that the divided vote in other voting 
groups that had reviewed on her application did not give sufficient assurance that Sister 
McDonough possessed the “optimal qualifications for the position.” Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  
 83. The procedural history summarized in this paragraph can be found in id. at 459–60. 
 84. Id. at 459. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 856 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C 1994). 
 88. Id. at 12. 
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religious” functions.89 Emphasizing her role as an instructor in the 
ecclesiastical law that “governs the Church’s sacramental life, [and] 
defines the rights and duties of its faithful and the responsibilities of 
their pastors,”90 Judge Buckley’s opinion concluded that her primary 
duties would consist of teaching and spreading the faith. The court 
buttressed its conclusion with an emphasis on the particular role 
played by Catholic University, whose Canon Law Department “is 
the sole entity in the United States empowered by the Vatican to 
confer ecclesiastical degrees in canon law.”91 In addition, over the 
ten years preceding the litigation, the department had awarded the 
great majority of its graduate degrees to priests or members of 
religious orders, a fact which led the court to conclude that the 
department played a central role “in the graduate education of 
American priests.”92 
Having analyzed in close detail the functions of Sister 
McDonough’s position and the role of canon law at both Catholic 
University and in the Church as a whole, the court affirmed the 
dismissal of the case. It concluded that the Free Exercise Clause 
(even after Smith) protected the University against a court 
substituting its judgment for that of University agents on the merits 
of Sister McDonough’s scholarship and that the Establishment 
Clause prohibited the kinds of substantive and procedural 
entanglements that had been produced by EEOC investigation and 
district court litigation, including discovery and trial.93 
The opinion in the Catholic University case is noteworthy in 
several respects. First, it quite appropriately parsed the functions of 
 89. 83 F.3d at 463. 
 90. Id. at 464. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. The court also held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act still applied to the 
federal government and that it too required dismissal of the action. Id. at 467–69. A 
concurring opinion by Judge Henderson, id. at 470–76, expressed the view that the district 
court, by careful management, might have remained within the Constitution and still assessed 
whether the school’s determination about Sister McDonough’s scholarship had been a pretext 
for sex discrimination. Judge Henderson believed that the district court should have limited 
itself to the evidence of scholarly quality that had been considered by the University’s 
reviewing committees and not taken outside, expert testimony from ecclesiastical sources on 
the quality of the work. Id. at 472–75. Judge Henderson concurred in the result, however, on 
the ground that the remedies sought by Sister McDonough, including reinstatement with 
tenure, would interfere with the final authority of the Vatican to appoint tenured professors in 
the Canon Law Department at Catholic University. Id. at 476. 
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the job to see if it was religiously distinctive; had Sister McDonough 
been a professor of mathematics, the school presumably would not 
have had a comparable immunity. Second, it approvingly noted the 
district court’s sua sponte focus on the ministerial exception and the 
questions of forbidden entanglement; these concerns relate to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the courts, and a party’s willingness to 
litigate cannot waive a jurisdictional requirement. Whatever 
institutional reasons may have moved the University to contest Sister 
McDonough’s claim of sex discrimination on its merits, rather than 
to assert its immunity, civil courts may not render judgments on 
theological questions.94 
We believe that the D.C. Circuit reached the correct result in 
Catholic University, but we also believe that the court—like virtually 
every other court that has confronted questions of ecclesiastical 
immunity—misanalyzed the problem in one critically important 
respect. Ecclesiastical immunities, including the ministerial 
exception, are not the offspring of rights in the conventional sense. 
They are not the legal entitlements of religious entities in the way 
that, for example, authors and political advocates possess rights to 
communicate. Instead, ecclesiastical immunities are the entailments 
of the jurisdictional limitations that the Establishment Clause 
imposes upon the state’s role.95 Because the state is forbidden from 
being the author or coauthor of religious faith, it may not adjudicate 
or regulate the ways in which communities of faith are organized. 
Nor may the state select the voices which lead these communities, 
nor the lessons they communicate. Religious entities cannot waive 
this jurisdictional limitation, which we believe resides most 
comfortably in the Establishment Clause (even as it furthers Free 
Exercise values). Hence the district court judge correctly decided to 
stop the trial on the merits of Sister McDonough’s claim. Moreover, 
no state assertion of countervailing state interests, compelling or 
 94. The least well-explained element in Catholic University is the assertion of the court’s 
procedural concern about “excessive entanglement” independent of the substantive merits of 
the ministerial exception. Id. at 466–67. The question of procedural entanglement is one that 
is omnipresent in the process of discovery and trial in tort cases involving claims of sexual 
misconduct and defenses of ecclesiastical immunity, and we shall return to it in the next part of 
this paper. See infra Part IV.B.2.b(2)(ii). 
 95. For elaboration of this view, see Carl Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a 
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Carl Esbeck, Myths, 
Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment Clause, 13 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 285 (1999). 
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otherwise, may operate to set aside this limitation. The Catholic 
University decision remains correct, regardless of the governmental 
interest in combating sex discrimination in employment. 
One additional development in American law sheds further light 
on ecclesiastical immunity and its constitutional underpinnings. 
About twenty years ago, in Nally v. Grace Community Church,96 a 
California court awarded summary judgment against a pastor and his 
church to a family whose son had committed suicide after 
undergoing a series of counseling sessions with the pastor.97 The 
theory of the litigation was clergy malpractice—that is, that members 
of the clergy were legally obliged to follow objective standards of 
care in counseling parishioners, and that this pastor had failed to 
follow such standards.98 A California appellate court soon reversed 
the judgment on the theory that the First Amendment precludes civil 
judges and juries from deciding what standards of care a reasonably 
prudent and trained clergyman should follow.99 We think Nally must 
be correct because any such inquiry would inevitably take judges and 
juries into the heart of theological arrangements and would 
inevitably be biased against non-mainstream faiths. Since Nally, 
almost every American court that has been presented with a claim for 
clergy malpractice—i.e., a claim that requires civil authorities to 
articulate and apply objective standards of care for the 
communicative content of clergy counseling—has rejected the claim 
on grounds of ecclesiastical immunity.100 
 96. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), withdrawn, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 97. Id. at 304–05. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988). 
 100. See WILLIAM W. BASSETT, RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND THE LAW § 8:19 n.9 
(listing cases). The one exception seems to be Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991), 
which leaves open the possibility of a clergy malpractice claim (though the court does not 
allow such a claim in this case). The quickly aborted development of the tort of clergy 
malpractice does not imply that clergy and their supervisors are perpetually safe from liability 
for their performance as counselors. As we document and assess in Part IV of this paper, courts 
have held a substantial number of clergy, and a smaller but significant number of their 
supervisors, liable for sexual exploitation in counseling relationships with adult parishioners. 
The courts that have affirmed imposition of such liability have based their rulings on a theory 
of fiduciary duty, which some, but by no means all, courts assert is an approach that avoids the 
constitutional pitfalls associated with the tort of clergy malpractice. For now, we hold this 
question for the general discussion in Part IV, below. 
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In a number of recent lawsuits arising out of alleged sexual 
misconduct, defendant religious organizations have asserted some 
version of ecclesiastical immunity as defenses.101 Defendants have 
claimed that the disputes are internal and therefore beyond the reach 
of judicial resolution. Additionally, defendants have at times argued 
that tort claims arising out of sexual misconduct of clergy inevitably 
implicate the policies behind the ministerial exception because the 
adjudication of such claims involves questions about the ordination, 
assignment, supervision, and retention of such clergy. Some courts 
have been receptive to blanket claims of immunity, but many have 
not.102 At least one academic commentator, writing from within the 
Catholic tradition, has expressed the concern that broad assertions of 
immunity from tort claims against supervisors and religious entities 
will not only fail but will poison the well in ways that render courts 
deeply resistant to more reasonable assertions of ecclesiastical 
immunity.103 
Cases involving clergy sexual misconduct, especially those that 
include criminal sexual assaults on children, implicate the state’s 
legitimate and deep concerns to protect the bodily and psychic 
integrity of its citizens. When, however, such controversies reach 
beyond the offending clergyman104 to the substance and process of 
clergy selection, assignment, and retention, the controversies cannot 
help but touch the institutional arrangements and theological 
understandings that inform the structure of faith communities and 
their leadership. 
The tensions between protecting innocent victims of sexual 
misconduct and maintaining ecclesiastical immunities for distinctively 
 101. See, e.g., J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 102. Compare Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) 
(permitting a claim against a church for negligent employment arising out of a pastor’s 
molestation of a child), with Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 
1999) (holding that the First Amendment bars such claims against religious institutions). We 
discuss these trends, and cite cases supporting them, in Part IV.B.2.b.i, infra. Professor 
Idleman’s important work also documents such trends in detail. Idleman, supra note 20. 
 103. See Angela C. Carmella, The Protection of Children and Young People: Catholic and 
Constitutional Visions of Responsible Freedom, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1054–55 (2003). 
 104. We believe that we have looked at every case ever decided by an American court 
involving sexual misconduct by a member of the clergy. To our knowledge, all but one of the 
allegedly offending clergy in these cases have been men. The sole exception is found in 
Barquin v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, 839 F. Supp. 275 (D. Vt. 1993) (alleging 
sexual abuse of a child by an unnamed Sister Jane Doe). 
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religious activity are palpable. How can they be resolved? The 
conventional but thoroughly unproductive way to approach this 
problem is to argue that the Free Exercise Clause exempts certain 
religious conduct from generally applicable norms of tort and 
criminal law. For a variety of reasons, this approach is a dead end. 
First, religious actors and institutions never claim that the sexual 
misconduct itself is religion-based. As a result, courts quickly 
repudiate any notion that religious liberty requires consideration of 
an exemption for such behavior. Second, the regimes of Employment 
Division v. Smith105 and Jones v. Wolf.106 appear to intersect in a focus 
on “neutral principles,” meaning principles that do not single out 
religion for disfavored treatment. Even though Smith appears to 
preserve a realm of church autonomy for resolution of internal 
disputes, it is all too easy to distinguish cases of property and 
contract, which involve voluntary private ordering, from cases of tort 
and crime, which involve coercive harm to third parties. Smith 
repudiates any exemptions for religious actors from general rules in 
this latter category.107 Third, even if Smith were overruled, or if state 
law recognizes the possibility of exemptions, the state has many 
compelling interests in preventing predatory sexual behavior.108 
Moreover, the relevant law of tort and crime is sufficiently well 
tailored to that end that courts are unlikely to narrow the ambit of 
such rules in the name of free exercise. 
Does the failure of the model of free exercise exemptions 
necessarily lead to the death of ecclesiastical immunities from law 
designed to control sexual misconduct? Two important possibilities 
lead us to argue that it does not. First, the Free Exercise Clause 
protects religious actors and institutions against discrimination in 
both the content of the law and its application. Clergy misconduct 
cases may at times be subtle vehicles for just such discrimination. 
Second, jurisdictional limits on the state, as manifest in the 
 105. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 106. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
 107. 494 U.S. at 889–90. 
 108. For a recent illustration of the judicial tendency to treat state interests in such cases 
as sufficiently weighty to overcome objections rooted in religious liberty, see Society of Jesus of 
New England v. Commonwealth, 808 N.E.2d 272, 281–83 (Mass. 2004) (noting that the 
Commonwealth’s interest in obtaining evidence of a sexual crime by a priest against high 
school students is sufficiently compelling, under Massachusetts constitutional law, to overcome 
an objection to producing documentation of conversations between the defendant and 
investigators acting on behalf of a religious order). 
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ministerial exemption cases and the universal rejection of the tort of 
clergy malpractice, suggest boundaries on the application of criminal 
and tort law to the structure of clergy supervision. In Part IV, we 
work out the implications of these two lines of constitutional 
analysis. 
IV. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND ECCLESIASTICAL IMMUNITY 
Civil and criminal actions involving sexual abuse by religious 
leaders involve many different claims and charges. Some arise 
specifically from the sexual misconduct itself, while others arise out 
of the religious organization’s duties to avoid or respond to such 
misconduct. In this Part, we focus first on those claims and charges 
that relate most narrowly to the act or acts of sexual abuse, including 
criminal charges of sexual assault and civil actions for breach of 
fiduciary obligations. We then turn to the broader assertions of 
organizational liability, which include civil claims for breaches of 
institutional fiduciary duty, negligent hiring or supervision, and 
perhaps criminal charges for failure to protect children. 
 Our overarching theses can be reduced to several relatively 
straightforward propositions. First, clergy who commit sexual crimes 
should never have valid defenses based on ecclesiastical immunity. 
Second, clergy who sexually exploit their followers in noncriminal 
ways may be in breach of fiduciary duties, but the Free Exercise 
Clause requires that the law frame those duties in ways that do not 
single out clergy for disfavored treatment. Third, similar 
considerations of equal treatment should inform the analysis of 
fiduciary duties owed by religious institutions to the sexual victims of 
their clergy; courts must take special care lest they subject religious 
institutions to uniquely onerous legal obligations. Fourth, claims 
against religious institutions for negligent employment of clergy 
must be reconciled with First Amendment considerations of 
ecclesiastical autonomy. We suggest that the regime of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, applicable to a different conflict between principles 
of tort law and First Amendment freedoms, may be a useful starting 
place for thinking about a similar reconciliation in this context. 
Finally, we believe that criminal investigations of, and plea 
negotiations with, religious entities must be conducted with 
constitutional sensitivity to limits on the state’s role in the selection 
and retention of clergy. 
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A. The Wrongdoer’s Criminal and Civil Liability  
for Sexual Misconduct 
Every American jurisdiction criminalizes, and makes tortious, 
sexual contact with persons below a specified age of consent.109 
Ecclesiastical immunity has never barred criminal prosecution or civil 
actions for a religious leader’s violation of these laws. The reasons are 
obvious. Few would be willing to defend such conduct by claiming 
that their religious commitments included sexual interaction between 
adults and minors, or that a government investigation into such 
interaction would impermissibly entangle the state in religious 
matters. Were such defenses raised, courts would emphatically reject 
them on grounds that the public interest in protecting children vastly 
outweighs any claim of religious privilege,110 and that investigation 
and adjudication of the sexual abuse of children can proceed without 
state intrusion into questions of religious doctrine or governance. 
In some circumstances, sexual contact with adults presents 
equally simple cases. If the sexual contact involves physical coercion, 
or the adult lacks full mental capacity to consent, then both criminal 
and civil laws will condemn the conduct.111 As with sexual abuse of 
children, ecclesiastical immunity offers no shelter to a religious leader 
who has violated these norms. 
In the absence of physical coercion, however, sexual relationships 
between religious leaders and mentally competent adults present 
significantly more complicated issues. Consensual sexual conduct 
between competent adults does not generally give rise to criminal or 
civil liability. The torts of seduction and criminal conversation, under 
which a paramour could be sued for luring a woman into a sexual 
 109. In many states, the age at which a minor may legally consent to sexual relations is 
higher when the relationship is with a person in a position of trust and authority. See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-405, 18-3-405.3 (2004) (prohibiting sexual contact with a child 
under the age of fifteen, except when the person having contact is in a position of trust, in 
which case the age of consent is eighteen); see also Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1227 
(Colo. App. 1996) (discussing a Colorado provision governing the sexual assault of a child by a 
person in a position of trust), vacated, First United Methodist Church v. Bohrer, No. 
96SC490, 1997 Colo. LEXIS 24 (Jan. 13, 1997). 
 110. See, e.g., Society of Jesus of New England, 808 N.E.2d 272 (rejecting the Society’s 
claim of constitutional privilege for documents pertaining to the criminal investigation into 
clergy sexual misconduct). The privilege unsuccessfully asserted in this case was broader than 
the priest-penitent privilege recognized by state law.  
 111. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.344(1)(d) (2003) (prohibiting sexual contact with a 
mentally impaired person). 
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relationship, are long dead in most jurisdictions.112 Therefore, our 
legal analysis in this section turns on a fundamental question: what 
makes sexual interaction between a clergyman and congregant 
different than an ordinary, nonactionable, consensual sexual 
relationship between two adults? The problem is more intricate than 
it might initially appear. As we analyze this question, we focus on 
those qualities of clergy-congregant relationships that give rise to 
such liability in the secular counterparts to those interactions. Where 
courts can identify and apply criteria that encompass secular as well 
as religious roles, the liability of clergy for noncriminal sexual 
relationships may appropriately follow. By contrast, clergy-specific 
triggers of liability offend constitutional norms against disfavoring 
religion.113 
The standard (but constitutionally inadequate) answer to the 
question we ask in this section identifies the clergy-congregant 
relationship as special—one that imposes heightened obligations on 
the clergyman not to exploit parishioners under his care.114 The 
special quality of this relationship may, however, arise from the 
clergyman’s practice of professional techniques that are essentially 
secular, rather than from his religious role.115 In most jurisdictions, 
 112. See, e.g., Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ohio 1988) (discussing 
amatory actions and the reasons why such actions have largely been abolished, and collecting 
cases and statutory provisions from other jurisdictions that have abolished such actions). Many 
states have abolished amatory actions by statute. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-923 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-601 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 
(Anderson 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (Michie 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN.. § 1-23-101 
(Michie 1977); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 81 (1992) (discussing civil 
remedies for sexual offenses). See generally Jill Joner, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: 
Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 61 (1998) 
(explaining the history of the amatory torts); Gregory L. Thompson, Note, The Suit of 
Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be Justified Today?, 56 N.D. L. REV. 239, 243 
(1980).  
 113. For a recent recognition of this problem, see Wende C. v. United Methodist 
Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (“[T]o impose greater liability [for 
battery] on an adulterer who happens to be a minister than on any other adulterer would, in 
our view, violate constitutional principles.”).  
 114. See generally Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual 
Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 37–48 (1996) (arguing 
that the relationship between clergy and congregant is fiduciary in character, and sexual 
contact within that relationship is a breach of the fiduciary’s duty). 
 115. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336–37 (5th Cir. 
1998) (upholding a claim against a clergy member for professional negligence in his practice of 
essentially secular marriage counseling). 
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psychotherapists, social workers, and others who hold themselves out 
as secular counselors face tort liability, criminal responsibility, and 
professional discipline for sexual exploitation of their patients.116 
When clergy publicly advertise their availability to provide such 
counseling, perform the counseling in clinical settings similar to 
those of a secular counselor, and receive payment for rendering the 
service, they invite the application of the same standards applied to 
others similarly trained. If a pastor provided medical services as a 
trained and licensed physician in addition to her duties as a pastor, 
and was alleged to have negligently set a broken arm, no court 
would take seriously a claim for ecclesiastical immunity from medical 
malpractice.117 There is no more justification for recognizing such 
immunity for a pastor who practices secular therapy. 
Claims of sexual misconduct by secular counselors typically 
sound in professional malpractice, on the theory that a therapist has 
mishandled the strong emotional bonds that often arise between 
therapist and patient.118 To the extent that a clergyman has 
undergone training in secular modes of therapy, held himself out as 
qualified to perform such therapeutic techniques, and induced a 
patient to rely on that expertise, the law should hold the clergy-
counselor to answer for therapeutic malpractice in that vocation as 
well.119 
With few exceptions, however, courts have been unwilling to 
impose malpractice liability on clergy-counselors.120 This 
 116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 609.345(h)-(j) (2003) (establishing a criminal prohibition 
on sex between mental health practitioners and their patients); see also id. § 609.345(l) 
(extending criminal prohibition to sexual contact between clergy and congregant, when sex 
arises from counseling relationship). 
 117. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1433 (7th Cir. 1994). The court in Dausch 
explained the distinction between these two realms of action: 
[T]oday, religious groups offer their adherents, and sometimes the entire 
community, services that were not offered by ecclesiastical sources in the past. Few 
would doubt, however, that a lawyer practicing in a legal clinic operated by a church 
or a physician practicing in a clinic under church auspices would have to comply 
with the same standards of professional care and responsibility as any other law firm 
or medical facility. 
Id. 
 118. Id. at 1435; Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1380–81 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997); 
see also Villiers, supra note 114, at 43–45. 
 119. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337–38. 
 120. See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 283–86 (Colo. 1988) (permitting a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim in a suit over sexual misconduct of a pastoral counselor, but 
rejecting plaintiff.’s claim of malpractice in counseling). 
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unwillingness dates back to the landmark case Nally v. Grace 
Community Church of the Valley.121 In Nally, as we discussed above, 
plaintiffs alleged that their son had received negligent pastoral 
counseling at a church and that the pastors’ negligence was 
responsible for their son’s suicide. After an intermediate appellate 
court allowed plaintiffs to sue on a theory of clergy malpractice, the 
California Supreme Court reversed. The court reasoned that 
imposition of malpractice liability for negligent pastoral counseling 
would involve the court in judgments about the “religious 
philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings 
of the religious entity.”122 
Courts have good reason to reject claims of clergy malpractice 
when such claims invite the court to determine the standard of 
pastoral care for a “reasonable Catholic priest” or a “reasonable 
Orthodox rabbi.” These are judgments that only that particular 
religious tradition can render and are precisely the kinds of appraisals 
that the doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity bars.123 In Nally, the 
church and its pastors did not advertise their competence to perform 
secular therapy but instead offered thickly religious counseling.124 
The court found that it could not adjudicate plaintiff’s claim without 
determining a standard of care for reasonable spiritual counseling 
and that the Constitution prohibits such a determination. 
In order to avoid the need for a court to find a standard of care 
for the “reasonable clergyman,” plaintiffs and courts have looked to 
the law of fiduciaries as an alternative legal basis for recognizing the 
special relationship between clergy and congregant. In Destefano v. 
Grabrian,125 the leading case involving a priest’s sexual relationship 
with a woman he was counseling, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
rejected plaintiff’s claim of clergy malpractice.126 The court, however, 
did allow her to proceed on a theory that the priest had breached his 
fiduciary duty to her: 
 121. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). 
 122. Id. at 960. 
 123. Id.; see also Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 
Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208–10 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 
N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ohio 1988). 
 124. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950–52. 
 125. 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). 
 126. Id. at 285. 
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Edna’s first claim for relief alleges that Grabrian, in his position as a 
priest and as one who holds himself out to the community as a 
professional or trained marriage counselor, breached his fiduciary 
duty to her. A fiduciary is a person having a duty, created by his 
undertaking, to act primarily for the benefit of another in matters 
connected with the undertaking. A fiduciary has a duty to deal 
“with utmost good faith and solely for the benefit” of the 
beneficiary. . . . A fiduciary’s obligations to the beneficiary include, 
among other things, a duty of loyalty, . . . a duty to exercise 
reasonable care and skill, . . . and a duty to deal impartially with 
beneficiaries . . . . 
 A person standing in a fiduciary relationship with another is 
subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of 
the duty imposed by the relationship. . . . We have no difficulty in 
finding that Grabrian, as a marriage counselor to Robert and Edna, 
owed a fiduciary duty to Edna. His duty to Edna was “created by 
his undertaking” to counsel her. Grabrian had a duty, given the 
nature of the counseling relationship, to engage in conduct 
designed to improve the Destefanos’ marital relationship. As a 
fiduciary, he was obligated not to engage in conduct which might 
harm the Destefanos’ relationship. If the allegations are true, it is 
clear to us that Grabrian breached his duty and obligation when he 
had sexual intercourse with Edna.127 
The Destefano court also held that Grabrian had no plausible 
constitutional defense to the breach of fiduciary claim because the 
alleged misconduct was “not an expression of sincerely held religious 
belief.”128 
Three aspects of the Destefano court’s fiduciary analysis suggest 
constitutional weaknesses in this approach. First, the Destefano court 
limited its constitutional analysis to the Free Exercise Clause and 
summarily dismissed any defenses based on that clause because “the 
alleged wrongdoing of [the] cleric clearly [fell] outside the beliefs 
and doctrine of his religion.”129 As we discussed above, courts and 
litigants too frequently mischaracterize the constitutional roots of 
ecclesiastical immunity, which rest not in an individual’s claim of 
religious liberty but rather in the court’s recognition of the state’s 
limited jurisdiction. Few clerics claim that they have a religious 
 127. Id. at 284 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
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justification for engaging in sex with their congregants, but that is 
not the proper constitutional inquiry. The doctrine of ecclesiastical 
immunity requires the court to determine whether, and on what 
terms, it is competent to impose the standards of civil law on the 
clergy-congregant relationship. 
Second, the court’s expansive definition of the fiduciary’s 
obligations makes this cause of action virtually indistinguishable from 
malpractice, a claim that the court rejects because it “raises serious 
first amendment issues.”130 In addition to the duties of loyalty to and 
impartiality among beneficiaries, the court recognizes a duty to 
“exercise reasonable care and skill” in carrying out the fiduciary’s 
responsibilities.131 One might prove a breach of the duty of loyalty, 
and perhaps also a breach of the duty of impartiality, without 
reference to a standard of care, but “reasonable care and skill” 
obviously depend on a standard of the “reasonably careful 
fiduciary.”132 The Destefano court does not explain how application 
of the reasonable fiduciary standard differs in any way from the 
constitutionally impermissible adjudication of the reasonable priest 
standard—and not one of the courts that has followed the Destefano 
court’s analysis has offered an explanation either.133 
Third, and most importantly, the court held that the relationship 
between priest and counselee imposed fiduciary obligations on the 
priest as a matter of law and that sexual contact between such a 
fiduciary and his beneficiary constituted a breach of the fiduciary’s 
duties.134 These two determinations—first, identifying a fiduciary 
relationship, and second, designating sexual contact between 
fiduciary and beneficiary as a breach thereof—represent the fulcrum 
 130. Id. at 285. 
 131. Id. at 284. 
 132. For precisely this reason, a number of courts have rejected the distinction between 
clergy malpractice and breach of a cleric’s fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 
1425, 1438–39 (7th Cir. 1994); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326–27 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); Teadt v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816, 821–23 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1999); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
 133. See, e.g., Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 923 
P.2d 152, 157–58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 373–75 (Fla. 2002); 
F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703–05 (N.J. 1997). 
 134. Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284. In his concurring opinion, Justice Quinn makes this 
point more clearly: “No one can reasonably dispute the fact that the relation between a 
Catholic priest and a person of the same faith who is receiving marriage counseling from the 
priest is in a fiduciary relation founded on utmost trust and confidence.” Id. at 289 (Quinn, J., 
concurring). 
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upon which rest Destefano and its substantial progeny.135 They also 
represent the point at which careful constitutional analysis is most 
needed yet least often found in the decisions. 
To establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the plaintiff 
is typically required to prove the following elements, as articulated in 
Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn:136 
1) The vulnerability of one party to the other which 2) results in 
the empowerment of the stronger party by the weaker which 3) 
empowerment has been solicited or accepted by the stronger party 
and 4) prevents the weaker party from effectively protecting 
itself.137 
For our purposes, the most constitutionally significant elements 
are the first two—the source of the plaintiff’s vulnerability to the 
defendant cleric. Some courts have held that such vulnerability is the 
result of a “power imbalance between a clergy person and a 
parishioner.”138 Put more starkly, the cleric’s “fiduciary position is 
derived from his position as a pastor in his church.”139 We have 
searched diligently and have found no decisions in which courts have 
deemed leaders of non-religious voluntary associations to stand in 
fiduciary relationships with adult members of the association. If, as 
may be the case, the law is treating religious leaders differently, is 
such a disparity justified? 
Any answer that focuses on the peculiar nature of religious belief 
rests on dubious constitutional ground. In a careful consideration of 
 135. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Enderle v. Trautman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20181, at *25 (D.N.D. Dec. 3, 2001); 
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151 (D. Conn. 
1998); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Colo. 1996); Winkler, 
923 P.2d at 157; Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 330 (Colo. 1993); Malicki v. Doe, 
814 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002); Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 374 (Fla. 2002); Osborne v. 
Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 704 (N.J. 1997). 
 136. 677 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998), aff’d, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000).  
 137. Id. (citing Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, 
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 922); see also Richelle L. 
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 138. Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV. 13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *5 (D.N.D. Dec. 
3, 2001) (quoting D.E.M. v. Allickson, 555 N.W.2d 596, 604 (N.D. 1996)); see also Doe v. 
Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 373–77 (Fla. 2002). This argument is advanced in Villiers, supra note 
114, at 46–48. See also Zanita Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse 
by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 45, 58–67 (2001). 
 139. Enderle, 2001 WL 1820145, at *6. 
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this question, a California appellate court rejected a plaintiff.’s breach 
of fiduciary duty claim when the alleged duty was based on the 
religious relationship between priest and parishioner: 
[T]he crucial questions [of] whether appellant was vulnerable to 
Reverend Namocatcat and unable to protect herself effectively 
would focus sharply on the nature and depth of her religious faith 
and its basis, if any, in Roman Catholic doctrine. These are, of 
course, profoundly religious questions, as to which courts may not 
constitutionally inquire.140 
This constitutional limitation stems from the basic legal 
definition of a fiduciary relationship as an entrustment by one who is 
vulnerable to one who is not only stronger but who has also induced 
or accepted the vulnerable one’s entrustment. In short, the fiduciary 
relationship requires intentional action by both the weaker and the 
stronger. To determine whether a religious relationship should give 
rise to a fiduciary obligation, a court would need to examine the 
religious understandings of parishioner and priest. It is possible, of 
course, that the parties will hold consonant religious understandings 
of the relationship.141 It is equally possible, however, that the parties 
will assert divergent understandings. 
How would a court resolve this difference? Several courts seem 
to rely solely on the subjective religious views of the plaintiff,142 but 
that approach effectively—and unconstitutionally—discriminates 
against religious defendants by imposing fiduciary obligations on 
them through the unilateral action of the alleged beneficiary. The 
alternative is no more constitutionally acceptable. If the plaintiff and 
defendant disagree about the religious meaning of the relationship, 
the court will need to decide between the rival understandings. 
Whether the judge or the jury makes this determination, the 
constitutional offense is the same. A court may no more determine 
the “true” theological meaning of a clergy-congregant relationship 
than it may determine the standard of a reasonable cleric, or who 
 140. Richelle L., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. 
 141. See F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (N.J. 1997) (noting that a priest 
admitted in a deposition that sex with parishioner violated his fiduciary obligation to her). 
 142. Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“Where a person’s beliefs are alleged to give rise to a special legal relationship between 
him and his church, we may be required to consider with other relevant evidence the nature of 
that person’s beliefs in order properly to determine whether the asserted relationship in fact 
exists.”). 
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should be imam of a mosque, or which faction in an intrachurch 
dispute is more faithful to church teaching. 
A fiduciary relationship between clergy and congregant must be 
grounded in something other than its religious character.143 The vast 
majority of cases of clergy sexual misconduct with adult victims, 
including Destefano, arise from counseling relationships.144 As we 
argued above, the Constitution does not bar adjudication of claims 
where the clergyman has held himself out as willing and capable to 
provide secular counseling. Secular considerations—such as the 
vulnerability of one who seeks therapy, induced and accepted by one 
who offers such services—establish the fiduciary character of the 
counseling relationship. Courts will judge according to secular 
standards whether and to what extent a cleric-therapist who initiates 
a sexual relationship with his counselee has, in so doing, violated the 
obligations of one who offers such therapy. It matters little whether 
the plaintiff.’s claims are styled as therapist malpractice or a breach of 
fiduciary duties because courts will measure the standard of care 
using a reasonable practitioner standard from the secular therapy at 
issue. 
More constitutionally problematic, however, are cases in which 
the cleric did not hold himself out as offering secular therapeutic 
counseling but did provide religious counseling to a parishioner with 
whom he engaged in sexual misconduct. To assess such cases, it is 
important first to understand that the act of counseling does not 
create a legal relationship such that any sexual contact between the 
counselor and counselee constitutes actionable misconduct. Informal 
counseling between friends may lead to sexual intimacy, but the 
entrustment of confidences and its attendant vulnerabilities do not 
transform this intimacy into a breach of fiduciary duties. 
 143. In an astute reply to our paper, Bill Marshall asserts that courts might properly 
ground such fiduciary relationships in a religion-neutral theory of dependence and trust. See 
William P. Marshall, Separation, Neutrality, and Clergy Liability for Sexual Misconduct, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1921. In particular, he argues that leaders of any organization, religious or 
secular, might have fiduciary duties toward their followers. If we were confident that such 
duties could be articulated in a religion-neutral way, and rest on relational qualities that are not 
distinctively religious, we would be inclined to agree with Professor Marshall. We have, 
however, never come across a decided case in which any such liability has been imposed on a 
secular leader. 
 144. See Richelle L, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612 (listing cases arising out of sexual 
relationships in the religious counseling context). 
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Nor does the fact that two legally competent adults stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with one another mean that any sexual contact 
between the two is necessarily a breach of the fiduciary’s duties. Sex 
between a stockbroker and client or a trustee and beneficiary creates 
no greater legal liability than that between any two adult strangers.145 
Even the relationship between a physician and patient, with its legally 
privileged confidential conversations about treatment, is not one in 
which sexual contact represents a per se actionable breach of 
fiduciary duty.146 
In cases that have recognized fiduciary duty claims arising from 
sexual relationships between a doctor and patient, courts have 
typically focused on one of several special factors that would 
overcome the patient’s capacity to give effective consent to intimate 
contact. Courts find physicians to have breached a fiduciary duty 
when they have induced a patient to engage in sex by representing 
that the sex is part of the course of treatment,147 though such 
inducement may be better characterized as a form of fraud. As we 
discussed above, courts regularly hold that a physician has breached 
his fiduciary obligation if he offers therapeutic counseling, and the 
sexual relationship arises out of the therapeutic bonds.148 In the 
absence of such factors, however, courts have been reluctant to hold 
physicians liable for engaging in sexual relationships with their 
patients, even if such conduct represents a serious breach of 
standards of professional ethics. 
What, then, of a sexual relationship between a cleric and his 
congregant, when the affair does not arise out of secular therapeutic 
counseling? If courts deciding such cases follow the decisions of cases 
involving sex between physicians and patients, they should be 
reticent about finding civil liability, even though no one defends the 
moral propriety of the sexual relationship. In particular, courts 
should avoid the temptation to impose heightened liability on 
 145. Of course, if the fiduciary conditioned performance of his duties on the beneficiary’s 
participation in a sexual relationship, the fiduciary likely would have breached his duty, but the 
sexual quality of the condition does not make it a breach; any condition not specified in the 
trust would constitute a breach. 
 146. See, e.g., Atienza v. Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Odegard v. 
Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Darnaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2002). See generally Puglise, supra note 34, at 321. 
 147. Puglise, supra note 34, at 336. 
 148. Id. at 335–36. 
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religious leaders because of the leaders’ “sacred” position. 
Unfortunately, some courts have not resisted this temptation, as 
exemplified by F.G. v. MacDonnell,149 in which the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey wrote: 
Ordinarily, consenting adults must bear the consequences of their 
conduct, including sexual conduct. In the sanctuary of the church, 
however, troubled parishioners should be able to seek pastoral 
counseling free from the fear that the counselors will sexually abuse 
them. Our decision does no more than extend to the defenseless 
the same protection that the dissent would extend to infants and 
incompetents.150 
In the F.G. court’s reasoning, the religious quality of pastoral 
counseling is a crucial element of the parishioner’s vulnerability. 
Trust in the pastoral relationship arises because parishioners “turn to 
their pastor in the belief that their religion is the most likely source 
to sustain them in their time of trouble.”151 
The F.G. court’s language raises serious constitutional concerns 
that the court deployed civil law to enforce religious obligations—
securing “the sanctuary of the church” for “troubled parishioners” 
who should be able find solace in their pastor’s care.152 Although the 
court refers at times to the duties of secular psychotherapists, the 
court does not rest the duties of a pastoral counselor on the cleric’s 
practice of secular therapeutic techniques. Instead, the court 
explicitly grounds the duties of a pastoral counselor in the religious 
qualities of the relationship between clergy and congregant. The 
court’s rationale does not depend in any way on counseling as a 
course of treatment and would just as easily encompass the act of 
sacramental confession. The F.G. decision thus reflects precisely the 
same constitutional defect as those that regard clergy to be 
fiduciaries of their congregants as a matter of law. Both approaches 
impose special legal status on the religious character of a relationship. 
In rejecting the approach taken in F.G., we do not conclude that 
sex between a cleric and his congregant is actionable only if the cleric 
 149. 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997). 
 150. Id. at 705. This passage was quoted, with approval, by the Florida Supreme Court in 
Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 375 (Fla. 2002), another case involving sexual misconduct in a 
religious counseling relationship.  
 151. Id. at 564. 
 152. See Mansfield, supra note 62, at 1170 (finding the civil duty to act or not act in a 
certain way may not be based on “a church’s own law, customs, or traditions”). 
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is engaged in the practice of secular therapeutic counseling. We do 
believe, however, that judicial assessment of sexual relationships 
between clergy and parishioners requires heightened sensitivity to 
the constitutional problems inherent in such adjudications. At a 
minimum, courts should not hold religious defendants to a 
heightened standard of care because of their religious character. This 
protection would likely require courts to inspect closely the plaintiff’s 
case to determine if it contains sufficient evidence, not dependant 
upon religion-specific characteristics, of both a fiduciary relationship 
and breach of the attendant duty. In the absence of such evidence, 
the court should not permit the case to go to the jury. 
To illustrate how such a case might proceed, we return to the 
analogous situation of sexual relationships between patients and 
physicians. In recent years, several courts have held that a physician 
may be liable for engaging in sex with his patient, even if the 
physician did not offer therapeutic counseling or represent that sex 
was part of the medical treatment.153 For example, in McCracken v. 
Walls-Kaufman,154 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
permitted a woman to proceed with a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
against her chiropractor, arising from the chiropractor’s sexual 
contact with her during her course of treatment.155 The court 
recognized that the chiropractor’s conduct did not fit within the 
normal categories for holding “a person engaged in the healing arts” 
liable for having sex with his patients.156 He was not engaged in the 
practice of psychotherapy, he did not hold himself out as a 
therapeutic counselor, and he did not “represent[] to the patient 
that sex is a part of the treatment.”157 Nevertheless, the court 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the patient’s claim and held that 
such liability could also extend to contexts in which a health 
practitioner “become[s] engaged in giving counsel or advice to 
patients similar to that usually given by psychologists or 
psychologists.”158 The plaintiff alleged that the chiropractor invited 
 153. McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1998); Hoopes v. 
Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1986); Darnaby v. Davis, 57 P.3d 100 (Okla. Ct. App. 
2002); see also Puglise, supra note 34, at 340–45. 
 154. 717 A.2d 346. 
 155. Id. at 352. 
 156. Id. at 351. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 353. 
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discussion of personal matters during her treatments, provided advice 
and counseling to her on such matters, and knew that she was 
especially vulnerable because of an addiction to Valium.159 Given 
those facts, the court held that the plaintiff.’s complaint survived the 
chiropractor’s motion to dismiss.160 
A similarly structured inquiry could be applied in cases alleging 
sexual misconduct by clergy where the cleric has not held himself out 
as practicing secular therapeutic counseling.161 As a minimum 
condition for imposing liability, the inquiry should establish that the 
cleric has undertaken a regular course of counseling sessions with an 
adult congregant162 in which the cleric offers the congregant 
particularized advice on personal, as opposed to entirely spiritual, 
matters. Additionally, the congregant-plaintiff should demonstrate 
that the cleric knew of some special circumstance that made the 
congregant especially vulnerable to exploitation, such as a history of 
mental illness or substance abuse. Taken together, these 
requirements provide a safeguard against the temptation to hold 
clergy to a heightened standard of care because of their religious 
status, while simultaneously permitting courts to compensate 
plaintiffs who have been exploited in circumstances functionally 
identical to secular counseling. 
B. Civil Claims Against Religious Organizations and Supervisors 
In the preceding section, we discussed claims and charges against 
religious leaders accused of sexual misconduct. In this section, we 
examine plaintiffs’ claims against religious organizations arising out 
of the sexual misconduct of their clergy.163 For plaintiffs, assertions of 
 159. Id. at 349. The court cites a Nevada case, Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238 
(Nev. 1986), on the question of the patient’s particular vulnerability to exploitation. 
McCracken, 717 A.2d at 352. 
 160.  McCracken, 717 A.2d at 355. 
 161. Where a cleric has held himself out as offering—or offered—secular therapeutic 
counseling, claims of sexual misconduct against him should be treated the same as claims 
against any secular counselor. 
 162. The category of potential plaintiffs need not be restricted to members of the cleric’s 
congregation, or even faith, so long as the plaintiff can show she or he developed a counseling 
relationship with the cleric. As noted above, this category of claims only involves mentally 
competent adults who engaged in noncoercive sexual relationships with the cleric. 
 163. For purposes of simplicity, we typically refer in this section only to the liability of the 
organization, although plaintiffs frequently make claims against individual agents of the 
organizations as well. 
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institutional liability are important because institutional actors are 
often the only available source of compensation for the wrongdoing. 
This is especially true when the wrongdoing happened long in the 
past or when the wrongdoing involved criminal conduct for which 
the cleric is now incarcerated. Moreover, religious institutions and 
communities are more than just a set of pockets deeper than those of 
the individual clergy. The victim frequently has a substantial 
relationship with the religious community that the wrongdoer served 
and is likely to experience the sexual abuse as a betrayal of trust that 
the victim placed in the community and its faith. 
In this section, we divide plaintiffs’ civil law claims against 
religious institutions into three categories. The first consists of claims 
that arise out of the religious organization’s direct interactions with 
the plaintiff, including allegations that the organization breached 
obligations toward the plaintiff when responding to the plaintiff.’s 
injury. The widely cited decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado 
in Moses v. Diocese of Denver.164 is a good example of an alleged 
breach of the institutional fiduciary’s duty of loyalty, raised by a 
victim of sexual misconduct against a church official who had 
supervisory authority over the wrongdoer. 
The second encompasses claims arising out of the organization’s 
actions taken with respect to the wrongdoer—including training, 
hiring, and supervising—who is alleged to have caused harm to the 
plaintiff. The recent decision of a Massachusetts trial court in Hogan 
v. Archbishop of Boston,165 which led to the $85 million settlement of 
claims brought by several hundred plaintiffs, provides a typical list of 
alleged breaches of duties of care. The plaintiffs claimed that the 
Archbishop and his agents acted negligently with respect to the 
ordination, assignment, selection, supervision, transfer, and retention 
of the church’s priests.166 
The third category consists of claims that courts should hold a 
religious organization vicariously liable for the sexual misconduct of 
its employee. These claims do not involve allegations of wrongful 
conduct on the part of the institution but rather impute to the 
 164. 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). 
 165. No. 02-1296 (Mass. Sup. Ct Feb. 18, 2003), at www.socialaw.com/superior/ 
supFeb03xx.htm. 
 166. The court distinguished plaintiffs’ negligent retention, selection, and transfer claims 
from negligent ordination and failure to laicize—that is, to strip priests’ ordination. Id. It held 
the latter claims barred by the Constitution. 
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wrongdoer’s employer the responsibility for bearing the costs of its 
employee’s misdeeds.  
These three categories of institutional liability—as a fiduciary to 
victims, as a negligent actor in the supervision of clergy, and, by way 
of the doctrine of respondeat superior, as an employer of clergy—
have all been expanding in response to the scandals associated with 
clergy sexual misconduct. Some aspects of this expansion are 
constitutionally acceptable and meritorious on policy grounds. Other 
features of these developments, however, are dubious on both 
constitutional and policy grounds. In what follows, we look in depth 
at each of the three categories. Fiduciary liabilities are growing the 
quickest and pose the greatest risk of unconstitutionally singling out 
religious institutions for disfavored treatment. Negligence liabilities 
are a matter of great controversy, and we offer what we hope is the 
novel and useful suggestion that First Amendment standards, 
borrowed from the constitutional law of defamation, may help 
reconcile the tensions in this field. Vicarious liability has shown the 
least tendency to expand under pressure, but here, too, we identify 
considerations of constitutionality and policy that may help courts 
move in a sound direction. 
1. Institutional fiduciary duties to victims of sexual misconduct 
In Part IV.A, above, we discussed claims against sexual 
wrongdoers and noted the persistent trend among courts to reject 
claims of clergy malpractice while remaining receptive to claims that 
clergy had breached fiduciary duties to their parishioner-counselees. 
It was only with more caution than courts have exercised that we 
approved of this move, which rests on the constitutional 
presupposition that the state may not define duties of pastoral care 
but may specify duties of pastoral-counselor loyalty. 
When the locus of liability shifts from clergy wrongdoers to 
institutional actors who stand behind them, the constitutional norms 
may play out in more subtle ways, but the underlying dynamics 
remain the same. Here, too, courts must craft legally imposed duties 
in constitutionally sensitive ways. Tort law rules and processes should 
not permit religious character alone to trigger the imposition of 
duties, nor should tort law effectively require religious entities to 
restructure themselves to satisfy a state-imposed vision of the “good” 
or well-ordered religion. 
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In a number of recent suits, plaintiffs have diversified their claims 
against organizations in much the same ways that they and their 
lawyers have learned to do against individual wrongdoers.167 It has 
become routine for such lawsuits to include claims that the 
defendant institutions or supervisors have breached fiduciary duties, 
as well as duties of care, to plaintiffs who assert that they have been 
victims of sexual abuse. In the context of institutional claims, 
however, fiduciary responsibilities have a very different character than 
in the context of claims against clergy alleged to be sexual 
wrongdoers. In the latter context, the assertion always involves an 
intimate relationship between the clergyman and the parishioner.168 
In contrast, the institutional fiduciary claims rarely involve any close, 
personal connection between organizational leaders and victims of 
sexual abuse. Instead, the claim of fiduciary breach in such cases 
typically arises out of the organization’s failure to investigate 
allegations of wrong,169 to warn potential victims,170 to take earlier 
remedial action against known wrongdoers, or a combination of such 
defaults.171 
The law of fiduciary duties requires a demonstration that a 
relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties—that the 
claimed beneficiary of the duty has reposed special confidence in the 
claimed holder of the duty and that the asserted holder of the duty 
has accepted that trust.172 In such a relationship, the trusted party is 
under a legal duty to act for, and give advice for the benefit of, the 
trusting party on matters within the scope of their relationship.173 A 
number of courts have dismissed on the pleadings such claims 
against religious institutions on the theory that the defendant 
religious organization and its representatives have not undertaken 
any special duties with respect to each and every adherent of the 
 167. The leading decisions marking this trend include Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman 
Catholic Diocese Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2nd Cir. 1999) and Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 
310 (Colo. 1993). Both of these decisions are analyzed in detail below. 
 168. See, e.g., Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988). 
 169. See, e.g., Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 426–30. 
 170. Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999). 
 171. Doe v. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 2002). 
 172. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (defining elements of the fiduciary 
relation). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979). 
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faith.174 These dismissals are consistent with a common-sense 
recognition, rarely expressed in judicial opinions, that religious 
institutions have their own set of interests, some religious and some 
material, which may conflict with the interests of individuals. 
Accordingly, members of the religious community do not have any 
legitimate expectations that organizations will respond to assertions 
of sexual misconduct by clergy with actions taken for the sole benefit 
of the accuser. 
Nevertheless, perhaps out of understandable impulses that 
wrongs should be remedied and that religious organizations, 
claiming to do God’s work, should be held to standards higher than 
those of the marketplace, some prominent courts have begun to 
expand the fiduciary obligations of religious organizations and their 
spokespersons in cases involving sexual abuse. The first important 
opinion in this line of development is Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,175 
decided by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1993. Ms. Moses (now 
known as Mary Moses Tenantry and so referenced in the opinion), 
who had been sexually abused by her father and had a long history of 
mental illness, became sexually involved with a Episcopal priest, 
Father Robinson, at her church.176 Ms. Tenantry had sought the 
priest out for counseling on family matters, although the opinion 
hints that her infatuation with him began prior to the counseling.177 
When her husband learned of the affair, he consulted with the 
diocesan bishop, who asserted his desire to supervise “whatever 
needed to happen.”178 In the presence of Ms. Tenantry’s husband, 
the bishop confronted Father Robinson, who by this time had 
become pastor of a different church, and urged him to get 
counseling and to advise the bishop immediately if there were any 
similar episodes in his new parish.179 
The bishop then met with Ms. Tenantry and advised her to stay 
away from Father Robinson.180 He further advised her to stop talking 
 174. See Bryan R., 738 A.2d at 844–47; Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Mo. 
1997); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 385, 395–98 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. 1995). 
 175. 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). 
 176. Id. at 316. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 317. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 318. 
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about her affair to anyone except her husband and a “priest or 
counselor.”181 According to the opinion, the bishop “took no further 
action to assist [Ms.] Tenantry after this meeting.”182 
Three years later, Ms. Tenantry had a chance encounter with 
Father Robinson.183 Her report of the encounter to her husband 
began a downward spiral that led to the dissolution of her marriage, 
disintegration of other family relations, failure of her business, and 
profound collapse of her mental health.184 At trial, mental health 
experts testified that the bishop’s willingness to support Father 
Robinson in his assignment at his new parish “led to the unraveling 
of Ms. Tenantry’s personality structure.”185 More particularly, these 
experts testified that her personality structure depended upon her 
relationship with the church, in which she had lost confidence as a 
result of her experience with Father Robinson and the bishop. The 
bishop’s actions, according to this testimony, aggravated her 
breakdown in trust because the bishop:  
1) allowed her to believe that she was primarily at fault; 2) did not 
ask to hear her side of the affair; 3) did not ask her how she felt 
about the relationship or how she planned to deal with it; and 4) 
requested that she maintain secrecy about the relationship.186 
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for Ms. 
Tenantry against the bishop and the diocese. Asserting the quite 
familiar distinction between clergy malpractice and fiduciary 
duties,187 the court ruled that the jury had been properly instructed 
on the elements of fiduciary duty and that there had been sufficient 
evidence to support the verdict.188 As the court characterized the 
claim, “this case involves a party who used his superior position as a 
counselor, a bishop, and a final arbiter of problems with the clergy to 
the detriment of a vulnerable, dependent party.”189 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 318. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 318 n.9. 
 187. The Colorado Supreme Court had already pioneered the distinction in Destefano, 
discussed and criticized in Part III.A.  
 188. Moses, 863 P.2d at 337. 
 189. Id. at 322. 
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The Moses opinion is full of danger signs for religious 
organizations. It is not hard to see the ways in which Ms. Tenantry’s 
troubled past would lead the courts, and jurors, to be sympathetic to 
her plight. But it is equally easy to see, if one is willing to look, that 
the bishop did not hold himself out as her counselor, nor did he 
represent that he was acting in her interest rather than the 
institutional interests of the church in clergy management and crisis 
control. The expert’s testimony that the bishop did not listen to Ms. 
Tenantry’s side of the story or help her explore her feelings or her 
planned course of action, is quite inconsistent with a claim that he 
was acting as her spiritual counselor rather than the caretaker of the 
church’s interests. When courts allow juries, under vague and general 
instructions, to permit the institutional position of bishop or pastoral 
leader to become dispositive factors in the imposition of fiduciary 
duties, courts are effectively imposing upon religious organizations a 
state-backed vision of how religious organizations should conduct 
pastoral relations. As understandable as those normative expectations 
may be, their application to religious organizations in cases like Moses 
is in serious tension with the First Amendment considerations 
associated with the doctrines of ecclesiastical immunity.190 
The constitutional defects lurking in the Moses decision 
manifested themselves two years later in Winkler v. Rocky Mountain 
Conference,191 decided by a Colorado appellate court. Winkler, a 
church volunteer, alleged that her pastor had groped her and other 
women.192 Consequently, she sued the pastor, the congregation, and 
the United Methodist Conference to which the congregation 
belonged, alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty.193 
The local congregation settled with the plaintiff, but the plaintiff 
received a substantial jury award in her fiduciary duty claim against 
the conference.194 In contrast to Moses, Winkler’s claims do not arise 
out of the direct counseling relationship between conference officials 
and herself. Instead, the alleged fiduciary relationship is based 
 190. If Father Robinson exploited another counselee at his new parish and the bishop 
had failed to warn officers at that parish of Father Robinson’s prior problems, potential liability 
to the next victims would rest on theories of negligence we explore in Part IV, below, rather 
than a theory of fiduciary duty. 
 191. 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 192. Id. at 156. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 157. 
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entirely on actions taken by the conference in investigating her 
charges: 
Winkler asserts that a fiduciary relationship was created by the 
Conference assuming control of the investigation of her complaints 
and those of others. Winkler argues that such a fiduciary 
relationship was created by: (1) the Conference’s actions at the 
April 24, 1992, meeting at which the Conference seemed very 
concerned about the women and wanted them to stay together and 
be supportive of each other; (2) the Conference providing a 
therapist to help the women; and (3) the Conference preparing and 
sending a letter to the Grace Church congregation stating that: 
“We are equally concerned for the healing of any persons who have 
been hurt. They will continue to receive appropriate help for their 
healing and restoration.”195 
Winkler then alleged that the conference breached its fiduciary 
duties by not providing the victims with adequate support, which 
included the conference’s failure to inform the congregation “that it 
had found the women’s claim credible.”196 Although the 
conference’s act of providing counseling may look like a traditional 
fiduciary’s undertaking,197 Winkler did not allege any breach arising 
out of the quality of that counseling. The breach seems to involve 
only the quality of the conference’s administrative response to the 
cleric’s wrongdoing.198 Nonetheless, the court sustained the jury’s 
finding that the conference owed, and had breached, fiduciary duties 
to Ms. Winkler.199 
Four years later, judicial willingness to permit claims of fiduciary 
duty against organizations expanded yet further in a highly 
influential decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.200 
Martinelli involved allegations that a diocese had failed in the mid-
1960s to investigate complaints about Father Lawrence Brett, who 
had been a parish priest in Stamford, Connecticut, and then spiritual 
 195. Id. at 158. 
 196. Id. 
 197. The conference did not directly provide the women with counseling; instead, it 
financed counseling of the women provided by professionals. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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director at a Catholic college within the diocese.201 Father Brett had 
initiated a sexual relationship with Mr. Martinelli at a time when 
Brett “acted as a mentor and spiritual advisor to a small group of 
boys, including Martinelli, who were interested in liturgical reforms 
in the Catholic Church.”202 Martinelli alleged that he recovered his 
memory of this experience in the early 1990s, and complained in his 
lawsuit that the diocese had not pursued the complaints about 
Father Brett that it received from others in the mid-1960s.203 Had 
the diocese done so, Martinelli claimed, it would have discovered 
that Father Brett abused him, and it would have helped Martinelli to 
seek the sort of assistance that might have prevented the emotional 
harm that befell him as his life proceeded.204 
The fiduciary claim in Martinelli played a central role in the 
disposition of the case because of the statute of limitations. If 
Martinelli’s claim sounded only in negligence, the claim would have 
been time-barred.205 If, however, the claim of fiduciary obligation 
and breach was legally sufficient, tolling doctrines of fraudulent 
concealment (applicable to those with fiduciary obligations) would 
come into play and open up the possibility of recovery on the 
merits.206 
Under the pressure of this problem, the Second Circuit ruled 
that the diocese owed fiduciary obligations to Martinelli. The diocese 
argued that it could not be held to have a special relationship of trust 
and confidence with each and every one of the 300,000 Roman 
Catholics in the Bridgeport Diocese.207 The court rejected, however, 
this conception of the diocese’s fiduciary duty.208 The complaints 
that had come to the diocese in 1966 included one from a young 
man who had been a member of the small group of boys with whom 
Father Brett had cultivated close relationships.209 Accordingly, the 
court reasoned, the diocese had a duty to the other students in that 
small group to investigate further, to locate other victims if there 
 201. Id. at 414–15. 
 202. Id. at 414. 
 203. Id. at 416. 
 204. Id. at 426. 
 205. Id. at 416. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 428–29. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 430. 
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were any, and to help such victims cope with the emotional injury 
inflicted by their experience with Father Brett.210 
Like Moses, the opinion in Martinelli proceeds from 
understandable impulses. Martinelli suffered emotionally from Father 
Brett’s encounters with him, and the diocese did nothing to search 
out other, unknown victims of Father Brett’s sexual misconduct. But 
here, as in Moses, the imposition of fiduciary duties upon the diocese 
to a young man whose identity was unknown involves assertions of a 
relationship of personal trust and confidence that the diocese had not 
undertaken. That parishioners hope and expect that religious officials 
will respond to allegations of wrongdoing in a proactive, victim-
oriented way cannot in and of itself create a relationship in which the 
religious organization is legally obliged to do so. To hold otherwise 
is to make parishioners’, judges’, and juries’ collective expectations 
for religious organizations the measure of organizational liability. 
And that measure, imposed by the expectations of third parties 
rather than by explicit undertakings of the faith community, will 
inevitably result in pressure to internalize state-imposed changes in 
organizational structure. Whatever it is labeled, this kind of liability 
represents a normative judgment about organizational 
(mal)practice—that is, a judgment about how the religious polity 
responds in crisis to its clergy and to its adherents.211 
For church lawyers looking for ways to confine Martinelli, the 
fact that Mr. Martinelli was a member of a small group of followers 
of Father Brett, and that the diocese had learned that Father Brett 
had abused another boy in that group, represents the case’s 
dominant and potentially limiting feature. But in Doe v. Evans,212 the 
Florida Supreme Court has recently expanded the most disturbing 
feature of Martinelli—that an institution can assume fiduciary duties 
to an unknown member—in a way that must have sent chills up 
church lawyers’ spines. Doe significantly furthers the trend toward 
recognizing organizational fiduciary duties in cases in which there is 
no personal, face-to-face relationship between the organization and 
the claimed beneficiary. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Mark Chopko characterizes this sort of liability as “situational.” See Chopko, supra 
note 67, at 1106–07. 
 212. 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002). 
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Ms. Doe, an adult at all relevant times, alleged that she belonged 
to the Church of the Holy Redeemer, an Episcopal Church in the 
Diocese of South Florida; that Pastor Evans offered her pastoral 
marital counseling when he learned that she was having marital 
difficulties; and that he commenced a personal and romantic 
relationship with her.213 This relationship caused Ms. Doe harm, and 
the diocese and its officers knew that Evans had engaged in sexual 
misconduct during counseling at this and other churches within the 
diocese.214 Doe also alleged that the diocese “had the right to 
exercise control over a sexually exploitive pastoral counselor” and 
failed to do so.215 She asserted that the diocese’s actions constituted 
negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and a breach of fiduciary 
duty.216 The lower court dismissed these claims on First Amendment 
grounds, and an intermediate appellate court affirmed.217 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed and reinstated all of Ms. 
Doe’s claims. Having analyzed comparable negligence problems in a 
very recent companion case, Malicki v. Doe,218 the court said virtually 
nothing new in Evans about issues of negligent supervision but 
simply reiterated that such claims involved “neutral principles” of law 
and therefore were not subject to any First Amendment bar.219 With 
respect to the fiduciary duty claim, the court was brief and blunt. 
Citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Martinelli,220 the opinion 
announced: 
[W]hen a church, through its clergy, holds itself out as qualified to 
engage in marital counseling and a counseling relationship arises, 
that relationship between the church and the counselee is one that may 
be characterized as fiduciary in nature. . . . [A]s to the 
 213. Id. at 371–73. The complaint does not allege a sexual relationship, although the 
parties briefed the case, and the court decided it, on the assumption that the relationship was 
sexual. One of the dissenting judges rested his objections to the opinion on the ground that 
the court had impermissibly gone outside the pleadings in making this assumption. Id. at 379–
81 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. at 372. 
 215. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 216. Id. 
 217. 718 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 218. 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002). 
 219. Evans, 814 So. 2d at 373 (citing Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 361). 
 220. Id. at 375 (citing Martinelli, 196 F.3d at 430). The court also cited the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988). Evans, 
814 So. 2d at 374. 
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relationship[] between Doe and . . . the Church Defendants, it is a 
question for the jury to determine whether a fiduciary relationship 
arose; the nature of that relationship; and whether as a result of the 
Church Defendants’ conduct, there was a breach of the Church 
Defendants’ duty as fiduciaries to Doe.221 
The opinion at this point drew no distinction between the 
Church of the Holy Redeemer, which employed Pastor Evans, and 
the Episcopal Diocese of South Florida, which stood somewhere in 
the background of that employment relationship but was not a party 
to it. 
By failing to distinguish between personal and institutional 
relationships with the plaintiff, Doe v. Evans completed the cycle of 
expansion of institutional fiduciary duties. Unlike claims against the 
sexual wrongdoer, in which fiduciary duties arise out of the personal 
undertaking as counselor, such duties arise in Doe v. Evans out of 
wholly impersonal relations between the church and its members. 
The duty springs from the general church’s holding out its pastors as 
willing to counsel its adherents, coupled with general knowledge of a 
pastor’s tendencies to exploit such relationships in the past. Under 
legally apt circumstances of control, discussed below,222 we can 
understand and might well approve the imposition of duties to 
supervise the conduct of Pastor Evans, although they fall more 
readily and efficiently on his employer, the Church of the Holy 
Redeemer, than on the far more remote Episcopal Diocese of South 
Florida. Failure to supervise, by one with knowledge of danger and 
in a position to supervise, may appropriately give rise to liability in 
negligence. 
The court holding in Doe v. Evans, however, goes considerably 
further. It is unmindful of degrees of care and supervision that the 
church and the diocese might have imposed on Pastor Evans, and it 
is similarly heedless of questions of diocesan control, or lack thereof, 
over the hiring and work of pastors. The decision effectively instructs 
such a religious organization that it acts at its peril if it fails to 
remove from any pastoral role all clergy that it has reason to know 
have tendencies like those Evans allegedly possessed. 
Religious polities and personnel policies of the sort dictated by 
Doe v. Evans may well be prudent and humane. To those untutored 
 221. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
 222. See infra text accompanying notes 285–97. 
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in the complex structure of religious organizations and the pastoral 
quality of their personnel arrangements, the Florida Supreme Court’s 
expectations of how such organizations should behave will seem 
entirely reasonable. And juries, which must apply this new, sweeping 
conception of fiduciary duty, are likely to share those expectations, 
especially in a world flooded with stories about pedophile priests and 
lustful clerics of every religious persuasion. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the trend represented by the 
decisions from Moses to Evans creates three distinct problems. First, a 
rule that declares the mere meeting between a religious leader and a 
victim to be a trigger of a fiduciary duty may create disincentives to 
ameliorative contacts within the religious community.223 Whatever 
mixture of institutional interests and victim-supportive concerns may 
produce such interactions, they have the potential to accomplish 
some good. A victim of sexual abuse by clergy might seek out a 
religious leader about coping with anger or depression, or for 
guidance with the task of forgiveness, or for action in the form of 
clergy discipline. Such contacts may be deeply salutary. If 
institutions, in doing more than they must, create a risk of liability 
for doing less than they might, such ameliorative efforts might 
decrease in frequency. 
Second, this line of decisions finds no counterpart among secular 
institutions and therefore raises a question of discrimination against 
religious organizations in application of the law. Perhaps courts 
would apply comparable fiduciary standards to secular entities in an 
appropriate case, but this saving possibility has not yet arisen. 
Moreover, we have reason to doubt that courts would do so, 
especially in circumstances where the relationship is as remote as that 
between the diocese and the plaintiff in Doe v. Evans. Courts could, 
of course, take steps toward solving this problem by making clear 
that such theories of fiduciary duty apply equally to both religious 
and secular organizations. But even if courts did so clarify, jury 
instructions should be carefully framed so as to warn against relying 
on an institution’s religious character alone as a source of legal duty. 
Third, as we emphasize throughout this paper, the Establishment 
Clause forbids a state from using the civil law to impose a normative 
vision of the structure of religious organizations. Such organizations 
 223. See Patrick J. Schiltz, The Impact of Clergy Sexual Misconduct Litigation on Religious 
Liberty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 949, 969–71 (2003). 
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face complex tasks, material and spiritual. They have responsibilities 
to their adherents, but they also maintain relationships with their 
financial supporters, with those dependent on the organization’s 
largesse, and with other organizations in their community. Most 
importantly, religious institutions generally aspire to act with fidelity 
toward their tradition. Like many secular nonprofit organizations, 
religious institutions operate through a variety of agents, both 
employees and volunteers. Without question, they should be aware 
of the risks of harm to third parties which their activities may create, 
and they should take reasonable precautions—within the boundaries 
of their own self-determined structures—to avoid the harms such 
risks entail. Encumbering them, however, with special duties of 
loyalty to their adherents, who may number in the many millions and 
be spread across the globe, inevitably involves either a rearrangement 
in their structure, policy, or practice of relations with clergy, or, if 
they are unwilling to so rearrange under the pressures of tort law, a 
system of fines upon them for continuing to rely on structures of 
authority inadequate to control clergy who misbehave.  
After Doe, one would expect the Episcopal Diocese of South 
Florida, and other comparable religious entities, to significantly 
increase their degree of control over the decisions of individual 
Episcopal churches to hire or retain particular priests. Because such 
duties of loyalty to all adherents of the faith effectively dictate the 
mechanisms of control over clergy, and effectively compel a 
particular organizational response to victims of clergy misbehavior, 
imposing these duties tends to unconstitutionally establish a legally 
preferred structure of denominational life. 
2. Institutional duties of care in employment of clergy 
Most of the cases brought against religious organizations assert 
that such institutions are obliged to act with reasonable care in their 
employment practices, especially when their employees will have 
significant interaction with children or other vulnerable people. We 
can divide plaintiffs’ claims of institutional negligence into two 
general categories. The first consists of charges that the defendant 
negligently conferred religious status on the wrongdoer; this theory 
raises obvious constitutional problems, which we discuss below. The 
second includes claims that the defendant negligently employed the 
wrongdoer. This theory suggests more subtle constitutional 
concerns, which we elaborate at greater length. 
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a. Negligent ordination. Claims in this category are the most 
constitutionally problematic, and accordingly are the least commonly 
raised by plaintiffs. Four different kinds of alleged negligence fall 
within this heading: (1) the religious entity should have done a 
better job of screening candidates for the ministry to eliminate those 
with a propensity for sexual misconduct;224 (2) the entity should have 
trained candidates for the ministry in how to avoid or prevent sexual 
misconduct;225 (3) the entity should not have ordained (or licensed 
or certified) a particular candidate for ministry;226 or (4) (which we 
discuss in the next section) the entity should have revoked the 
wrongdoer’s religious status.227 
As far as we can tell, no court has permitted a plaintiff to proceed 
on a claim that an institution negligently prepared or ordained a 
candidate for ministry.228 The constitutional defects with such an 
inquiry are all too obvious. The choice and application of criteria for 
ordained ministry involve quintessentially religious questions.229 On 
two occasions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that courts cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over the eligibility of candidates for ecclesiastical 
office.230 The ministerial exception to employment laws has a similar 
 224. Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (D. 
Conn. 2003); Roman Catholic Bishop of S.D. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402–
04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Beach v. Jean, 746 A.2d 228, 234–35 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); 
Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (App. Div. 
1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Wis. 1995). 
 225. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 144; Wilson v. Diocese 
of N.Y. of the Episcopal Church, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2051, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 226. Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 351–52 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246–47 (Mo. 1997); Kenneth R., 654 
N.Y.S.2d at 794. 
 227. Hogan v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, No. 02-1296 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.socialaw.com/superior/supFeb03xx.htm. 
 228. The closest case may be Harkins v. Gauthe, 707 So. 2d 1308 (La. Ct. App. 1998), 
in which a priest employed by the diocese sexually molested a boy at a motocross event. The 
court held that “[t]his priestly status, which is conferred by the church” could be the basis of 
the diocese’s duty to a Catholic child, even though the child did not plead that he was a 
member of a congregation within that diocese. Id. at 1313–14. 
 229. “Whether an individual is qualified to be a clergy member of a particular faith is a 
matter to be determined by the procedures and dictates of that particular faith.” Rashedi, 54 
P.3d at 352 (citations omitted); see Chopko, supra note 67, at 1112–13. 
 230. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976); 
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). 
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function—it strictly limits the ability of courts to intervene in 
disputes about the qualification or employment status of clergy.231 
Claims about the screening or training of candidates for status as 
clergy may seem, at first glance, to be less objectionable than those 
focused on the decision to ordain or license a candidate. After all, 
seminaries and theological schools often have to comply with 
standards for accreditation, which tend to have far more robust 
requirements than those proposed by plaintiffs.232 Accreditation, 
however, is voluntary. Organizations may choose to require their 
leaders to obtain certain credentials, but the government does not, 
and may not, mandate any qualifications for ordained ministry. 
Indeed, hostility to government licensing of clergy is an important 
part of the historical legacy of the Constitution’s religion clauses.233 
Finally, a duty of “reasonably careful ordination” would place a 
greater burden on religious organizations than is imposed on 
nonreligious bodies and, therefore, would violate the constitutional 
norm against disfavoring religious entities. Neither professional 
schools nor professional associations in law, medicine, or other 
learned disciplines can be held liable for negligent preparation for or 
admission to professional status. Because other, more 
constitutionally sensitive and precisely focused theories of relief can 
address the harms about which the state has a legitimate concern, 
like protecting the vulnerable from foreseeable harm, courts should 
continue to reject claims of negligent preparation for ministry. 
 
b. Negligent employment. Plaintiffs’ most common claims of 
institutional negligence focus on the defendant’s employment 
relationship with the wrongdoer. The claims allege that the 
defendant failed to exercise due care in one or more facets of that 
relationship, whether in hiring, supervising, or failing to discharge 
the wrongdoer. In contrast to claims of negligent ordination, the 
concept of negligent employment practices has clear and well 
 231. See supra notes 69–95 and accompanying text. 
 232. See, for example, the accreditation standards of the Association of Theological 
Schools in the United States and Canada, available at http://www.ats.edu/accredit/ 
stantoc.htm. 
 233. See JOHN T. NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 67 (1998) (discussing James Madison’s opposition to 
the Crown’s licensing of ministers in Virginia); Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Pierce and Parental 
Liberty as a Core Value in Educational Policy, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 491, 503–05 
(2001). 
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established secular parallels. Section 307 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides: “It is negligence to use an 
instrumentality, whether a human being or a thing, which the actor 
knows or should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or 
defective, that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
others.”234 Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
extends that liability to acts that fall outside the scope of the agent’s 
employment: 
 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control 
his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to 
prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so 
conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm 
to them, if 
(a) the servant 
 (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon 
which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or 
 (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and 
 
(b) the master 
 (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to 
control his servant, and 
 (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising such control.235 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 307 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 213 (1958) (“A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is 
subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: . . . (b) in 
the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to 
others.”). In the context of clergy sex abuse, plaintiffs’ claims of negligent hiring involve 
defects in the decision to place a candidate in a specific position, or defects in the process of 
selection—that is, the employer should have done a more thorough investigation or screening 
of candidates. See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F. Supp. 2d 195, 200–
01 (D. Conn. 1999); Roman Catholic Bishop of S.D. v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 
402–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 748, 757–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 323–29 (Co. 
1993); Petho v. Fuleki, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. 254 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993); Malicki v. Doe, 814 
So. 2d 347, 361–63 (Fla. 2002); J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 
N.W.2d 589, 593–94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931–32 
(Sup. Ct. 1992); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 385, 401–
04 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995). 
 235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). Section 317 is important 
because so few courts have found sexual misconduct, especially involving children, to be within 
the scope of the cleric’s employment. See also Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454–55 
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The comment to Section 317 addresses liability for negligent 
retention: 
There may be circumstances in which the only effective control 
which the master can exercise over the conduct of his servant is to 
discharge the servant. Therefore the master may subject himself to 
liability under the rule stated in this Section by retaining in his 
employment servants who, to his knowledge, are in the habit of 
misconducting themselves in a manner dangerous to others.236 
Despite widespread recognition of the tort of negligent 
employment in cases against secular employers, courts and 
commentators have disagreed sharply on the constitutionality of 
applying the tort to religious institutions’ employment of clerics and 
other leaders.237 In some jurisdictions, courts have held that the First 
Amendment confers on religious institutions complete immunity 
from claims of negligent employment,238 while courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that the First Amendment provides no such 
immunity.239 Indeed, at least one court has gone so far as to say that 
the Establishment Clause may actually prohibit a grant of immunity 
in this context.240 As we argue below, these two categorical 
approaches are inadequate, in terms of both the constitutional values 
and the public policies at stake in adjudicating negligent employment 
claims against religious organizations. After examining and rejecting 
the two categorical models, we offer a more nuanced way to 
accommodate the relevant constitutional and policy concerns. 
 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Nardella v. Dattilo, 36 Pa. D. & C.4th 364, 379–80 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1997). 
 236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c. 
 237. Other scholarly attempts to discuss these questions include Carmella, supra note 
103, at 1054–55; Chopko, supra note 67, at 1112–13; Christopher R. Farrell, Note, 
Ecclesiastical Abstention and the Crisis in the Catholic Church, 19 J. L. & POL. 109 (2003); and 
Mansfield, supra note 62, at 1169. 
 238. See, e.g., Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999); 
Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 
780 (Wis. 1995). 
 239. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Rosado v. 
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998); Doe v. 
Evans, 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002). 
 240. Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 80 (D.R.I. 1997) (citing City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
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 (1) Categorical approaches. When faced with claims that a 
religious institution has failed to exercise due care in the employment 
of a religious leader, courts tend to proceed on an all-or-nothing 
basis. These courts hold that either the First Amendment imposes no 
limitation on applying traditional tort standards, or the First 
Amendment stands as a complete bar to the application of those 
standards. 
  
(a) No immunity. The first approach rests on the premise 
that religious employers deserve no different treatment than secular 
employers for their tortious employment practices. On this view, the 
First Amendment offers religious institutions no shield against claims 
of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, especially when those 
claims are raised in the context of clergy sexual misconduct. Many 
courts that have adopted this “no immunity” approach quote from 
language in an opinion by Justice William Rehnquist, in which he 
denied a stay in a case involving a religious nursing home: 
There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a civil 
court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical 
cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But this 
Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply 
outside the context of such intraorganization disputes. . . . [Some] 
cases are premised on a perceived danger that in resolving 
intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially 
religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing 
particular doctrinal beliefs. Such considerations are not applicable 
to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular 
defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, 
breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.241 
Courts that adopt this stance draw a sharp distinction between 
internal and external disputes, and restrict the doctrine of 
ecclesiastical immunity to disputes that are internal, such as fights 
between groups within a church over control of church property. 
Tort claims fall squarely outside that limit. A dispute involving those 
 241. Gen. Council on Fin. & Admin. V. Cal. Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 1372–73 
(1978) (citations omitted), quoted in Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. 
Supp. 2d 139, 144 (D. Conn. 2003); G.B. v. Archdiocese of Portland, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7033 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2002); JC2 v. Maurice Grammond, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Or. 
2001); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 356–57 (Fla. 2002); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 
450, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
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“who allege that they were seriously injured by the negligence of the 
church officials . . . hardly can be characterized as a dispute involving 
an internal church matter.”242 
Moreover, courts that reject ecclesiastical immunity typically find 
that the tort of negligent employment rests upon a “neutral 
principle[] of law,” applicable to religious institutions even if the 
dispute involves questions of religious documents or practices.243 
These courts’ use of the “neutral principles” approach, approved by 
the Supreme Court in cases involving disputes over religious 
property,244 is reducible to this basic proposition: “The court is 
simply applying secular standards to secular conduct which is 
permissible under First Amendment standards.”245 “Secular 
standards” refers to the principles of tort law that define an 
employer’s liability for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an 
employee.246 The reference to “secular conduct” reflects these 
courts’ tendency to analyze defendants’ constitutional arguments 
under the Free Exercise Clause. Because defendants rarely claim that 
the wrongdoer’s misconduct was religiously motivated, courts find 
that the religious institution’s response to that misconduct is not 
religious either, and so judicial inquiry does not implicate 
defendants’ First Amendment rights.247 
 242. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. at 77. This distinction between internal and external 
matters is also found in Malicki, 814 So. 2d at 355–65; Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 455–56; and 
Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 385, 410–11 (Pa. Com. Pl. 
1995). 
 243. Enderle v. Trautman, No. CIV.A3-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145, at *8–10 (D.N.D 
Dec. 3, 2001); Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of the Church of the Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 353–55 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 319–21 (Colo. 1993); Hayes 
v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2440 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 24, 2004); Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Konkle, 
672 N.E.2d at 454–56; Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 931 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Smith v. 
Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395, 396–98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Podolinski v. Episcopal Diocese of 
Pittsburgh, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 385, 401–03 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1995). 
 244. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603–04 (1979); see also infra notes 304–26 and 
accompanying text for further discussion of “neutral principles” in clergy sex abuse cases. 
 245. Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Moses, 863 P.2d at 321); see also Bear Valley 
Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1323–24 (Colo. 1996) (citing same passage); 
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 716 A.2d 967, 970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1998) (same); Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 397–98 (same). 
 246. See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text. 
 247. Enderle, 2001 WL 1820145, at *10; Moses, 863 P.2d at 320–21; Konkle, 672 
N.E.2d at 456. 
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Enderle v. Trautman248 provides a good example of the “no 
immunity” approach. In Enderle, an adult parishioner alleged that 
she was injured through her adulterous sexual relationship with her 
pastor.249 In addition to claims that the pastor had breached his 
fiduciary duty to her, the plaintiff alleged that the congregation and 
synod had negligently supervised and retained the pastor.250 The 
court denied the summary judgment motions of the congregation 
and the synod, holding that the “determination of whether the 
defendants negligently supervised or retained Trautman can be made 
solely in accordance with well-established tort law principles.”251 The 
court continued: “[A] determination of whether Olivet and the 
Synod knew of Trautman’s alleged sexual improprieties and failed to 
respond adequately to allegations of sexual improprieties would not 
implicate any interpretation of ecclesiastical principles or 
doctrine.”252 These two findings, knowledge and failure to act on 
that knowledge, represent the core of the “no immunity” approach. 
The resolution of negligent employment claims in the context of 
sexual misconduct suits involves only the application of “secular 
standards” to “secular conduct.” 
The problem with the Enderle court’s analysis became evident 
immediately after the court declared that proof of defendants’ 
negligence “would not implicate” matters of religious doctrine.253 In 
its summary judgment motion, the synod denied that it had “the 
authority to supervise or fire Trautman.”254 The court responded: 
The Synod contends that any negligent supervision/retention claim 
is predicated upon an employer-employee relationship and since it 
did not employ Trautman it cannot be responsible for his acts. The 
Court agrees that an employer-employee relationship is necessary 
for a finding of supervisory and retention liability. However, 
whether Trautman was an employee of the Synod is a question of 
fact properly resolved by a jury.255 
 248. No. CIV.13-01-22, 2001 WL 1820145 (D.N.D., Dec. 3, 2001).  
 249. Id. at *1. 
 250. Id. at *2. 
 251. Id. at *9. 
 252. Id. at *10. 
 253. Id. at *9. 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. (citation omitted). 
4LUP-FIN 12/2/2004 12:35 PM 
1789] Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity 
 1853 
 
This “simple” question of fact goes to the proper relationship 
between bishops and pastors, a profoundly contested question of 
ecclesiastical polity.256 And yet the “no immunity” approach treats 
proof of this relationship as no more important than any other 
disputed fact in the litigation. 
Is such treatment constitutionally appropriate? Or might there be 
some constitutional limitation on adjudication of negligent 
employment claims against religious organizations, a limitation that 
derives from the same principle that has led courts to reject claims 
for clergy malpractice? Above we noted that courts have uniformly 
denied plaintiffs’ attempts to state a cause of action for clergy 
malpractice.257 Any such action requires the court to articulate a 
standard of the reasonable cleric. Whether the standard is 
denomination-neutral, identifying the “reasonable religious 
professional,” or denomination-specific, identifying (for example) 
the “reasonable Greek Orthodox priest,” the problem remains the 
same: the plaintiff will have to put on evidence of the rules governing 
conduct of the religious office. If this evidence attempts to establish 
a generic duty of care for all ministers, the court’s adjudication will 
amount to the wholesale creation of not only the duty but even the 
categories of generic minister or generic religion, neither of which 
has independent reality.258 If, however, the plaintiff.’s evidence seeks 
to establish the standard of care of a “reasonable Greek Orthodox 
priest,” the court will face the specter of dueling theologians, with 
each presenting a rival account of the priest’s office. Such a conflict 
would require the court to decide which of the rivals represents the 
authoritative interpretation of Greek Orthodox doctrine. 
 256. See Chopko, supra note 67, at 1116–17; Mansfield, supra note 62, at 1170–71. 
 257. See supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text. 
 258. The Internal Revenue Service, of course, must distinguish religious from 
nonreligious actors and entities. While an assessment of IRS practice in this area is beyond the 
scope of this article, we think it significant that the IRS’s designation of an entity as religious 
does not impose normative obligations on the entity; the designation simply means that the 
entity enjoys a favored tax status (one that is generally, though not universally, shared with 
nonreligious charitable institutions). In contrast, a court’s determination of a religious 
professional’s standard of care would necessarily involve determination of normative 
obligations. The IRS criteria for designation as a religious entity was set forth in American 
Guidance Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 & n.2 (D.D.C. 1980). See 
also INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1828, TAX GUIDE 
FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 23 (2002). 
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A similar problem confronts courts’ adjudication of negligent 
employment claims against religious organizations. The normative 
documents or standards of the religious tradition invariably govern 
the hiring, supervision, and retention of religious leaders. Disputes 
over the power to select leaders and to exercise authority over the 
conduct of the ministerial office manifest deep and long-standing 
theological differences between and within faith traditions.259 And 
yet adjudication of a negligent employment claim may result in a 
court imposing a specific resolution to such theological disputes. If 
supervisory authority is arguably located in the dioceses260 of a 
particular tradition, the court may find that the diocese acted 
unreasonably if it failed to exercise that authority. The operation of 
tort law, then, effectively requires the religious body to adopt 
stronger episcopal oversight, even if the extent of such oversight is 
strongly contested within the faith tradition.261 
To determine whether a court should hold a diocese liable for 
negligently hiring or supervising a priest, the court will need to 
decide that the bishop or some other agent of the diocese possessed 
the authority to hire, supervise, or remove that priest, and that the 
diocese’s agent acted carelessly in exercising that authority. Both of 
these determinations invite much the same inquiry as that deemed 
unconstitutional when applied to claims of clergy malpractice. To 
establish the bishop’s authority over the priest, the plaintiff must 
introduce evidence of such authority from canon law or from the 
practices of the defendant or other dioceses. To establish the 
allegedly unreasonable exercise of the diocese’s authority, the 
plaintiff must present evidence of what a reasonable person who 
possessed that authority would have done. The court will be obliged 
 259. A highly influential decision from the federal district court for the Southern District 
of New York makes the same point: “The traditional denominations each have their own 
intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no rights of visitation. Church 
governance is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millenia.” Schmidt 
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 260. In what follows, we use “diocese” and “bishop” to refer to any ecclesiastical polity 
with an organizational structure that includes an institution or official with responsibility over 
more than a single house of worship. The character of that responsibility will differ widely 
among, and sometimes within, religious traditions. 
 261. Schiltz, supra note 223, at 965–75. This concern is especially present when the issue 
of institutional control is a factual dispute submitted to a jury. As we note below, a jury is likely 
to assume that the structure of the defendant organization conforms to its expectations, i.e., 
the bishop of every faith has authority equivalent to that of a Roman Catholic bishop. 
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to address the question “what would a reasonable bishop have 
done?” 
These concerns are not speculative but real. Moses v. Diocese of 
Colorado.262 provides a concrete illustration of litigation that focused 
on expert testimony about the authority of an Episcopal bishop. The 
expert testified about the formal and informal authority Episcopal 
bishops exert within their dioceses.263 His evidence ranged from 
details about the bishop’s exercise of pastoral care for priests in the 
diocese, to the bishop’s relationship with seminarians preparing for 
ministry, to the bishop’s influence over matters not directly under 
control of the diocese.264 As in Enderle, the Moses court showed no 
signs of treating this evidence as constitutionally sensitive and offered 
the following conclusion to its recitation of the expert’s testimony: 
“The trial court properly submitted this issue to the jury for 
determination and the jury found that there was an agency 
relationship between Father Robinson and the Diocese.”265 
The Enderle and Moses decisions represent both substantive and 
procedural flaws in the “no immunity” approach. The substantive 
error resides in the courts’ treatment of ecclesiastical structure as an 
ordinary question of fact. The courts’ method of resolving disputes 
about that structure compounds this error. In both cases, the trial 
court sent the question to the jury.  
We think that the attitudes reflected in Enderle and Moses about 
the role of juries, in disposing of issues of religious authority and 
control, are constitutionally troublesome. As is always the case in tort 
law, juries see the disputes in hindsight. They are aware that 
someone has been injured, and they are asked to assign culpability. 
When religious organizations are defendants, especially in sexual 
misconduct cases, they may well face a form of jury bias that will lead 
to the discriminatory imposition of special ecclesiastical liability. 
Jurors may have expectations, conscious or not, that religious leaders 
will demonstrate greater virtue than the average person. Moreover, 
jurors unaware of the particulars of ecclesiastical structure may 
assume that bishops and other religious officials have, by virtue of 
their office, considerably more control than they actually do.  
 262. 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993). 
 263. Id. at 323–29. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 327. 
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A legal rule that provides religious organizations with no 
constitutional immunity from liability for negligent employment of 
clergy may thus lead, with some predictable frequency, to the 
imposition of undeserved liability for failure to act as a “reasonable 
religious organization” should. And this, in turn, will inevitably 
create incentives for religious organizations to reconfigure their 
structure of authority in ways designed to avoid liability. First 
Amendment norms should address the role of state law in the 
imposition of that incentive structure. 
 
(b) Categorical immunity. The second approach is the 
complete opposite of the first and rests on the premise that any 
inquiry into a religious entity’s exercise of authority over its leaders 
unconstitutionally entangles the court with a religious community’s 
right of self-governance.266 As expressed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland,267 
When a civil court undertakes to compare the relationship between 
a religious institution and its clergy with the agency relationship of 
the business world, secular duties are necessarily introduced into 
the ecclesiastical relationship and the risk of constitutional violation 
is evident. The exploration of the ecclesiastical relationship is itself 
problematic. To determine the existence of an agency relationship 
based on actual authority, the trial court will most likely have to 
examine church doctrine governing the church’s authority over 
[the priest]. 
. . . .  
 266. A number of courts hold that categorical immunity applies only to claims of 
negligent hiring and/or negligent retention—a distinction that they purport to draw from the 
“ministerial exception” cases. See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1151–
54 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the First Amendment bars claim of negligent hiring, but 
not negligent supervision); J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 
589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the First Amendment bars scrutiny of church’s 
hiring decision but not supervision or retention). It is not clear to us why that distinction 
should matter. The torts of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention all involve essentially 
the same questions: did the defendant have notice of the wrongdoer’s propensity to commit 
sexual misconduct, authority to prevent the harm, and some duty of care to those who were 
harmed? Seen in that light, hiring and retention are simply points along a continuum of 
opportunities for a principal to exercise control over its agents. 
 267. 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997). 
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 Even assuming that the trial court could discern the existence of 
actual authority without determining questions of church doctrine 
or polity . . . , constitutional obstacles remain. The imposition of 
secular duties and liability on the church as a “principal” will 
infringe upon its right to determine the standards governing the 
relationship between the church, its bishop, and the parish priest 
. . . . Pastoral supervision is an ecclesiastical prerogative.268 
Courts in several other jurisdictions have followed the same path 
as that mapped in Swanson, recognizing a categorical prohibition on 
negligent employment claims against religious organizations and 
grounding that recognition in a robust doctrine of 
nonentanglement.269 
The court in Swanson determined that any judicial inquiry into 
the distribution of authority within or among religious institutions 
would require courts to construe religious texts and doctrines.270 
Drawing from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Serbian Eastern 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,271 Swanson holds that the 
Constitution forbids any inquiry that depends on the interpretation 
of religious texts, such as canon law or a congregational charter, 
because such an exercise would inevitably impose on the religious 
organization an external, government-endorsed model of 
ecclesiastical governance.272 Under this view, any set of employment 
standards adopted by the court usurps the religious institution’s 
autonomy to structure its polity in accordance with its own beliefs 
and practices.273 
The Swanson court’s approach, however, fails to acknowledge 
that, as with claims of professional negligence by clergy, claims of 
negligent employment may be justiciable under some circumstances. 
 268. Id. at 444–45. 
 269. See Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 738 A.2d 839 (Me. 1999); 
Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 802 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002); L.L.N. v. 
Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 
780 (Wis. 1995). Several decisions in New York, involving both federal and state courts, have 
reached a similar conclusion. See Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 
328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Langford v. 
Roman Catholic Diocese, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 2000). But see Jones v. Trane, 591 
N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (permitting negligent hiring and supervision claims against a 
church). 
 270. Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444–45. 
 271. 426 U.S. 696 (1976), cited in Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444. 
 272. Swanson, 692 A.2d at 444. 
 273. Id. at 445. 
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Not every inquiry into the authority of a diocesan bishop will require 
the court to resolve disputed questions of ecclesiastical polity or 
invite the court to impose a normative form of parish governance.274 
If courts can conduct any such inquiry without producing 
unconstitutional entanglement, there are sound jurisprudential and 
policy grounds for allowing judges to determine whether a particular 
case can proceed. 
At the most basic level, plaintiffs often have experienced 
profound, lasting injuries from sexual molestation, and the religious 
institution frequently represents the only viable source of remedy for 
the harm they have suffered. Moreover, and notwithstanding our 
concerns about the imposition of alien structures of authority on 
religious organizations, the viability of civil actions against religious 
institutions should make such institutions and their insurers more 
responsive to concerns about their leaders’ abusive behaviors. By 
foreclosing all claims of negligent employment by religious 
organizations, Swanson determined that the risk of unconstitutional 
entanglement outweighs the benefits of both recovery to injured 
plaintiffs and potential reform of socially harmful practices of 
religious organizations. We believe that neither the Constitution nor 
a wise exercise of jurisprudence necessarily leads to such a stark, 
disappointing, and socially unpalatable result. 
  
(2) An alternative approach. The two categorical approaches 
share the singular virtue of ease of application. One rejects 
constitutional challenges to the use of traditional tort principles, 
while the other finds that the First Amendment grants complete 
immunity to religious organizations accused of negligence in their 
employment practices. Neither approach, however, manages to give 
a coherent account of why certain claims against religious 
organizations, such as clergy malpractice, should be barred, while 
others, such as an organ builder’s action against a congregation for 
breach of a contract to buy an instrument, should be allowed to 
proceed. From the no-immunity perspective, if “neutral principles” 
can be applied to determine the character of the authority that a 
bishop has over a priest, such principles could similarly be developed 
to adjudicate claims of clergy malpractice. From the no-liability 
 274. See infra notes 306–28 and accompanying text (discussing the use of “neutral 
principles” to guide construction of religious texts). 
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perspective, if courts are constitutionally forbidden to inquire into 
the polity of a religious organization, how can a court determine 
whether those who signed a contract with an organ builder on behalf 
of a religious entity had the legal authority to do so? 
Courts need, and the religion clauses require, an approach that 
falls somewhere between the categorical analyses outlined above. In 
the sections that follow, we sketch out several attempts to delimit 
judicial inquiry into the character and structure of ecclesial authority, 
while still permitting courts to hold institutions accountable for the 
harms that such institutions negligently inflict on those under their 
care. The problem requires reconciling state-created tort law with 
the demands of the First Amendment. Reconciliations of this sort 
have been part of the enterprise of constitutional law since the 
Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan275 
almost forty years ago. Whether the tort is defamation,276 invasion of 
privacy,277 or intentional infliction of emotional distress,278 the First 
Amendment sometimes requires that concerns of tort law give way, 
at least in part, to constitutional considerations. In what follows, we 
draw in detail on the concerns of substance and process that 
characterize this methodology of reconciliation. Moreover, we 
expand on this methodology by revisiting Jones v. Wolf.279 and by 
focusing on its character as a decision about rules of evidence. So 
viewed, Jones may buttress rather than undermine the argument for 
constitutional limits in cases alleging negligent employment of 
clergy. 
 
(a) Reconciling tort law and the First Amendment: lessons 
from the freedom of the press. As we argued above in critiquing the 
decisions that reject all ecclesiastical immunities in this context, the 
constitutional problems here concern the interaction of process and 
substance. In cases of sexual abuse, the threat to First Amendment 
values arises from the role of juries, in applying general and sweeping 
standards of care to an employer’s duties to third parties. Here, as 
 275. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 276. Id.; see also Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, decided together 
at 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the rule of New York Times to plaintiffs who are “public 
figures”). 
 277. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 278. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 279. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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elsewhere, one must reconcile tort law and First Amendment 
considerations, and the respective roles of judge and juries. The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan280 and 
its progeny, Time, Inc. v. Hill.281 and Hustler v. Falwell,282 in which 
the Court harmonized potential liability of the press under state law 
with considerations of press freedom, offer provocative analogies 
from which to draw. The doctrines elaborated in these decisions 
(which we hereafter describe as the “regime of New York Times”) are 
designed to permit the press to perform its duties robustly, without 
inhibition borne of the fear of after-the-fact imposition of liability by 
hostile juries. Similarly, ecclesiastical immunity gives religious 
organizations “breathing space” within which to organize their own 
polities, select their own leaders, and preach their own creeds.283 The 
New York Times regime contains elements of substance as well as 
process, and we draw on both in developing our own 
recommendations. 
 
(i) Substantive standards of liability. 
a. Knowledge. One highly relevant and 
particularized way in which the regime of New York Times might 
inform the analysis of negligent employment involves the question of 
whether liability should be limited to those who have actual 
knowledge of a clergyman’s propensity to commit sexual 
misconduct, or whether courts should extend liability to those with 
constructive knowledge. Under the most robust versions of the 
constructive knowledge rule, religious entities may find themselves 
pressured to investigate the backgrounds of those who seek training 
or employment in their ranks of clergy. Failure to do so may give rise 
to liability for sexual misconduct that juries determine was reasonably 
foreseeable at a much earlier stage. 
If the First Amendment forbids any system of clergy licensing, as 
suggested in Part II above, it might similarly prohibit a regime of 
liability that imposes on religious entities a duty to inquire into the 
 280. 376 U.S. 254. 
 281. 385 U.S. 374. 
 282. 485 U.S. 46. 
 283. At least one court has extended the rule of New York Times to defamatory 
falsehoods uttered during a sermon, on the subject of divorce delivered as part of a worship 
service in a church. See McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
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psychological makeup of clergy aspirants, and the consequent 
financial incentive to exclude those whose life details and behavioral 
profiles suggest a propensity to sexual misconduct.284 Such a broad 
duty may well lead religious entities into a form of self-limitation, or 
self-censorship, that is inconsistent with the freedom protected by 
ecclesiastical immunity from official inquiry into the selection of 
religious leaders. 
With respect to the question of culpable states of knowledge, the 
qualified privilege represented by the regime of New York Times v. 
Sullivan might be of particular value. That rule limits the liability of 
the press for defamation of public officials with respect to their 
official conduct to situations in which the defendant acted with 
“actual malice,” defined in New York Times as “knowing” falsehood 
or “reckless disregard” of the truth.285 The rationale of New York 
Times is that strict liability in defamation, as the common law 
imposed, or even a system of negligence-based liability, will lead to 
self-censorship, with a consequent loss to the public of a press willing 
to provide information about public officials and their official 
behavior.286 
In Gibson v. Brewer,287 the Supreme Court of Missouri adopted a 
closely analogous rule for adjudicating claims against religious 
organizations, in which the claims arise out of the organization’s 
employment of one who commits sexual misconduct. Gibson rejected 
plaintiffs’ claims of negligent employment, holding that adoption of 
any standard of reasonable care for that conduct “would result in an 
endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, 
ordination, and retention.”288 The court then distinguished claims 
 284. For discussion of this and other effects of sexual misconduct litigation on religious 
organizations, see Schiltz, supra note 223. 
 285. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 286. The regime of New York Times also extends to press comment on public figures. See 
Curtis Publ’g. Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, decided together at 388 U.S. 130 
(1967). 
 287. 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997). 
 288. Id. at 247. The court reaches the same conclusion with respect to negligent 
supervision: “Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric—what the 
church ‘should know’—requires inquiry into religious doctrine. . . . [T]his would create an 
excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of 
supervision.” Id. Quite provocatively, the Gibson court also said that the clauses in Missouri’s 
state constitution “‘declaring that there shall be a separation of church and state are not only 
more explicit but more restrictive’ than the First Amendment.” Id. at 246 (quoting Paster v. 
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101–02 (Mo. 1974)). The Gibson court does not address the state 
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for “intentional failure to supervise clergy” from those of negligent 
employment: 
A cause of action for intentional failure to supervise clergy is stated 
if (1) a supervisor (or supervisors) exists, (2) the supervisor (or 
supervisors) knew that harm was certain or substantially certain to 
result, (3) the supervisor (or supervisors) disregarded this known 
risk, (4) the supervisor’s inaction caused damage, and (5) the other 
requirements of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 317 
are met. This cause of action requires a supervisor. The First 
Amendment does not, however, allow a court to decide issues of 
church government—whether or not a cleric should have a 
supervisor.289 
The Gibson court rested its distinction between intentional failure 
and negligent failure to supervise squarely upon the First 
Amendment. Although the court made no reference to the regime of 
New York Times, Gibson’s twofold focus on actual, rather than 
constructive knowledge and actual, rather than constructive 
authority, parallels closely the concerns expressed in that regime.290 
In the defamation context, the privilege created by New York 
Times protects the press as an instrument of control over the actions 
of government, at the potential expense of the reputation of officials. 
The press is free to publish unless it knows the story to be false and 
defamatory, or is in possession of information creating a high 
probability that the story is false and defamatory. In the context of 
clergy sexual misconduct, a requirement that plaintiffs show the 
defendants had actual knowledge of their employees’ propensity to 
commit misconduct is strongly analogous to the requirement of 
knowing falsehood in defamation. Both involve a highly culpable 
form of scienter as a basis for liability. Similarly, if agents of a 
constitution because it said that neither party had raised Missouri’s religion clauses. If part of 
the constitutional defect in plaintiffs’ claim falls under the state disestablishment provision, and 
thus represents a defect in the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court certainly would 
have the authority to raise the provision sua sponte, but did not do so. 
 289. Id. at 248. 
 290. The Missouri Supreme Court’s approach in Gibson has been followed in at least one 
other jurisdiction. See Heroux v. Carpentier, No. PC 92-5807, 1998 R.I. Super. LEXIS 52 
(Jan. 23, 1988); see also Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, No. PC 95-6524, 
2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 104 (Aug. 26, 2003) (finding that a church could not be held 
accountable for behavior of which it was unaware); Williams v. United Pentecostal Church 
Int’l, 115 S.W.3d 612 (Tex. 2003) (holding that a church cannot be held liable when abuse 
was not foreseeable); Chopko, supra note 67, at 1119. 
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religious organization have facts readily available to them that 
indicate a significant risk of sexual misconduct, and yet take no 
responsive action, their inaction might be seen as a “reckless 
disregard” of the likelihood of harm. When a clergyman spends “too 
much” time alone with adolescent boys, or flirts provocatively and 
excessively with attractive women in his congregation, supervisors 
will not be able to ignore the clergyman’s conduct. Any broader 
version of constructive knowledge of propensity for sexual 
misconduct, however, would function like liability for negligence or 
perhaps even like strict liability. Such liability standards, if 
internalized by religious entities, would require expensive and 
sweeping precautions about whom to train and ordain and would 
tend to operate as an externally imposed, though self-enforced, 
scheme of clergy licensing. 
We recognize the force of various objections to the First 
Amendment-based analogy between liability for clergy supervision 
and liability for defamatory falsehoods. First, the strong version of 
the New York Times rule is limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are 
public officials or public figures who can fairly be said to have 
assumed some of the risk of defamatory publicity.291 In contrast, 
plaintiffs in sexual misconduct cases—especially those in which the 
clergy misbehavior is criminal—cannot be said to have consented to 
such risks. The case for assumption of risk is at least somewhat more 
plausible in cases of adult counseling, but even there we cannot say 
that plaintiffs assume risks analogous to those of bad publicity 
assumed by public officials and public figures. We note, however, 
that the New York Times regime extends to “private figure” lawsuits 
for invasion of privacy,292 and that courts may award punitive 
damages in defamation cases brought by “private figures” only upon 
a showing of actual malice.293 Thus, even in situations involving 
private figures who have not consented to the risk of adverse 
publicity, the Supreme Court has remained solicitous of the interests 
of the press in conducting its business free of the fear of crushing and 
unpredictable liability. 
A second, and perhaps more telling, objection to extending the 
“actual malice” rule to claims of negligent supervision by religious 
 291. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 292. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967). 
 293. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). 
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entities is the disincentive such a rule may create to investigate and 
respond to hints of sexual misconduct by clergy. Under the regime 
of New York Times, the press may have such a disincentive to more 
fully investigate stories that are potentially defamatory. This 
disincentive would arise from a fear of learning information that 
might make a story appear to be knowingly false or to have been 
published in “reckless disregard” of the truth.294 
We do not dismiss this concern lightly, but we have a number of 
responses to it. First, the argument is overstated with respect to press 
liability and is even more overstated with respect to the liability of 
religious organizations. The incentive to avoid liability in both cases 
may be substantial, but the counterincentives to behave responsibly 
can normally be expected to produce socially productive behavior. 
For the press, the incentive to ignorance created by the regime of 
New York Times is typically offset by the concern for institutional 
reputation. The press earns and maintains respect by its reputation 
for accuracy, and by the perceived investment it makes in accuracy. 
Reputable news organizations that structure their news gathering so 
as to avoid learning facts that might make them realize that planned 
stories are false would soon be considered disreputable. The decline 
in reputation would cost them readers, listeners, viewers, and, quite 
quickly, advertisers as well. 
We recognize that the tabloid press might face a different 
structure of incentives and behave differently. But we are confident 
that the great majority of religious organizations would follow the 
path of the reputable press by designing structures of information 
gathering designed to keep them informed about risks of harm. 
Indeed, we think there are good reasons to expect the great majority 
of religious entities to do even better than the reputable press in 
pursuing information relative to the risks they create. The press 
writes about strangers, operates on short time lines, and is in the 
business of selling copy. Whatever its institutional concerns about 
accuracy, fairness, and reputation, the press at times may lack 
incentive to self-correction fully sufficient to avoid the danger of 
defamatory falsehood. 
By contrast, the question of how to manage the risk of clergy 
misconduct involves a very different set of institutional 
considerations. First, the victims of such misconduct are highly likely 
 294. N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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to be adherents, perhaps long-term, to a faith community. The care 
and concern frequently felt for and owed to those in a lengthy and 
committed association with such a community is very likely to be 
thicker and deeper than what is felt toward the victims of 
defamation, who are likely to be perceived in an impersonal manner. 
Second, sex scandals leave an enduring stain on the affected 
institutions and individuals. Short of an extended bout of plagiarism, 
the press is rarely exposed to the risk that its employees can quickly 
compromise an enormous portion of its institutional good will. 
Third, most leaders of religious institutions are entrusted with the 
stewardship of good will engendered by a legacy of hundreds or 
thousands of years of human faith. Such leaders have frequently 
committed their entire adult lives to such institutions and face 
consequences of condemnation and shame if they bring the faith into 
disrepute. 
Thus, when rumors float upward in a religious organization, we 
expect that incentives to ameliorate the problem will frequently 
overcome the liability-avoiding disincentives to investigate. If we are 
correct in our expectations, religious organizations will systematically 
take steps that will bring to them actual knowledge of their clergy’s 
propensity to sexual misconduct. Such steps will follow inevitably 
from the combination of regard for adherents of the faith with a 
sense of immediate history. Does not every living religious leader 
have an acute awareness of the damage done to the Roman Catholic 
Church in the U.S. as a result of public perception that the Church 
could have stopped the epidemic of abuse within its ranks? We think 
that liability for knowing but not acting will quickly lead to an urge 
to both know and act, rather than to some contrived and willful 
ignorance. 
Even if we are overly optimistic in our expectations, 
organizations that structure themselves to avoid knowledge of their 
agents’ misdeeds face serious risks of criminal and civil liability.295 
 295. For a sophisticated legal and ethical analysis of entities arranged to avoid knowledge 
of and responsibility for their agents’ acts, see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 
957 (1999). For recent discussions of the interplay between institutional structure, legal 
structure, and criminal responsibility, see Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified 
Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931 (2000); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003); Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 217 (2000). 
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Thus, a responsible and well-advised religious leader will not create 
structures of information flow designed to insulate him from 
knowledge that a particular clergyman presents a significant risk of 
sexual misconduct. For the leader to do so would be to fail in his 
stewardship as well as to create significant liability risks for himself 
and his institutional employer. 
There remains, of course, a question of what quantum of 
knowledge is sufficient to trigger liability under the standard that we 
propose. If a religious leader becomes aware of a single, vague rumor 
about the predilections of a particular pastor, will the leader (and his 
employer) be chargeable with actual knowledge of danger if the 
pastor subsequently acts in sexually predatory ways toward his 
congregants? 
The best analogy on this issue from the law of defamation relates 
to the question of what degree of disregard for the truth is 
“reckless.” Under the regime of New York Times, reckless disregard 
for the truth involves “serious doubts as to the truth of [the] 
publication.”296 Transposition of this norm into the law of negligent 
employment of clergy involves sensitivity to both the similarities and 
differences in the relevant legal contexts.  
Unlike the problem of defamation, in which the judgment to be 
made involves an appraisal of the objective truth of some past or 
present circumstance, the context of negligent employment involves 
prediction of an employee’s future behavior. Predictive judgments 
are frequently more contingent and difficult than ascertainment of 
the truth of stories typically reported in the press. Nevertheless, the 
underlying emphasis from New York Times on the gravity of doubt is 
appropriate here. We suggest that supervising officials be held liable 
only when they fail to act on knowledge creating substantial grounds 
for concern that a member of the clergy will use his position to 
commit sexual crime or to take sexual advantage of a member of the 
faith. When coupled with the procedural protections that we suggest 
below,297 this proposed standard will oblige religious leaders to take 
 296. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 297. As a matter of process, New York Times itself requires the proof of the requisite 
degree of culpable knowledge to be “clear and convincing.” 376 U.S. at 285–86. A 
subsequent opinion requires lower courts to inquire into the convincing clarity of such 
knowledge at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
255–56 (1986). We elaborate on the significance of procedural safeguards for our proposed 
regime in Section 2(c)(i), below. 
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action in appropriate circumstances without requiring them to purge 
the clergy ranks of everyone about whom there is even a whiff of 
uncertainty. 
b. The relationship between culpable knowledge and 
authority over the offending employee. Adjacent to the issue of the 
quantum of knowledge necessary for liability lies the question of who 
possesses it, and whether the person alleged to have the requisite 
knowledge of risk also has the responsibility and authority to act on 
that knowledge. Imagine, for example, that a manager at the Buick 
Division of General Motors lives next door to an employee of a 
Chevrolet dealer, a firm which is in a contractual relationship with 
GM. The Buick employee knows that his neighbor has a tendency to 
drink at lunch and then drive autos around the Chevy dealer’s 
parking lot. If the Chevy employee’s drinking and driving leads to an 
accident on the Chevy dealer’s premises, the law would not impute 
knowledge of, and legal responsibility for, the accident to General 
Motors. The common affiliation of Buick and Chevrolet with 
General Motors would not make GM legally culpable on these facts, 
because the business relationship among the various parties would 
not support the imputation of knowledge from the Buick manager to 
the Buick Division, and then from Buick to GM, nor would it 
support the legal responsibility of GM for the accident on the lot of 
an independent contractor.298  
In some circumstances, such questions of the coincidence (or 
lack thereof.) of knowledge and authority may raise constitutional 
questions. In the context of defamation, for example, the First 
Amendment may require limits on whose knowledge may be 
attributed to the defendant organization. The press acts through 
agents and employees, and ordinarily a suit for libel would focus on 
what the reporters, editors, fact checkers and others involved in the 
subject matter of a story knew at the time of publication. Suppose, 
however, that someone working in the printing plant across town 
from the editorial offices, or someone working in a position equally 
remote from the article’s creators, had knowledge of a story’s 
falsehood. 
 298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 315, 317 (1965) (noting that a master has 
no duty to control the conduct of his servant outside of their employment relationship unless 
he knows or has reason to know that the servant’s conduct is harming others or creating an 
unreasonable risk of harm). 
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Would it violate the First Amendment to impute such a person’s 
knowledge to her defendant-employer? We know of no judicial 
decision involving facts of this character, but the constitutional 
argument is not hard to develop. If the defendant’s “state of mind” 
includes the states of mind of all of the defendant’s agents, including 
those who have nothing whatsoever to do with the story, the 
organization would have a liability-driven incentive to take expensive 
and time-consuming steps to clear every story it published with 
everyone who works for it. 
Moreover, the problem of imputed knowledge, potential 
liability, and self-censorship would be that much greater if it 
extended to the defendant’s organizational affiliates. Assume that 
USA Today, a Gannett publication, was under a civil obligation to 
clear potentially defamatory stories with every employee of every 
newspaper in the Gannett chain in order to be sure that no one in 
the organization had actual knowledge of the story’s falsehood, or 
information that would suggest that publication is in “reckless 
disregard” of the truth. Once the imputation of knowledge spreads 
that far, no editor could ever be sure that his news organization was 
safe from a successful libel suit in a matter where the facts are 
contested and uncertain. The probable chilling effect of such a rule 
on major news organizations is obvious. Under such a regime of tort 
liability, they would be inclined to refrain from publishing anything 
that was potentially defamatory, or reorganize their processes in 
complex and expensive ways in order to avoid the possibility of such 
liability. 
However farfetched such worries may be when applied to 
questions of libel, where the risk of the knowledgeable but otherwise 
uninvolved employee may appear remote, these concerns are 
anything but fanciful in the context of religious organizations being 
called upon to answer for negligent supervision of clergy. Any claim 
of negligent supervision must include an assertion that the employer 
knew, or should have known, of the risk that the offending employee 
would cause harm. Even within a religious organization that 
organizes itself along simple lines, the question of imputation of 
knowledge from someone within the organization to the entity itself 
may be quite difficult. If, acting collectively, a Baptist congregation 
hires a particular pastor, and one person within the congregation 
knows of, but does not disclose, the new pastor’s prior sexual 
misbehavior with minors, has the congregation engaged in 
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actionable negligent hiring? A conclusion in favor of liability would 
be sound only if the knowledge of one is imputed to all. 
To make matters considerably more difficult, religious 
organizations frequently have idiosyncratic and complex 
organizational forms.299 Consider The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (“Church of Jesus Christ”), in which all adult males 
in good standing are members of a lay, unpaid priesthood. May the 
knowledge that any one of them has of the sexual proclivities of 
another be imputed to their local congregation, to their bishop, to 
the stake president to whom the bishop reports, or to the 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop in Salt Lake City?300 If liability 
may result from imputation of such far-flung knowledge, religious 
organizations will come under tremendous pressure of one or both 
of two kinds. They may impose elaborate, expensive, and rigid 
systems of surveillance and reporting on all of their clergy, to ensure 
that those in a position to remove potential or actual offenders really 
do know everything that courts or juries might impute to them. 
Alternatively, or cumulatively, they may adopt a tremendously thick 
initial screen on those who seek the status of clergy or priest. Either 
way, they will have responded to the risk of liability by changing the 
structure of their organization or their criteria for the priesthood. 
For reasons we have elaborated above, law-driven reforms in either 
of these directions are constitutionally objectionable. 
c. Constitutionally permissible adjudication of 
claims against religious institutions. In order to avoid constitutional 
problems of this character, courts adjudicating claims of negligent 
hiring, supervision, or retention must follow a few simple but 
significant rules. First, the legal judgment about who is the employer 
of a particular member of the clergy must be made using criteria 
identical to those utilized in analogous secular settings. Just as GM 
should not be responsible for the actions of an employee of a Chevy 
dealer, even if the dangers were known to an agent of the Buick 
Division, a religious organization that is affiliated by name with 
 299. Mark Chopko has done the most comprehensive work on the relationship between 
the complexity of religious organization and issues of liability. In addition to his article in the 
Boston College Law Review, supra note 67, see Mark Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious 
Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 289 (1993). 
 300. Our knowledge of the organization of the Church of Jesus Christ derives primarily 
from Frederick Mark Gedicks, Church Discipline and the Regulation of Membership in the 
Mormon Church, 7 ECCLES. L.J. 31, 31–33 (2003). 
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many congregations, but does not control their hiring, supervision, 
and retention of clergy, should not be held liable for the behavior of 
a congregational employee. 
Second, this result should not change even if an employee of the 
larger organization has actual knowledge of the relevant risk. 
Liability in these cases should turn on a conjunction of knowledge 
and supervisory authority. Just as we argued in the preceding section 
that authority without knowledge should not be sufficient to create 
liability, so we suggest here that knowledge of risk, without legal 
authority to act on it, is similarly insufficient. 
The concern that knowledge, unaccompanied by legal authority 
to act, should not give rise to the imposition of tort liability involves 
more than a constitutionally-inspired insistence on evenhanded 
treatment of religious and secular entities. Beyond that constitutional 
worry lies a matter of policy and practice that moves many religious 
entities, as well as some secular organizations. Crisis intervention by 
institutional leaders should not be the predicate of liability for their 
organizations. As long reflected in tort law policies concerning good 
samaritans, and as reflected above in our discussion of institutional 
fiduciary duty, the imposition of liability on those who intervene 
voluntarily to minimize harm will tend to discourage ameliorative 
steps. A similar concern attends the imposition of negligence liability 
on those who seek knowledge about wrongdoing within their ambit 
of institutional concern. If acting in this way leads to actual 
knowledge that a clergyman presents a risk of sexual misconduct, but 
the acquirer of that knowledge invites personal or institutional 
liability once the knowledge is in his possession, he may be 
disinclined to seek the truth and to act correctively through the use 
of influence or persuasion rather than legal authority. Legal 
standards should not discourage this sort of effort. 
Thus, for both constitutional and policy reasons, we strongly 
recommend that the adjudication of claims of negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention of clergy employees be accompanied by 
constitutionally sensitive methods of deciding who within a religious 
organization had authority to act in the requisite ways. On this 
point, we have no substantive recommendation analogous to the 
“actual malice” rule on the question of requisite knowledge. Instead, 
we urge in the next two sections of this paper that constitutional 
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awareness be manifested in concerns of process.301 In particular, 
courts may demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to the issue of 
authority to supervise in their decisions allocating power between 
judges and juries, in doctrines concerning evidentiary sources, and in 
jury instructions tailored to the relevant constitutional concerns. 
 
(ii) Processes of adjudication and the First 
Amendment. As suggested above in our discussion of culpable 
knowledge, the regime of New York Times is not one of substance 
alone. From New York Times onward, the Supreme Court has been 
concerned about the problem of jury bias in application of First 
Amendment norms in defamation cases. The rule of “actual malice” 
will do little good in protecting press freedom if juries, acting to 
protect their neighbor’s reputation, can systematically disregard the 
rule and bring in verdicts against the press. 
Accordingly, the Court has created in defamation cases a series of 
process rules designed to allocate power to judges, entrusted with 
constitutional values, and away from juries. In New York Times itself, 
the Court remanded the case for dismissal rather than a new trial 
because “the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the 
convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands”302 and 
thus “would not constitutionally sustain the judgment”303 against the 
Times. In subsequent decisions, the Court has reinforced this 
requirement that proof of “actual malice” must rest on clear and 
convincing evidence;304 that trial judges should lean towards granting 
summary judgment to press defendants in cases where the evidence 
of actual malice that would go to the jury cannot reasonably be said 
to be clear and convincing;305 and that appellate courts should 
scrutinize the record in defamation cases to be sure that they 
properly went to the jury under these standards.306 Coincidentally 
with and in support of this structure of decision making, the Court 
in Hebert v. Lando.307 approved a broad right of defamation plaintiffs 
 301. For comparable argument with respect to freedom of speech and press, see Henry P. 
Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970). 
 302. 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
 303. Id. at 286. 
 304. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984). 
 307. 441 U.S. 153, 157–58, 177 (1979). 
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to engage in discovery designed to ferret out evidence of actual 
malice. If that is to be the controlling constitutional standard, the 
Court reasoned, plaintiffs must be free to inquire into editorial 
processes in order to demonstrate that the press defendants indeed 
knew that the information was false or that there was a high 
probability that it was false.308 
These process rules, designed to permit plaintiffs to prove their 
cases while at the same time protecting the press against juries that 
may be insensitive to the concerns reflected in constitutional rules of 
privilege, might play a comparable role in lawsuits alleging the 
negligent employment of clergy who commit acts of sexual 
misconduct. If a rule of “actual employer knowledge” were to be 
adopted for such cases, the procedural apparatus of defamation cases, 
including full opportunity to discover relevant knowledge, 
requirements of evidentiary clarity, and corresponding practices for 
summary judgment and appellate review, might well be appropriate 
for this category of litigation. 
Even beyond substantive issues involving organizational 
defendants’ degree of awareness of clergy proclivities, however, these 
sorts of judicial controls might be more widely deployed in such 
cases. As we note above, a crucial question in many of the negligence 
cases brought against religious entities is that of the authority of the 
entity to take action with respect to a member of the clergy, even if 
the entity’s agents have actual knowledge of the danger. The 
combination of the inability of juries to appreciate the nuances of 
ecclesiastical structure, combined with juries’ high expectations for 
the organization’s virtuous character, render jury trials treacherous 
indeed for organizational defendants.309 In particular, courts should 
not leave juries to draw their own unguided conclusions about the 
authority reposed in an officer with the title of “bishop,” or other 
comparable titles suggesting hierarchical authority. 
In light of the danger that negligent employment claims pose to 
the freedom to structure ecclesiastical arrangements free from state 
prescription or interference, judges might assume extraordinary 
control of such cases. In particular, judges might take it upon 
 308. Id. at 175–77. 
 309. See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589–90 (Ohio 1991) (imposing standards for 
specificity of pleading in negligent employment cases because of danger of excessive 
entanglement with religious organization). 
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themselves to inspect the evidence of supervisory authority, in order 
to be sure that the evidence to support a finding of requisite 
authority is sufficiently clear and convincing that the question should 
appropriately go to the jury. 
We recognize that this recommendation is one of process alone, 
and that substantive constitutional questions remain concerning the 
sources of such evidence, and the permissibility of considering them 
in determining issues of knowledge and control. Whatever the form 
of the evidence, the role of the judge in such cases should be to 
ensure that juries will impose liability only on the basis of actions 
that create unreasonable risks in light of the actual structure of the 
defendant religious organization, understood as much as humanly 
possible in secular terms. Juries should not be free to decide what 
constitutes a reasonable structure for a religious organization, or to 
decide whether a religious entity has reasonably applied its own, 
internal rules. 
The First Amendment doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity is 
designed to remove precisely those questions from state cognizance. 
If judges do not understand the contours of such a forbidden 
inquiry, they will be unable to properly ensure that the state and its 
decision-making processes stay clear of it. The subtleties attached to 
these questions are considerable, and we hope that our attention to 
them will invite more nuanced consideration than they have received 
to date. 
(b) Neutral principles and evidentiary sources. Faced with claims 
that a religious institution has failed to exercise due care in the 
selection or management of its clergy, courts frequently ask whether 
“neutral principles of law” can be applied to resolve the dispute. The 
concept of “neutral principles” refers to an analytic model accepted 
by the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Wolf,310 as a way of resolving 
disputes over the ownership and control of religious institutions’ 
property. As we suggested above, courts that invoke the concept of 
“neutral principles” typically, and with little or no explanation, 
restate the concept as “the application of secular standards to secular 
conduct.”311 Finding that the tort law concept of negligent 
employment is built upon secular standards, courts proceed to 
employ those standards to measure the performance of religious 
 310. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). 
 311. See text at notes 245–46 and cases cited therein. 
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organizations.312 A close examination of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Jones v. Wolf, however, reveals an inquiry that is markedly 
different from the one undertaken by most courts in the context of 
clergy sex abuse. 
Jones v. Wolf was the penultimate chapter in a long story of 
conflict within Presbyterian churches in Georgia.313 In the mid-
1960s, several congregations that belonged to the Presbyterian 
Church USA (PCUSA) withdrew from that body and joined the 
Presbyterian Church in America (PCA).314 The PCUSA decided, 
through its adjudicative process, that ownership of the local 
congregations’ property should remain with the national body. 
When the PCUSA attempted to assert control over the local church 
properties, the congregations brought suit to establish their rights to 
ownership. 
In one such case, Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights 
Presbyterian, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided that the 
property should remain with local congregations.315 The Georgia 
court found that the national church held the local congregational 
property in an implied trust. Ordinarily, such a finding would require 
deference to the national body’s decisions about the property.316 In 
this case, however, the court determined that the national body had 
breached the implied trust through its “substantial abandonment of, 
or departure from, the original tenets of faith and practice. . . .”317 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Constitution 
prohibits courts from determining whether a religious community 
has “substantially abandoned” its faith.318 Adjudication of disputes 
 312. See text at notes 237–40 and cases cited therein. 
 313. In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Georgia courts to 
clarify whether their decision to award the property to the local congregation was based on a 
standard legal presumption of majority rule. 443 U.S. at 606–08. In the final chapter of this 
saga, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly applied the 
presumption of majority rule, and affirmed a decision in favor of the majority. Jones v. Wolf, 
260 S.E.2d 84 (1979).  
 314. Both Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 597–99, and Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth 
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441–44 (1969), involve disputes within the 
United States Presbyterian Church.  
 315. 159 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1968), rev’d, Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440. 
 316. Id. at 695–96. 
 317. Id. at 701. The actual holding was slightly more complicated, but no more 
constitutionally appealing: the Georgia court held that the question of the national church’s 
departure from doctrine was one that properly went to the jury for determination. Id. 
 318. Hull Church, 393 US at 450. 
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within religious organizations, the Court held, must not turn on the 
resolution of ecclesiastical questions.319 Instead, “there are neutral 
principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which 
can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is 
awarded.”320 
On remand, the Supreme Court of Georgia abandoned its 
doctrine of implied trust and held that it now would adjudicate such 
disputes by examining the traditional documents used to resolve any 
dispute over title to property.321 The Georgia court then found that 
the deeds to the church properties in question made no mention of 
any express trust or other interest benefiting the national church and 
so reaffirmed ownership in the local congregations.322 
Jones v. Wolf involved a very similar controversy within another 
Presbyterian congregation in Georgia. In this case, the congregation 
had divided into competing factions, and the majority group decided 
to remove the congregation from the PCUSA and join the PCA.323 
The minority faction appealed to the PCUSA, which decided that 
ownership of the church property should remain with the minority 
faction.324 The parties brought the dispute before the civil courts, 
and, following the “neutral principles” approach adopted on remand 
in Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian, the courts 
examined the relevant deeds, corporate charters, and other church 
documents and found no grant of an express trust to the national 
body. Accordingly, the Georgia courts confirmed ownership of the 
property in the majority faction of the congregation.325 
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the approach taken by the 
Georgia courts but remanded for clarification of the reason that the 
trial court had awarded the property to the majority faction.326 In 
approving the “neutral principles” analysis adopted by the Georgia 
courts, the Court wrote: 
 The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are 
that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to 
 319. Id. at 449–50. 
 320. Id. at 449. 
 321. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian, 167 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. 1969). 
 322. Id. at 659–60. 
 323. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 598 (1979). 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 660. 
 326. Id. at 607–08. 
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accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The 
method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of 
trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby 
promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in 
questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, 
the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-
law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and 
obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. Through 
appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious 
societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the 
event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will 
determine the ownership in the event of schism or doctrinal 
controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can ensure 
that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be 
resolved in accord with the desires of the members.327 
Using neutral principles of property and trusts law, courts can 
examine documents relating to control of the property—including 
“religious documents, such as a church constitution”328—to 
determine ownership. Any judicial inquiry into such documents 
requires “special care” to ensure that the court’s interpretation is 
performed “in purely secular terms.”329 
Many, including Justice Rehnquist, have questioned whether 
courts should apply the “neutral principles” approach outside the 
context of church property disputes.330 We earlier quoted Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion in denial of a stay in a case involving a religious 
nursing home, in which he stated that the “Court never has 
suggested that those constraints [imposed on resolution of church 
property disputes] similarly apply outside the context of such 
intraorganization disputes.”331 
There are at least two reasons for questioning Justice Rehnquist’s 
conclusion. First, Justice Rehnquist opposed special protections for 
 327. Id. at 603–04. Professor Greenawalt raises serious questions about the extent to 
which the neutral principles approach actually respects the intention of the members of 
religious communities. Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 1901–04. 
 328. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See, e.g., Gen. Council on Fin. and Admin. v. Cal. Superior Court, 439 U.S. 1369, 
1372–73 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978). 
 331. Id. at 1372; see also supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
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religious institutions even in the context of internal disputes,332 so he 
would not be likely to extend such protections to external disputes. 
Second, the boundary between internal and external disputes is less 
clear than one might think. Disputes over the appointment or 
retention of a priest seem internal, but a cleric who alleges wrongful 
termination does not look much different from others who bring 
tort claims against the church. Indeed, disputes over the ownership 
of church property are not purely internal. In Jones v. Wolf, the 
majority faction literally excluded the minority faction from use of a 
church to which many of the minority had contributed. 
Even if one recognizes that the First Amendment has some 
application to “external” disputes involving religious organizations, 
one still might believe that the special meaning of “neutral 
principles” associated with Jones v. Wolf should be restricted to 
disputes within religious communities over ownership of real 
property. As developed by the Georgia courts and approved by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the neutral principles approach focuses heavily 
on the interpretation of written evidence, especially of legal 
documents like deeds and corporate charters, to determine the 
parties’ relative legal interests in the disputed property. This almost 
exclusive focus on documents is entirely appropriate in the context of 
real property; the Statute of Frauds requires parties to create or 
convey an interest in property in a signed writing.333 No such 
evidentiary limitation applies in most tort cases, in which resolution 
of the claim requires the court to consider all relevant evidence, 
including parties’ patterns of conduct that may directly contradict 
their authority as prescribed by church documents. 
We may, however, glean from the neutral principles approach 
some guidelines for dealing with a wider range of disputes, including 
tort claims, involving religious organizations. The neutral principles 
approach has two central limitations on the scope of admissible 
evidence. First, to avoid the constitutional error of imputing to 
religious organizations patterns of authority that they have not 
chosen, courts might strictly limit the introduction of testimony 
intended to show patterns of conduct that contradict the 
organization’s written allocations of authority. Even if such 
 332. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 728–29 (1976) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 333. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30 (2003) (contracts required to be in writing). 
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testimony might be useful in determining what really happened in a 
given dispute, courts should be concerned that the jury will disregard 
the formal structure of a religious entity. Either out of prejudice 
against the organization or a desire to provide a remedy for the 
victim, a jury might impose its own views of the responsibilities that 
a religious organization should bear for misconduct by those who 
speak in its name. 
Second, in looking to the religious organization’s documents to 
determine the respective rights and obligations of and within a 
religious organization, the court should examine only those materials 
that it can interpret in secular terms. If the burden of persuasion rests 
on the plaintiff, courts should look for clear statements of specific 
kinds of authority to supervise clergy. 
In the context of claims that religious organizations failed to 
exercise due care in their employment practices, the reconsidered 
neutral principles doctrine would thus permit judges to make the 
most constitutionally sensitive determinations on a motion for 
summary judgment, rather than sending those determinations to the 
jury. By examining the documents that create or reflect a religious 
entity’s structures of authority, the court could determine whether a 
particular official or body had the power to hire, supervise, or retain 
a particular individual. As with the neutral principles approach in the 
context of property disputes, this examination has the decided virtue 
of letting the religious organization determine its own patterns of 
authority. The court would avoid the constitutional problem of 
imposing on the entity an alien polity. 
This reconsidered application of neutral principles is less than 
perfect for at least three reasons. First, despite Jones v. Wolf, this 
application cuts directly against the basic intuition of many courts, 
which have intentionally excluded consideration of the religious 
community’s documents in the belief that any interpretation of the 
responsibilities reflected within such documents would 
unconstitutionally entangle the court in the religious community’s 
affairs. Second, the approach might work with institutions that have 
developed formal patterns of interaction, but many religious 
communities have unwritten and even fluid structures, which then 
cannot be assessed under this reconsidered doctrine. Exclusive 
reliance on documents rather than practices to prove authority thus 
can be no more than a presumption, designed to govern only when 
documentary evidence is available. Third, even in religious 
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communities that have a codified structure, a review of documents 
may not eliminate all of the ambiguities concerning the powers and 
duties of a particular office or body. In property cases, recourse to 
the default norm can resolve such ambiguity. In the absence of 
express evidence to the contrary, property belongs to the holder of 
record title. However, such recourse will not resolve ambiguity when 
the dispute involves the authority of a position. Nonetheless, we 
believe that this evidence-centered conception of the doctrine of 
neutral principles may be a useful approach for courts to apply in 
those cases in which formal documentation of rights and duties is 
available. 
 
 (3) Vicarious liability of a religious organization for its agent’s 
sexual misconduct. Plaintiffs in cases of sexual misconduct routinely 
claim that the wrongdoer’s religious organization should be 
vicariously liable for the wrongdoer’s acts.334 The claim of vicarious 
liability, typically referred to as respondeat superior, does not allege 
fault on the part of the religious organization, but only that the 
wrongdoer was an agent of the organization, and that the wrong 
involved acts that fall within the scope of that agency.335  
The doctrine of respondeat superior rests on a variety of 
grounds. Because the organization (the principal) reaps the benefit 
of its agent’s work, the principal should also bear the costs of that 
agent’s work, including harms imposed on third parties through the 
 334. See Chopko, supra note 67; Chopko, supra note 299; see also Carl H. Esbeck, Tort 
Claims Against Churches & Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. 
VA. L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958). In at least two different ways, 
claims of vicarious liability can become intertwined with allegations of negligence. First, 
plaintiffs can claim that a defendant organization should be deemed to have ratified the 
wrongdoer’s conduct because it failed to take action to disavow or report the wrong, or to 
mitigate plaintiff’s harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1958); Gagne v. 
O’Donoghue, No. CIV94-1158, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 4 (July 14, 1998). Second, a 
number of statutes relating to sexual exploitation by psychotherapists have provisions that hold 
the therapist’s employer liable for such exploitation if the employer has failed to investigate the 
wrongdoer’s employment history. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 148A.03(a) (2003), quoted in JM v. 
Minn. Dist. Council of the Seventh-day Adventists, 658 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003). But see Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 2003) (finding that communications 
between priest and female parishioner about intimate details of her life did not come within the 
definition of psychotherapy in Minnesota statute). 
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agent’s performance of his work.336 As a matter of policy, it also 
seems reasonable to impose that burden on the principal, because 
the principal typically has control over the agent’s execution of the 
work, the financial means to pay claims resulting from the agent’s 
misconduct, and the ability to obtain insurance that will cover such 
claims.337 
Plaintiffs rarely succeed in their claims that a religious 
organization is vicariously liable for its agent’s sexual misconduct. In 
most of the cases in which plaintiffs assert claims of vicarious liability, 
the court skips over the question of whether the wrongdoer was an 
agent of the defendant, because the court finds that the plaintiff 
cannot prove that the tortious behavior was within the scope of a 
cleric’s agency, regardless of who employed the cleric.338 Courts in a 
significant majority of jurisdictions have held that, as a matter of law, 
sexual misconduct is not within the scope of a religious leader’s 
employment by a religious organization. Such misconduct is, these 
courts hold, motivated by the wrongdoer’s desire for “personal 
gratification.”339 Although courts tend to reach this legal conclusion 
with little explanation, it is logically connected with plaintiffs’ claim 
that the sexual abuse represents a breach of the cleric’s fiduciary 
obligations. In alleging that the clergyman breached his duty of 
loyalty by taking personal advantage of the relationship, the plaintiff 
at least implicitly claims that the clergyman has put his own desires 
above his professional responsibilities and therefore has ceased to 
serve his principal. This, of course, is the legal description of acts that 
fall outside the scope of an actor’s agency.340 
 336. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious 
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1749–64 (1996) (discussing justifications for vicarious 
liability of employer). 
 337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).  
 338. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 329–30 (Colo. 1993); Mills v. 
Deehr, No. 82799, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2148 (May 11, 2004) (holding that a claim for 
vicarious liability was properly dismissed because sexual abuse “cannot be said to further the 
goals of religion”). 
 339. N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592, 599 & n.30 (Okla. 1999) (holding 
that, as a matter of law, sexual misconduct is not within the scope of a pastor’s duties, and 
listing other jurisdictions in which courts have reached the same conclusion). 
 340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1958) (“Conduct of a servant 
is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond 
the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.”). 
In other jurisdictions, courts have denied vicarious liability on facts that are intertwined with 
the limited situations in which parishioners may bring suit against the cleric for sexual 
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Several courts, however, have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on 
claims of vicarious liability against religious organizations for the 
sexual misconduct of their agents. Most of these decisions follow Doe 
v. Samaritan Counseling Center,341 in which the Supreme Court of 
Alaska said that a plaintiff could assert a claim of vicarious liability 
against a counseling center that employed the pastoral counselor, 
whom she accused of sexual misconduct in a counseling relationship. 
The court held that the wrongdoer’s “motivation to serve” the 
employer is not a prerequisite to a finding of vicarious liability. 
“[W]here tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental 
to the employee’s legitimate work activities, the ‘motivation to serve’ 
test will have been satisfied.”342 In the counseling context, the court 
held that sexual misconduct arises when the counselor mishandles 
the “transference phenomenon,” which is a normal part of the 
counseling relationship. Seen in that light, the misconduct is a 
normal, if unfortunate, aspect of the employer’s business, and the 
costs of the harm are justly imposed on the employer.343 
misconduct. For example, in Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church, 30 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. 
2000), a Texas appellate court permitted a plaintiff to bring a tort claim for sexual misconduct 
against a pastor from whom she received marital counseling only because the content of the 
counseling was secular. Id. at 451–52 (finding that plaintiff stated a cause of action under the 
Texas Sexual Exploitation by Mental Health Services Provider Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
§§ 81.001–81.009 (2004)). The court then found that such secular counseling was outside the 
scope of the pastor’s employment; the church authorized only religious teaching and 
counseling and had no notice that the pastor was offering secular counseling. Id. at 454; see 
also Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Hodges v. 
Kleinwood Church of Christ, No. CIV01-98-00384, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4845 (July 20, 
2000) (same). 
 341. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990), cited in Enderle v Trautman, No. CIV.A3-01-22, 
2001 WL 1820145, *8–*10 (D.N.D. Dec. 3, 2001); Patel v. Himalayan Int’l Inst. of Yoga 
Sci. & Philosophy of the United States, No. 3:CV-94-1118, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22532 
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1999). The Supreme Court of Alaska subsequently overruled portions of its 
Samaritan Counseling decision. Veco v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999) (“In 
[Samaritan Counseling] we stated the ‘motivation to serve’ test would be satisfied ‘where 
tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work 
activities.’ To the extent that this language suggests that the employee’s act need not be 
motivated in fact at least to some degree to serve the master’s business we disapprove of it.”). 
 342. Samaritan Counseling, 791 P.2d at 348, overruled by Veco v. Rosebrock, 970 P.2d 
906 (Alaska 1999). 
 343. Id. at 348–49; see also Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1997) (permitting, in a case in which a plaintiff alleges sexual exploitation by priest-
psychotherapist, vicarious liability claim to go forward because “a trier of fact could reasonably 
find that the sexual relations between [the priest] and the plaintiff directly grew out of, and 
were the immediate and proximate results of, the church sanctioned counseling sessions”); 
Nelligan v Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 476 (Mar. 5, 2004) 
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As long as courts neutrally apply the test for vicarious liability to 
both religious and nonreligious entities, the Samaritan Counseling 
court’s expansive interpretation of that test does not raise special 
constitutional problems when applied to religious organizations.344 If 
the underlying tort claim against the employee survives 
constitutional scrutiny, then the identity of the one upon whom the 
remedy is imposed—whether agent or principal—is a matter without 
constitutional significance.345 
Cases on clergy sexual misconduct do not typically address the 
issue of the wrongdoer’s status as an agent, but the one court that 
did squarely address that question found that proof of an agency 
relationship may proceed because the inquiry involves only neutral 
principles of law.346 In J.M. v. Minnesota District Council of the 
Assemblies of God, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota held that a 
plaintiff could establish a minister’s employment status through 
factors that courts apply to determine employment in any context: 
“(1) the right to control the means and manner of performance; (2) 
the mode of payment; (3) furnishing of materials and tools; (4) 
control of premises where work is performed; and (5) right of the 
employer to hire and discharge.”347 
The second, third, and fourth factors are clearly susceptible of 
proof by “neutral principles of law.” A court should be able to 
determine whether the defendant organization paid for the 
wrongdoer’s services, provided the means through which the 
wrongdoer performed his work, and controlled the place(s) where 
that work was performed. As we argue above, however, proof of the 
first and fifth factors—the power to hire, supervise, and retain—may 
well draw the court into complex and perhaps contested questions of 
(finding that, in light of evidence submitted that four percent of clergy had been accused of 
sexual abuse, such abuse is no longer outside the scope of duty as a matter of law). 
 344. See generally Timothy E. Allen, Notes & Comments, The Forseeability of 
Transference: Extending Employer Liability Under Washington Law for Therapist Sexual 
Exploitation of Patients, 78 WASH. L. REV. 525 (2003); Linda Mabus Jorgenson et al., 
Transference of Liability: Employer Liability for Sexual Misconduct by Therapists, 60 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1421 (1995). 
 345. See Odenthal v. Minn. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 657 N.W.2d 569, 
576–77 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that neutral principles guide the judicial definition of 
the scope of vicarious liability). 
 346. See, e.g., JM v. Minn. Dist. Council of the Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589, 
595–96 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 347. Id. at 595; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (listing 
factors for determining when an actor is a servant). 
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ecclesiastical polity, questions that are not so readily solved through 
application of “neutral principles.”348 Many religious traditions have 
multiple layers of authority, with very different types of relationships 
between the layers. 
Even if judicial determination of which entity has the powers to 
hire, supervise, and retain is constitutionally problematic when the 
plaintiff claims that a religious institution has been negligent in its 
performance of those functions,349 the constitutional problem might 
be avoidable when the court is analyzing a claim of vicarious liability. 
Assume, for example, that a cleric has sexually molested a minor in 
his congregation, and the victim has sued the cleric’s congregation, 
diocese, and religious order under a claim of vicarious liability. 
Because a claim of vicarious liability does not require a finding that 
any particular defendant failed to use due care in supervision, such a 
claim avoids judicial parsing of the precise extent of authority 
possessed by any single entity. 
Instead, the court can avoid that constitutionally sensitive 
determination by asking a simpler question—one that the IRS 
regularly applies: Was the wrongdoer an employee or an independent 
contractor?350 If the court deems the cleric to be an independent 
contractor, then the claim of vicarious liability fails by definition. If, 
on the other hand, the court deems the cleric to be an employee, 
then the court will need to identify the employer. In some, and 
perhaps most, circumstances, identification of the employer will be 
uncontroversial; a single entity will pay for and control the work of 
the wrongdoer. 
In other circumstances, however, a number of bodies might 
exercise control over the employee, with corresponding uncertainty 
or dispute about the precise limits of each body’s authority. If a 
court finds sufficient justification to hold that several different 
entities bear indicia of employer status, the court might hold each of 
the bodies jointly and severally liable. The parties would then be free 
to allocate among themselves their shares of the vicarious 
 348. See supra notes 237–40 (discussing claims of negligent employment made against 
religious entities). 
 349. See id. 
 350. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 15-A, 
EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE 5 (2004). 
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responsibility.351 Such an approach might even encourage the various 
entities to make ex ante agreements about how such liability should 
be apportioned for a given position.352 
C. Criminal Culpability of Supervisors and Religious Institutions 
As demonstrated in Part IV.B, religious institutions may be 
civilly liable for their failure to supervise their clergy, when such 
failure leads to foreseeable harms to those who are vulnerable. Does 
anything change when prosecutors pursue supervisors and religious 
organizations for alleged criminal wrongdoing arising out of the 
same conduct? We may glean the first insights into this question 
from the results of the criminal investigations of various Roman 
Catholic dioceses over the past several years. The most prominent 
and well-publicized among these occurred in Boston, where the 
Office of the Attorney General of Massachusetts conducted a lengthy 
investigation, empanelled a grand jury, and prepared a high-profile 
public report;353 in New Hampshire, where the state attorney general 
similarly investigated and reported on the Diocese of Manchester;354 
in Suffolk County, New York, where the county district attorney 
empanelled a special grand jury that produced a public report, with 
names of alleged perpetrators and victims omitted, on sexual abuse 
of children in the Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York;355 and in 
Phoenix, Arizona, where the Maricopa County District Attorney in 
June 2003 reached an agreement with the bishop of the diocese in 
 351. This approach, of course, might also lead the various components of institutions to 
sever any relationships that might confer on them the status and responsibilities of an 
employer. To the extent that entities are willing to reorganize themselves in such ways—that is, 
by sharpening distinctions between the entity that employs a pastor and those that do not—
that decision should be respected by the law. We are not convinced, however, that religious 
communities will so easily abandon the historical forms of ecclesiastical polity which have 
produced the present interrelationships between local and regional authorities. 
 352. In such cases, all that we have said above about constitutional sensitivity in processes 
of adjudication and sources of evidence applies with equal force. See supra notes 302–33 and 
accompanying text. 
 353. MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2. 
 354. NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11.  
 355. SUFFOLK COUNTY SUPREME COURT, GRAND JURY REPORT CPL § 190.85(1)(C), 
Jan. 17, 2003 [hereinafter SUFFOLK COUNTY REPORT]. Of the three reports, this one is the 
most detailed and graphic with respect to the sexual misconduct of the offending clergy. 
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lieu of prosecuting him for obstruction of justice.356 All four of these 
investigations focused on allegations that leaders in the church 
hierarchy engaged in supervisory wrongdoing, and all four 
contemplated the possibility of indicting leaders as well as the 
religious institution of the diocese or archdiocese itself.357 
In addition to their focus on organizations belonging to the 
Roman Catholic Church, these proceedings displayed certain 
common characteristics. First, they all involved sexual crimes against 
minors rather than adults. As noted above in Part IV.A, sexual abuse 
of minors by clergy is always a crime of some sort, while comparable 
mistreatment of adults by clergy rarely involves criminal 
wrongdoing.358  
Second, all of the investigations involved religious entities against 
which there had been allegations of systematic wrongdoing going 
back over a period of many years. The New Hampshire Attorney 
General’s Report, for example, summed up its relevant conclusions 
by asserting that “in multiple cases the Diocese knew that a 
particular priest was sexually assaulting minors, the Diocese took 
inadequate or no action to protect these children within the parish, 
and that the priest subsequently committed additional acts of sexual 
abuse against children that the priest had contact with through the 
church.”359 In Massachusetts, the Attorney General’s report found 
“that widespread sexual abuse of children was due to an institutional 
acceptance of abuse and a massive and pervasive failure of 
leadership.”360 In light of this combination of criminal abuse of 
children and persistent institutional failure to take appropriate action 
with respect to accused priests, it should be no surprise that 
prosecutors pursued the possibility of supervisory or organizational 
culpability. 
Third, none of these jurisdictions produced an indictment of a 
supervisor or an organization. As described below, however, all of 
 356. Press Release, Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Six Priests Indicted: Bishop, 
Diocese Sign Agreement Insuring Protection of Children (June 2, 2003), at 
http://maricopacountyattorney.org/Press/PDF/catholic_church_rev.pdf. 
 357. A similar investigation is now underway in Philadelphia. See David O’Reilly, Clergy 
Victims Urge D.A. to Punish Archdiocese, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 18, 2004, at B1 
(reporting on the status of a twenty-five-month-long grand jury investigation of sexual abuse 
in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia). 
 358. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
 359. NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. 
 360. MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
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the investigations produced evidence of wrongdoing that public 
authorities thought sufficient to warrant the imposition of criminal 
penalties. In Boston, and Suffolk County, N.Y., the authorities 
concluded that the available law was insufficient, either because (in 
the cases of many of the sexual abusers) the statutes of limitations 
had expired361 or (in the cases of supervisors and organizations) the 
relevant criminal statutes were insufficiently tailored to the wrongs.362 
In Manchester and Phoenix, church officers admitted wrongdoing, 
and the investigations ended with agreements rather than trials.363 
1. Manchester, New Hampshire 
The State of New Hampshire came closest to an indictment of 
the diocese itself. The Attorney General’s Report, released in March 
2003 asserts that the State “was prepared to present indictments [to 
the local grand jury] . . . charging the Diocese of Manchester with 
multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a minor . . . .”364 
Rather than face those indictments, the diocese “acknowledged that 
the State had evidence likely to sustain a conviction against the 
diocese for child endangerment.”365 The diocese entered into an 
agreement with the State in which the diocese promised to comply 
with strict requirements of reporting future allegations of similar 
wrongdoing, and to provide the state authorities with unlimited 
access to church documents, past and future, concerning the internal 
handling of such claims.366 
 361. SUFFOLK COUNTY REPORT, supra note 355, at 172. 
 362. See MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
 363. NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11, at 1; Alan Cooperman, Bishop Avoids 
Charges, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at A1 (describing admission by Bishop of Phoenix that he 
“concealed sexual abuse of children by priests”). 
 364. NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. The relevant statute, New 
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated § 639.3, provides that “[a] person is guilty of 
endangering the welfare of a child . . . if he knowingly endangers the welfare of a child under 
18 years of age . . . by purposely violating a duty of care, protection, or support he owes to 
such a child.” Under state law, a corporation (including the “corporation sole” represented in 
the office of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester) is included within the definition of 
“person” in the state’s criminal code. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:11, II (2004). 
 365. NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. 
 366. The key provisions of the agreement are summarized in the NEW HAMPSHIRE AG 
REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. New Hampshire is the only state (out of the four that have 
brought investigations against clergy) to explore First Amendment considerations, but these 
are limited to cursory analysis of Employment Division v. Smith and do not represent anything 
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2. Boston, Massachusetts 
The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Report, released to the 
public in July 2003, conceded that its investigation had found no 
evidence of recent or ongoing sexual abuse of children in the 
Archdiocese of Boston.367 The bulk of the Report, however, 
consisted of a scathing set of accusations aimed at the behavior of the 
leaders of the archdiocese.368 
Nevertheless, the Report included as a major finding that “the 
investigation did not produce evidence sufficient to charge the 
Archdiocese or its Senior Managers with crimes under applicable 
state law.”369 The Report cursorily analyzes and dismisses the 
possibility that the Archdiocese or its leaders might have (1) 
committed acts of obstruction of justice; (2) been accessories before 
or after the fact of the felony of child sexual abuse; or (3) been 
parties to a criminal conspiracy. All of these crimes include 
requirements of intent to facilitate or benefit from the primary crime, 
and the Report asserts that the evidence from the investigation did 
not support a finding of such intent. 
The Report applauded, however, the recent enactment by the 
Massachusetts legislature of several laws designed to correct similar 
wrongdoing in the future. First, in the spring of 2002, the legislature 
acted to extend to clergy and other church employees who work 
regularly with children on the church’s behalf the state’s law on 
mandatory reporting of child abuse.370 Second, a few months later, 
like a full and fair exploration of possible ecclesiastical immunities of the sort we are 
considering in this paper. Id. at 19–20. 
 367. MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (Finding No. 1). 
 368. Id. at 25–72 (Finding No. 3). The elaborate subfindings in this part of the Report 
include those pertaining to knowledge by archdiocese officials of the extent of the clergy sexual 
abuse problem; placing children at risk by official inaction; failure to notify law enforcement 
authorities of allegations of abuse; failure to conduct adequate internal investigations; 
transferring abusive priests to other parishes; accepting transfers of abusive priests from other 
dioceses; and failure to supervise priests with a history of sexual abuse of children. See id. at 3–5 
(executive summary).  
 369. Id. at 21 (Finding No. 2). 
 370. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2004). This law, which had originally been 
enacted in 1973 and had covered health care professionals, teachers, and others but not clergy, 
was amended to include any  
priest, rabbi, clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leader of any church or 
religious body, accredited Christian Science practitioner, person performing official 
duties on behalf of a church or religious body that are recognized as the duties of a 
priest, rabbi, clergy, ordained or licensed minister, leader of any church or religious 
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the legislature created the new crime of “recklessly endangering 
children.” This enactment covers “[w]hoever wantonly or recklessly 
engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily 
injury or sexual abuse to a child or wantonly or recklessly fails to take 
reasonable steps to alleviate such risk where there is a duty to act.”371 
The Report laments that neither of these enactments apply to the 
Archdiocese’s institutional failures, all of which predated the new 
laws.372 
3. Suffolk County (Long Island), New York 
The report of the special grand jury empanelled to investigate the 
Diocese of Rockville Centre is the most graphic of all those 
produced by the official inquiries into possible criminal wrongdoing 
by a Catholic Diocese or Archdiocese. The Report includes nearly a 
hundred pages of close detail concerning alleged instances of abuse 
of minors by diocesan priests and the failures of other diocesan 
agents, aware of the abuses, to take protective action.373 Additionally, 
the Report devotes another sixty-five pages to the institutional 
inadequacies of diocesan policy and practice in responding to sexual 
abuse by clergy.374 
Nevertheless, as in the Boston investigation, the grand jury did 
not issue indictments. It concluded that the acts of many priests had 
body, or accredited Christian Science practitioner, or person employed by a church 
or religious body to supervise, educate, coach, train or counsel a child on a regular 
basis.  
Id. However, the statute further provides that  
[n]otwithstanding section 20A of chapter 233, a priest, rabbi, clergy member, 
ordained or licensed minister, leader of a church or religious body or accredited 
Christian Science practitioner shall report all cases of abuse under this section, but 
need not report information solely gained in a confession or similarly confidential 
communication in other religious faiths. Nothing in the general laws shall modify or 
limit the duty of a priest, rabbi, clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leader 
of a church or religious body or accredited Christian Science practitioner to report a 
reasonable cause that a child is being injured as set forth in this section when the 
priest, rabbi, clergy member, ordained or licensed minister, leader of a church or 
religious body or accredited Christian Science practitioner is acting in some other 
capacity that would otherwise make him a reporter. 
Id. 
 371. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13L (2004). 
 372. MASSACHUSETTS AG REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. 
 373. SUFFOLK COUNTY REPORT, supra note 355, at 3–95. 
 374. Id. at 106–71. 
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violated laws protecting children against sexual abuse, but that the 
relevant statutes of limitations had expired, making successful 
prosecutions impossible. And it concluded “that the conduct of 
certain Diocesan officials would have warranted criminal prosecution 
but for the fact that the existing statutes are inadequate.”375 
The Suffolk County Report concluded with a lengthy list of 
legislative recommendations. These included elimination or 
extension of statutes of limitations for various sexual crimes against 
minors;376 the extension of laws prohibiting sexual relations between 
professional care-givers and clients to include “anyone representing 
themselves as a member of the clergy who provides health care or 
mental health care services;”377 the expansion of accessory liability to 
include postcrime conduct “that conceals or hinders discovery of the 
crime or the discovery of evidence of the crime;”378 the expansion of 
the statutory duty to report abuse of a child to include any child 
abused by any person,379 and the specific imposition of this duty 
upon members of the clergy or others serving a religious 
institution;380 and the enactment of a new criminal law on 
“Endangering the Welfare of a Child.”381 
4. Phoenix, Arizona 
The Maricopa County District Attorney’s Office conducted a 
lengthy grand jury investigation of sexual misconduct in the Phoenix 
diocese. The grand jury indicted six priests for abuse of children, and 
the grand jury heard evidence that Bishop Thomas O’Brien knew of 
the misconduct, failed to report it to public authorities, and 
transferred the accused priests to new parishes without informing 
anyone at those parishes of the accusations.382 The district attorney 
 375. Id. at 174. 
 376. Id. at 175–76. 
 377. Id. at 177; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing tort liability for 
clergy who hold themselves out as providers of mental health and other services). 
 378. SUFFOLK COUNTY REPORT, supra note 355, at 177. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. at 178. 
 381. Id. at 177. Such an enactment would apparently be akin to the recently enacted 
Massachusetts law on reckless endangerment of a child. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13L 
(2004). 
 382. Charlie LeDuff, Bishop of Phoenix Admits Transfers of Accused Priests, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 2003, at A5. 
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seriously considered indicting Bishop O’Brien for obstructing justice 
as a result of the bishop’s conduct during the investigation.383 
Facing the likelihood of prosecution, Bishop O’Brien entered 
into an agreement covering the relationship between the diocese and 
public authorities with respect to the handling of complaints of 
sexual misconduct against clergy under the diocese’s jurisdiction. 
Like the agreement in New Hampshire, the Phoenix agreement 
requires reporting to public authorities of all complaints of sexual 
misconduct by clergy within the diocese. The Phoenix agreement 
goes further, however, by committing the bishop to appoint a 
Moderator of the Curia, who is to serve as the bishop’s chief of staff, 
and a Youth Protection Advocate within the offices of the diocese.384 
The agreement specifies that the newly appointed moderator, rather 
than the bishop, will have ultimate responsibility “for dealing with 
issues that arise relating to the revision, enforcement and application 
of the [newly agreed to] sexual misconduct policy.”385 The Youth 
Protection Advocate is responsible for implementation of the policy 
within the diocese. In addition, the agreement specifies that the 
advocate’s decision to report allegations of child sexual abuse to 
public authorities is “to be made by the Youth Protection Advocate 
independently and not subject to the consent of Thomas J. O’Brien, 
or any other Diocesan personnel.”386 
 
5. Overarching considerations 
 
The policies reflected in the enactments and agreements 
produced in these four jurisdictions are of course highly significant 
for the protection of children from future wrongs and for the control 
of future misbehavior of this character by any and all institutions, 
religious or otherwise. Our particular focus in the remainder of this 
section, as in what has preceded it, is on the question whether 
 383. Joseph A. Reaves, Bishop O’Brien Admits Cover-up in Handling Sexual Abuse Cases, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 2, 2003, at A1.  
 384. The full agreement can be accessed via the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office Web 
site at http://maricopacountyattorney.org/Press/PDF/catholic_church_rev.pdf. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. Bishop O’Brien’s woes have mounted since the plea bargain. See Terry Greene 
Sterling & T.R. Reid, Bishop Convicted in Fatal Hit-and-Run, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2004, at 
A1 (reporting on the conviction of Bishop O’Brien for “leaving the scene of an accident in 
which the car he was driving struck and killed a man”). 
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religious institutions deserve distinctive treatment, separate and apart 
from that afforded to secular institutions. With respect to the child 
protection laws invoked or recommended by these reports, are there 
any which invite consideration of ecclesiastical immunities? 
At the very outset of Part IV, we rejected any notion that such 
immunities might protect clergy who themselves engage in 
actionable sexual misconduct.387 Nothing in the constitutional 
principles we have been exploring suggests any limitation on the 
state’s authority to allege and prove unlawful sexual contact with a 
minor by a member of the clergy. With respect to supervisors and 
institutions, however, we think that the Establishment Clause may 
indeed suggest limitations on some of the actions and 
recommendations that have emerged from these criminal 
investigations. 
First, the imposition upon clergy and religious institutions of a 
duty to report suspected instances of child abuse may raise questions 
related to the priest-penitent privilege.388 If, as is frequently the case, 
the information about abuse does not come to the official of the 
religious entity from a communication covered by the privilege, this 
concern of course does not arise.389 In some cases, however, a 
clergyman may learn of sexual misconduct by another clergyman 
only as a result of an otherwise privileged communication. In those 
circumstances, may the state impose a mandatory duty to report?390 
Such an imposition would implicate, for some faiths at least, 
profound issues of religious freedom. In the Roman Catholic 
Church, for example, a priest is absolutely forbidden from breaking 
the seal of the confessional.391 And it may well be both cruel and 
 387.  See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text. 
 388. The recent Massachusetts statute which extends to clergy the duty to report child 
sexual abuse exempts information gained in a confession or similarly confidential 
communication. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 § 51A (2004). For a thorough appraisal of these 
issues, see Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege 
and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127 (2003). 
 389. For a recent decision rejecting an argument that the federal or state constitutions 
require an evidentiary privilege broader than that afforded under the state’s priest-penitent 
privilege, see Society of Jesus of New England v. Commonwealth, 808 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. 2004). 
 390. See generally Abrams, supra note 388. 
 391. Non-Catholics may indeed wonder why this obligation of clergy is more strenuous 
than the obligation to refrain from sexual misconduct itself, especially with respect to a child. 
But it is the business only of the religious community, not the state, to assign gravity and 
priority among the religious duties of members of the clergy. 
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futile to impose a duty to report on clergy who will go to prison 
rather than violate the sacraments of their faith. 
Whatever the policy merits of imposing duties to report on 
otherwise privileged communications with clergy, we think it is 
useful to frame and answer the constitutional question that such an 
imposition would raise. If the priest-penitent privilege is a creature of 
common law or statute only, it would follow that a state may create 
an exception to the privilege for cases of sexual abuse of a child. And, 
indeed, the case for such an exception would be quite powerful if 
every other helping profession were similarly regulated. If all secular 
professionals are obliged to report suspected abuse of a child, why 
should clergy be let off the hook? The demise of constitutionally 
required exemptions from religion-neutral general laws, dictated by 
Employment Division v. Smith,392 suggests that clergy would have no 
basis for complaint under the Free Exercise Clause if they were 
among a wider group of professionals whose communication 
privileges were trimmed as a response to the problem of child abuse. 
Only if the law singled out clergy from among other professionals 
would Free Exercise objections to that deprivation seem 
meritorious.393 
There remains, however, a different constitutional perspective 
from which to analyze the question of a legislatively mandated 
exception to the priest-penitent privilege in cases of sexual abuse of a 
child. For reasons that derive from considerations of equal protection 
as well as free exercise of religion, the scope of the priest-penitent 
privilege is appropriately compared with the scope of attorney-client 
privilege.394 The law currently assures perpetrators of these (and 
other) crimes that they may safely confide in their lawyers concerning 
their misdeeds,395 and the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel may 
require such assurances.396 To permit the continuation of the 
attorney-client privilege for sex offenders while denying a 
 392. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 393. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 394. See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 52 (arguing for a constitutional 
paradigm shift from understanding religious liberty as a right of privilege to an understanding 
of religious liberty as—and only as—equal liberty of conscience and association). 
 395. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000) (defining the 
attorney-client privilege). 
 396. Id. § 68 cmt. c (citing Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983), and 
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.2 (1986) for Sixth Amendment justification for 
attorney-client privilege). 
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comparable priest-penitent privilege for those same offenders is to 
create a secular advantage, favoring those who seek advice about 
legal consequences and options over those who seek spiritual advice 
concerning the same underlying behavior. Thus, so long as the state 
maintains the attorney-client privilege for sexual abusers of children, 
it may be under a constitutional obligation to do likewise with 
respect to the priest-penitent privilege. By the same reasoning, 
victims of or witnesses to crimes of sexual abuse should also have the 
same right to seek spiritual or legal counsel, without fear of 
professional betrayal.397 
The second concern raised by the application of criminal laws to 
religious institutions in cases of sexual misconduct relates to the basis 
for imposition of affirmative duties to protect children and others.398 
Included as an element of the crime of reckless endangerment of a 
child is a requirement that the perpetrator must be under a legal 
duty to protect the child.399 Those who are legal strangers to the 
child (even though they might be friends or neighbors) are under no 
such duty and, thus, need not act to protect a child, even one in 
obvious and immediate danger. 
The crime of reckless endangerment thus sounds in fiduciary 
duty and raises the precise question that we considered in Part 
IV.B.1 concerning the constitutional danger that religious 
organizations will be held to unique and distinctive legal 
responsibilities. In discussing the duty of care that the Diocese of 
Manchester owed to its child parishioners, the New Hampshire 
Attorney General’s report cited with approval the decision in 
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.400 We 
 397. This equality-based argument to preserve the priest-penitent privilege has the same 
force with respect to victims or witnesses only so long as the state recognizes the attorney-
client privilege for those in the same position. For victims and witnesses, however, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel provides no floor under the attorney-client privilege, so states 
remain free to mandate reporting by lawyers and clergy when they learn of child abuse from 
persons other than the perpetrator. No states have mandated such reporting by lawyers, 
however, so the equality-based argument for exempting all communications protected by the 
priest-penitent privilege from mandatory reporting remains quite strong. 
 398. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061 
(2003). 
 399. The prospect of being charged with such a crime led the Diocese of Manchester, 
New Hampshire to acknowledge culpability and enter into an agreement with the state 
Attorney General. See NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. 
 400. 196 F.3d 409, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1999), cited in NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 5–6. 
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criticize Martinelli in Part IV.B.1, above, for its unreflective 
acceptance of the risk that a civil jury might rely on the religious 
character of an organization in the imposition of fiduciary duties,401 
and this criticism is similarly relevant to criminal prosecution. 
In the criminal context as well as in the civil, we think it is a 
constitutional mistake to derive such a duty and all of its legal 
consequences solely from the religious character of the association. 
Religions may differ widely in their internal sense of obligation of the 
community to its members, and courts should not impose a single, 
compulsory model of duty upon them all without more careful, 
individuated inquiry. The proper question to ask in this situation 
must be a religiously neutral one: Has the organization held itself 
out as being responsible for the care and protection of children who 
are involved in its activities? 
When the organization does so, duties of care to children follow. 
If, for example, a religious entity operates a youth ministry, 
children’s camp, or after-school sports program, the entity can fairly 
be said to assume a duty of care and protection towards the children 
enrolled. In these circumstances, parents and guardians trust their 
wards to the entity and its designated agents. If the entity assigns a 
known child abuser to a position of trust and responsibility toward 
children, it is fair to conclude that the entity has recklessly 
endangered a child toward whom it has a legal duty of protection. 
This result would be no different if the entity were a secular private 
school, camp, scouting program, or soccer league. 
In contrast, the law should not hold a religious community to 
the same legal duty to protect all children within the community 
from all persons who have some authority to speak for the group. 
Suppose a clergyman offers, disconnected from his official role within 
the faith community, to baby-sit for a parishioner’s child and then 
abuses that child. It is not reasonable, constitutionally or otherwise, 
to assign criminal liability for that abuse to the religious 
organization, even if its leaders knew of the clergyman’s proclivities. 
To hold otherwise is effectively to put the faith community under a 
mandatory duty to defrock the clergyman for his prior abuse, a duty 
which the state may not impose. 
 401. See supra notes 200–12 and accompanying text; see also Chopko, supra note 67, at 
1123–24. 
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Moreover, it would always seem unreasonable to impose such a 
duty in a comparable secular setting. If, for example, a university 
professor had been forcibly moved to emeritus status as a result of 
his sexually aggressive behavior with female students, we would not 
think that the university was under a legal duty to protect all women 
with whom the emeritus professor came into contact, even if the 
university had expressly permitted him the continued use of the 
emeritus title and he used the title to attract the attention of female 
students. The result should be no different if the organization from 
which the title is derived is religious rather than secular. As in the 
civil context, the Constitution precludes any concept of religiously 
distinctive liability or legal responsibility. 
Our final concern relates to the remedial surrender of 
ecclesiastical authority under the threat of criminal prosecution. The 
Phoenix plea agreement raises serious constitutional questions 
because it represents just such a surrender. The agreement requires 
the Bishop of the Diocese to cede final control to the Moderator of 
the Curia and the Youth Protection Advocate with respect to the 
internal handling of complaints of sexual abuse against clergy 
members.402 Issues of allocation of disciplinary authority over clergy 
are matters of church structure, and the state should not be dictating 
or involving itself in such arrangements. Because such arrangements 
implicate constitutional limits on state competence, the state should 
be forbidden from entering into them, whether or not the religious 
entity is willing to make such a deal. However tempting such an 
agreement may be, litigants or potential defendants may not waive 
violations of the Establishment Clause. Remedial provisions, no less 
than substantive norms or procedural mechanisms, are subject to the 
constitutional prohibition on state interference in matters of internal 
church governance.403 
 402. The agreement is available at http://maricopacountyattorney.org/Press/PDF/ 
catholic_church_rev.pdf. The New Hampshire agreement includes comparable degrees of 
official oversight into diocesan personnel practices. See NEW HAMPSHIRE AG REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 2. 
 403. Several courts have recognized the constitutional significance of remedies in cases 
involving clergy or other leaders of religious organizations. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of 
the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949–50 (9th Cir. 1999) (contrasting constitutional 
implications of compulsory reinstatement of clergy, which is constitutionally forbidden, with an 
order of back pay, which is not); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 852–54 (N.J. 2002) 
(same). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Religious institutions should have no sweeping immunities from 
any body of law, civil or criminal, dealing with any kind of 
misconduct. In most circumstances, courts should treat such 
institutions and their agents in the same manner as their secular 
counterparts. In some highly particularized legal contexts, however, 
the First Amendment may indeed limit the state’s decision-making 
bodies. The state may not impose unique legal responsibilities on 
religious bodies, expose such entities to an unreasonable risk of jury 
discrimination against them, or adjudicate the answers to questions 
that are internal to a religious community, including the crucial 
question of who may serve as a spokesperson for the faith. 
These First Amendment limitations leave the state with ample 
room to act when its concern is the protection of those who are 
especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation. The state may impose 
upon religious organizations responsibilities that are comparable to 
those borne by analogous secular entities: (1) to take appropriate 
precautions in assigning leaders to roles involving the risk of such 
sexual exploitation; (2) to report wrongdoing, unless knowledge of it 
arrives from a constitutionally protected relationship; and (3) to 
refrain from taking advantage of those who have reposed special trust 
and confidence in the organization’s leaders. 
When the state does impose such responsibilities, however, it 
must rely exclusively on organizational characteristics that find 
analogies in the secular world. Just as some judges may be tempted 
to overimmunize religious institutions, others will be inclined to 
hold religious entities to unique duties of care and loyalty. The 
Constitution counsels resistance to such biases in either direction. 
That humans are forever overexpecting qualities of virtue in their 
religious leaders and institutions should lead us neither to confer 
upon them distinctive rights nor to impose upon them distinctive 
legal responsibilities. In this recognition of the thoroughly 
undistinctive fallibility of all human institutions lies a measure of 
wisdom, constitutional and otherwise. 
 
 
